As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive? by Sternlight, Jean R.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 42 | Issue 1 Article 3
As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?
Jean R. Sternlight
Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2000), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol42/iss1/3
William and Mary
Law Review
VOLUME 42 No. 1, 2000
AS MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION MEETS THE CLASS




I. EXPLORING THE RELEVANT POLICY UNDERLYING BINDING
ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTIONS .................... 21
A. Law and Policy Underlying Binding Arbitration ...... 21
B. Law and Policy Underlying Class Actions ........... 28
1. Nature and Benefit of Class Actions .............. 28
2. Due Process Concerns Raised by Class Actions ...... 32
3. Criticisms of Class Actions ..................... 34
* Professor, University ofMissouri-Columbia School ofLaw; Senior Fellow, Center for the
Study of Dispute Resolution. I am grateful to the University of Missouri-Columbia School of
Law and to the Florida State University College of Law for their financial support. I
benefited greatly from comments on preliminary drafts received from Bob Bailey, Mark
Budnitz, Chris Drahozal, Phil Goldsmith, Tim Heinsz, Robert H. Kennedy, Cliff Palefsky,
Sylvia Lazos, JeffStempel, and Jim Westbrook. I am also very appreciative of the work done
by my research assistants at both Florida State and University of Missouri-Columbia: Brian
Beatte, John Devine, Karen Jordan, Michael Schmid, Yovannie Rodriguez Smith, and Todd
C. Werts.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
C. Pros and Cons of Classwide Arbitrations ............ 37
1. Purported Virtues of Classwide Arbitration ........ 38
2. Purported Failings of Classwide Arbitration ....... 44
a. The Securities Industry's Rejection of
Classwide Arbitration ....................... 45
b. Logistical Concerns ......................... 49
c. Due Process Concerns ........................ 52
II. THE CURRENT LAW: WHEN ARBITRATION MEETS
THE CLASS ACTION .................................... 53
A. Effects of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Upon Class Actions ............................. 54
1. Mandatory Binding Arbitration may be Imposed by
Contracts of Adhesion ......................... 55
2. No General Class Action Exemption from Arbitration.. 57
3. Specific Wording of Arbitration Clauses and
Relevant Rules ............................... 62
4. Recent Decisions Voiding Arbitration Agreements
that Prohibited Class Actions ................... 63
5. Class Actions Frequently are Ordered to Arbitration . 65
6. Class Actions in Arbitration .................... 66
a. Interpreting Silence in Agreements ............. 67
i. Classwide Arbitration Permitted ............ 67
ii. Classwide Arbitration Prohibited ............ 69
b. Agreements Addressing Class Actions ........... 72
i. Agreements Precluding Arbitral Class
Actions ................................ 72
ii. Agreements Allowing Class Arbitration ....... 74
B. Imposition of Binding Arbitration Subsequent to
Filing of Class Action ........................... 75
III. HOW COURTS SHOULD BE HANDLING THE MEETING OF
CLASS ACTIONS WITH BINDING ARBITRATION ........... 78
A. Using Existing Law to Preserve Plaintiffs' Rights to
Class Actions ............. .................... 79
1. Many Claims can be Brought Only as
Class Actions ................................ 80
2. The Importance of Agreement Language ........... 83
[Vol. 42:1
WILL THE CLASS ACTION SURVIVE?
a. Courts Should Not Interpret Silent Agreements as
Barring Class Arbitration .................... 84
b. The Growing Trend of Agreements Expressly
Prohibiting Class Action in any Venue ........... 90
3. Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements Precluding Class
Actions to Allow Litigation of Class Action Claims .. 91
4. Unenforceability of Arbitration Agreements Foreclosing
Class Actions in both Litigation and Arbitration ..... 92
a. Federal Statutory Arguments for
Unenforceability ............................. 93
i. Express Statutory Preclusion of
Class Action Waiver ....................... 96
ii. Legislative Intent and History as Precluding
Class Action Waiver ....................... 97
iii. Class Actions as Integral to Enforcement
of Statute ............................... 100
b. Unenforceability as a Matter of Contract Law .... 105
i. Unconscionability ........................ 105
ii. Other Contractual Claims and Defenses ...... 107
B. Parties'Ability to Elect Classwide Arbitration
Over Classwide Litigation ........................ 108
1. Possible Limitations on Parties' Choice of
Classwide Arbitration ......................... 109
a. Statutory Limits ........................... 109
b. Contractual Limits ......................... 109
c. Constitutional Limits ........................ 110
i. Due Process ............................. 110
ii. Court Protection of Due Process Rights ....... 111
iii. Raising Due Process Concerns in the
Instant Case ............................ 115
iv. Agreeing to Arbitration Should Not Waive
Due Process Rights ....................... 116
2. Likely Unpopularity of Classwide Arbitration ...... 117
C. How Courts Should Interpret Various
Arbitration Clauses ............................. 119
IV. A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM .................... 121
20001
4 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1
A. Legislation Precluding the Use of Arbitration
Clauses to Eliminate Class Actions ............... 121
B. Legislation Precluding the Use of
Classwide Arbitration ........................ 124
CONCLUSION ....................................... 125
20001 WILL THE CLASS ACTION SURVIVE?
INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that banks, insurance companies, and other
potential corporate defendants do not like class actions.' Today,
such potential defendants, in a broad array of industries, hope that
they have found a surreptitious way to defeat the feared class
action: mandatory binding arbitration.2 These companies and their
attorneys assert that they may use contracts of adhesion' to compel
consumers, employees, and others to arbitrate rather than litigate
their claims,4 and to require that such arbitration must proceed on
1. There are exceptions to this general rule. At times defendants are said to favor class
actions so that they can enter into favorable settlements with collusive plaintiffs' attorneys.
See Richard B. Schmitt, The Deal Makers: Some Firms Embrace the Widely Dreaded Class
Action Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1996, at Al (explaining that some corporations
welcome class actions in order to avoid future lawsuits); see generally DEBORAH R. HENSLER
ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRiVATE GAIN: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 15 (1999) (observing that in three often studied class actions, "from the moment
of filing, defendants seemed about as eager as plaintiff attorneys to settle the litigation
against them by means of a class action").
2. Several commentators have urged companies in various industries to adopt mandatory
binding arbitration, at least in part to avoid class actions. See, e.g., Edward Wood Dunham,
The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 142 (1997) (urging
franchisors to adopt binding arbitration); Alan S. Kaplinsky & MarkJ. Levin, Excuse Me, But
Who's the Predator? Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, BUS. L. TODAY, May-
June 1998, at 24, 24 [hereinafter Kaplinsky & Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the Predator?]
(discussing binding arbitration clauses in banking and consumer loans); Michael R.
Pennington, Every Health Insurer's Litigation Nightmare: A Case Study of How One Class
ActionAffected the Business of One Insurer, THE BRIEF, Summer 1999, at 47,52 (stating that
Alabama insurance companies are imposing binding arbitration clauses in an "effort to limit
litigation exposure in general, and exposure to class actions in particular"); J.T. Westermeir,
How Arbitration Clauses Can Help Avoid Class Action Damages, 14 COMPUTER L.
STRATEGIST, Sept. 1997, at 1 (discussing use of arbitration clauses by computer
manufacturers and internet service providers); John M. Flynt, Comment, A Solution to
Force-PlacedInsuranceLitigationForLenders:Disclosure andArbitration, 26 CUMB. L.REV.
537, 573 (1996) (proposing solutions to force-placed insurance). For examples of
correspondence showing that at least one arbitral organization has relied on the absence of
class actions in marketing its services to potential clients, see infra note 278.
3. By"contracts of adhesion" I simply mean contracts that are prepared in advance by the
drafter and imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Such contracts may be part of forms, or
may appear on the backs of tickets or boxes. Although some have attacked them as unfair,
and have argued that they should be presumptively unenforceable, see, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176-80 (1983),
most courts have held that the mere fact that a contract is adhesive does not mean that it
is void unless it is also unconscionable or unjust. See generally LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM
& ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559C (Supp. 1999) (discussing various
court determinations of what constitutes a contract of adhesion).
4. Courts are often quite willing to enforce arbitration clauses that are imposed as a
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an individual rather than class basis. Increasingly, potential
defendants are drafting arbitration clauses that explicitly bar class
actions, hoping that these will facilitate favorable court rulings.5
Thus far, it is not clear whether such strategies will work, at
least in the long term. This Article argues that it would be wrong
to allow companies to use arbitration clauses to insulate themselves
entirely from class action liability, and that courts and legislators
should take steps to protect access to class actions.
The companies and attorneys who seek to use arbitration to
eliminate class actions contend that plaintiffs, and especially their
attorneys, exploit the class action remedy as a way to extort unfair
settlements from innocent defendants.6 In an article aptly entitled
Excuse Me, But Who's the Predator?, attorneys Alan S. Kaplinsky
and Mark J. Levin state:
All of the dangers inherent in an individual consumer
lawsuit-the threats of costly and drawn-out litigation,
contract of adhesion. See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text; see also Jean 1&
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 33 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight, Rethinking] (stating that
many courts have held 'that the mere adhesive nature of a contract does not render it
invalid").
5. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 41, on file with author) (concluding that 16 of 34
arbitration clauses examined in a survey of clauses imposed by franchisors on franchisees
proscribed class actions in arbitral proceedings). In Zawikowski v. BeneficialNat'l Bank, No.
98-C 2178, 1999 WL 35304, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1999), the court noted that the company's
clause expressly prohibited the filing of a class action without the parties' consent, but did
not provide the wording of the clause in its decision. See id. at *2. A clause provided by
MBNA states, in part, "No Claim submitted to arbitration is heard by a jury and no Claim
may be brought as a class action or as a private attorney general. You will not have the right
to act as a class representative or participate as a member of a class of claimants with
respect to any Claim." An American Express clause states, in part, "There shall be no right
or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis or on bases involving
Claims brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of the general public, other
Cardmembers or other persons similarly situated; provided however, that the claimant's
individual Claim would be subject to this Arbitration Provision." A clause prepared by J.C.
Penney & Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia states, inter alia, "you will not have the
right to participate as a representative or member of any class of claimants pertaining to any
Claim subject to arbitration." A clause prepared by H&R Block states "No class actions are
permitted without the consent of the parties." (all clauses on file with author).
6. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text. This Article focuses on plaintiff rather
than defendant class actions, as these are by far the more prevalent, both generally and
specifically, in the arbitration context.
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runaway juries, gargantuan punitive damages awards and
adverse publicity- are magnified exponentially when a class of
hundreds or thousands of consumers is certified. Faced with
these threats, companies often feel pressured to pay substantial
amounts in settlement for reasons having nothing to do with
the actual merits of the dispute.7
This opposition to class actions is common to defendants in many
kinds of suits, but particularly includes defendants in mass tort
claims, securities fraud claims, and consumer claims.8 While class
action opponents have tried numerous legislative and other
strategies to limit or eliminate class actions in various arenas,
9
these measures have still left some defendants feeling vulnerable
to the class claim. As attorneys Kaplinsky and Levin put it:
"Consumers have been ganging up on banks. But now [referring to
binding arbitration] the institutions have found a way to defend
themselves."10
7. Kaplinsky & Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the Predator?, supra note 2, at 24. For a
general summary ofsome of the policy controversies surrounding class actions, see HENSLER
ET AL., supra note -1. See generally Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A
Psychological Theory, 67 U. CH1. L. REV. 163 (2000) (discussing psychological reasons why
defendants are likely to be far more interested in settling high-risk litigation than are
plaintiffs, and arguing that this disparity gives plaintiffs an advantage in the negotiation
process).
8. For example, Lew Goldfarb, Associate General Counsel to Daimler Chrysler Corp., has
stated that
Class action lawsuits should be used to resolve legitimate claims and not serve
as a rigged lottery for trial lawyers.... For too long, trial lawyers have been
exploiting class actions, turning these lawsuits into a form of legalized
blackmail. They launch frivolous cases because they believe that just the threat
of massive class actions filed in many states can coerce a company into
settlement.
Automaker Sues Attorneys for Filing "Frivolous" Class Actions, Andrews' Prof. Liab. Litig.
Rep., Jan. 2000, available in WL, File 9 No. 5 ANPLLR3; see also Mass Tort Litigation Fever
Running High: Practitioners Say There Is No Apparent Cure to This Societal Problem, ILL.
LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Illinois Legal Times File
(discussing the snowballing of mass tort class actions since the asbestos cases); Pennington,
supra note 2, at 52 (arguing that fraud class action brought against medical insurer Liberty
National had a severe and unfair detrimental impact on that company). For other articles
discussing allegedly exploitative lawsuits, see infra note 129.
9. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text for a briefdiscussion of proposed reforms
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 itself, and a discussion of securities and "tort reform"
legislation geared to limit plaintiffs' use of class actions.
10. Kaplinsky & Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the Predator?, supra note 2, at 24. In this
article Kaplinsky and Levin urge "Blenders that have not yet implemented arbitration
programs" to "promptly consider doing so, since each day that passes brings with it the risk
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When corporate defendants, their attorneys, arbitral organi-
zations, and other commentators sing the praises of arbitration to
the public at large, they generally do not highlight the impact of
arbitration on class actions. Instead, they make claims to the effect
that arbitration is quicker, cheaper, and better for all concerned,
and that consumers and employees will benefit just as much as will
the companies that are imposing the arbitration clauses." In
of additional multimillion-dollar class action lawsuits that might have been avoided had
arbitration procedures been in place." Id. at 28; see also Dunham, supra note 2, at 142 ("An
arbitration clause may not be an invincible shield against class action litigation, but it is
surely one of the strongest pieces of armor available to the franchisor."); Alan S. Kaplinsky
& Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause: Drafting and Implementation Issues
Which Should Be Considered by a Consumer Lender, 1102 PRACISING L. INsT. 513, 532
(1999) (stating that lenders "who in recent years have been assaulted by a barrage of
consumer class action lawsuits" should be interested in the fact that arbitrations are not
permitted to proceed on a class action basis); Alan S. Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class
Actions-A Contradiction in Terms, 1113 PRACTISING L. INST. 619 (1999) [hereinafter
Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions] (arguing that disputes which are arbitrable may
not proceed by way of class action, either in court or in arbitration, unless the arbitration
agreement expressly allows for arbitration); Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Drafting
and Implementing ofa ConsumerLoanArbitration Clause, 51 CONSUMERFIN. L.Q. REP. 295,
295 (1997) (stating that although lenders have recently been targeted by numerous class
action suits which they are frequently pressured to settle in order to avoid the threat of
costly and expensive litigation "having nothing to do with the actual merits of the dispute,"
arbitration can be a "powerful deterrent to frivolous lawsuits" in part because class actions
"usually are not permitted"); Westermeir, supra note 2, at 3 (suggesting that computer
manufacturers and internet service providers use contracts of adhesion-for example, in
enclosures, shrink-wrap, or Web-wrap-to impose arbitration agreements ontheir customers
in order to avoid class actions); Flynt, supra note 2, at 573 (urging that lenders who employ
"force-placed insurance," whereby buyers are compelled to purchase expensive insurance to
collateralize loans, require arbitration as a means of limiting class action challenges to such
programs); Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: 'You Can't Sue Us":Arbitration Clauses
Block Consumers from Taking Companies to Court, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at Al
[hereinafter Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print] (quoting an official at the arbitral organization
National Arbitration Forum as stating in a letter to a corporate attorney, "[tihe only thing
which will prevent 'Year 2000' class actions is an arbitration clause in every contract, note
and security agreement").
11. See, e.g., Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print, supra note 10, at Al (quoting American
Express spokeswoman Emily Porter as defending company's move to require customers to
arbitrate rather than litigate disputes against the company, stating that their purpose was
"to find an efficient and convenient way to resolve disputes more quickly than the court
system, which can be burdensome in time and money both for [the] company and [its]
customers"); Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?Arbitration Forum's Ruling Called
One-Sided, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at El [hereinafter Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?]
("Businesses such as First USA say that for everyone involved, arbitration is faster, more
efficient and cheaper than litigation."); Richard C. Reuben, Banking onADR, CAL. LAWYER,
Sept. 1992, at 17,18 [hereinafter Reuben, BankingonADR] (discussingtwo California banks'
adoption of mandatory arbitration programs with respect to customer claims and observing
that the banks have defended the programs as less expensive and time consuming than
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private, however, and in their own industry publications, defense
counsel and other arbitration advocates readily observe that
arbitration can be used to deter the filing of a class action suit, or
secure dismissal of a class action that was nonetheless brought.12
The potential defendants know that because many claims are not
viable if brought individually, plaintiffs will often drop or fail to
initiate claims once it is clear that class relief is unavailable.1 " The
potential defendants also believe that, should plaintiffs choose to
pursue individual claims in arbitration, defendants' exposure still
will be much lower than it would have been in class action
litigation. 4
litigation). Reuben quotes a bank official as stating that customers "Will have their
grievances addressed without having to pay the high court costs and attorneys fees." Id. He
also quotes the general counsel of a major arbitration organization as stating. "We find that
ADR is well-liked by both sides of most disputes, because it is quicker and less expensive
than litigation." Id. (quoting James J. Welsh, general counsel of JAMS).
12. See, e.g., Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions, supra note 10 (summarizing laws
that support the use of arbitration to eliminate class actions); Hal Davis, Banks Follow
Brokerages: Arbitrate Yes, Litigate No. Plaintiffs' Attorneys Say Forcing Consumers to
Arbitrate Disputes Will Eliminate ClassActions and Is Unfair, NATLL.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at
BI (quoting plaintiffs attorney and consumer advocate Patricia Sturdevant as stating that
the "real intent [behind Bank of America's adoption of mandatory binding arbitration of
customer claims] was to eliminate class action challenges"); Kaplinsky & Levin, Excuse Me,
But Who's the Predator?, supra note 2, at 24 ("[Llenders have discovered that the potential
for class action litigation is significantly reduced if the consumers have agreed to arbitrate
their disputes with the lenders."); Reuben, Banking onADR, supra note 11, at 18 (noting that
many critics of California banks' adoption of mandatory binding arbitration suggested that
the plans "are driven by an interest in short-circuiting high-stakes class action litigation and
hefty punitive-damage awards," and further observing that banks adopting such programs
"have recently been stung by multi-million-dollar court losses involving deposit fees and
credit card fees"). For a general discussion of the corporate strategy underlying the decision
by some banks and companies to impose mandatory binding arbitration, see RALPH NADER
&WESLEYJ. SIHTH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OFJUSTICE IN
ANERICA 300-08 (1996) (discussing Bank of America's collateral involvement in another
arbitration case in order to protect its stake in Badie v. Bank of America, No. 944916 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994), affd, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
13. Specifically, the named plaintiffs may drop their claims, and the non-named plaintiffs
may never file claims. See Dunham, supra note 2, at 142; see also Kaplinsky & Levin, Excuse
Me, But Who's the Predator?, supra note 2, at 26 ("Stripped of the threat of a class action,
plaintiffs' lawyers have much less incentive to sue."). Statistics produced by credit card
company First USA show that since it implemented its mandatory arbitration clause in early
1998, only four consumers have filed arbitration claims against the company. See Mayer, Win
Some, Lose Rarely?, supra note 11, at El. In contrast, First USA itself filed 51,622
arbitration claims against consumers in the same period. See id. Consumers' lawyers report
that the disparity is due to economics, in that consumer claims typically are not viable except
on a class basis. See id.
14. As one banker put it, "One outrageous $40 million verdict can sour your whole year."
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Attorney Edward Wood Dunham bluntly describes this strategy
in his article, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield.15 He
states:
The nine-figure jury verdict in the Meineke Discount Muffler
class action is a bracing reminder that franchising is full of
potentially catastrophic litigation risks. The verdict will almost
certainly spawn a new generation of class action suits against
franchisors, with particular emphasis on alleged mis-
management of franchisee advertising payments. Franchisors
with an arbitrationclauseintheirfranchise agreements have an
effective tool for managing these new class action risks.1"
He frankly goes on to explain:
Absent unusual circumstances . . . the franchisor with an
arbitration clause should be able to require each franchisee in
the potential class to pursue individual clainis in a separate
arbitration. Since many (and perhaps most) of the putative
class members may never do that, and because arbitrators
typically do not issue runaway awards, strict enforcement of an
arbitration clause should enable the franchisor to dramatically
reduce its aggregate exposure. 7
If successful, the strategy urged by Dunham and others would
permit any company that has an ongoing relationship with a
potential plaintiff-such as an insurer, manufacturer, cruise ship
or HMO-to use a contract of adhesion to require that person,
typically unknowingly, 8 to arbitrate rather than litigate, and to
Davis, supra note 12, at B1 (quoting Bank of America Assistant General Counsel Arne
Wagner).
15. See Dunham, supra note 2. Mr. Dunham is one of the attorneys who has represented
Doctor's Associates, the franchisor for Subway Sandwich shops, in a series of important
arbitration cases. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996)
(holding that the FAA preempted a Montana statute's notice requirement with respect to
arbitration clauses); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 139 (2d Cir. 1997)
(upholding injunctions against state courts to support arbitration); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding district court decision ordering arbitration
and granting preliminary injunction against state court); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77, 86 (D. Conn. 1996) (granting motion to compel arbitration
and issuing injunction to prevent state court litigation).
16. Dunham, supra note 2, at 141 (footnotes omitted).
17. Id.
18. Consumers and employees who become parties to arbitration agreements typically
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explicitly bar that person from proceeding by way of class action. 19
One might call this the "do it yourself" approach to law reform: the
company need not convince any legislature to pass revised laws, nor
persuade any judicial body to change court rules, but rather merely
choose to eliminate the pesky class action on its own. If companies
attempted to take direct and obvious legislative or even contractual
steps to eliminate class actions, they would likely encounter
substantial resistance, even in this era of "tort reform," from those
who credit class actions for many important achievements. By
contrast, using arbitration to eliminate class actions is
advantageous for class action opponents in part because it is
surreptitious.
In the most extreme version of this defense, some companies seek
to use arbitration to defeat class actions by issuing a mandatory
arbitration provision after the filing of the class action.2
Subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit that was designated as a
class action, but prior to the court's certification of the class,"
defendants in several cases have sought to impose binding
arbitration on the putative class members and then challenged the
have no idea that they are waiving their right to proceed by way of class action. See Joan
Lowy, Consumers Are Losing the Right To Sue Without Knowing It, Scripps Howard News
Service, May 2, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
19. Potential defendants who lack an ongoing relationship with the potential plaintiff,
such as those who may be sued in many personal injury suits, would not find it as easy to use
a binding arbitration agreement to evade a class action. For example, the Union Carbide
company could not feasibly have required all the residents of Bhopal, India to sign an
arbitration clause so that when the plant released poison gases the plaintiffs would lose their
right to pursue class relief. See generally In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, India, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 809 F.2d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 1987)
(describing facts of alleged toxic gas leak and granting dismissal of lawsuit based on forum
non conveniens).
20. They resort to this approach because, despite some defense attorneys' efforts to urge
all potential defendants to impose binding arbitration on their customers or employees prior
to the filing of a class action, some companies are not so farsighted. Full analysis of the
legitimacy of this post-filing attempt to impose arbitration exceeds the scope of this Article,
but it will briefly discuss the few decisions which have been issued in this area, all of which
have foreclosed the company from imposing binding arbitration after the fact. See infra notes
289-308 and accompanying text.
21. Until suits which have been filed as class actions actually have been certified to
proceed as a class, they are only "putative" class actions. This author is aware ofjust one
case in which, subsequent to certification of a suit as a class action, the defendant sought to
derail the suit by imposing binding arbitration on the class members. See H&R Block, Inc.
v. Haese, No. 13-97-673-CV, 2000 WL 924805, at *3-4 (Tex. App. June 29, 2000) (affirming
in relevant part trial court's order precluding defendant from imposing mandatory
arbitration, subsequent to certification of class action).
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legitimacy of the class suit on that basis.22 Still, courts have not yet
condoned this practice.2"
As one might expect, consumer and employee advocates have
vigorously opposed companies' attempts to use arbitration to
foreclose class actions, either before or after the filing of the
putative class action, arguing that class actions are imperative to
protect essential rights, and that companies should not be
permitted to use adhesion contracts to eviscerate this important
procedural mechanism. They observe that class actions historically
have proved critical to the protection of rights of employees,
consumers, medical patients, racial or ethnic minorities, and others
who lack the resources to litigate individual claims. 4 They urge
that using arbitration to eliminate class actions will relegate
22. See infra notes 289-308 and accompanying text. The practice has been publicly
endorsed by at least one defense attorney. See Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions,
supra note 10, at 639-40:
[T]here would seem to be no impediment restricting a credit card issuer from
implementing an arbitration program by sending change-in-terms notices to
members of the putative class. There would also seem to be no reason why an
issuer would need to disclose in its notice any pending putative class action
lawsuits. Finally, there would also seem to be no impediment restricting a
lender from including in a new closed-end loan an arbitration clause which
covers disputes which are the subject of a pending class action lawsuit which
has not been certified.
If few people opt-out of the change, the class action then may not be
certifiable based on its failure to satisfy the numerosity requirement. At a
minimum, the size of the class will be reduced.
Id. A bit later in the article, however, the author proposes a somewhat more conservative
approach, stating that in light of the fact that several courts have upheld challenges to
attempts to impose arbitration on putative class members, "a lender may want to carve-out
of its arbitration clause any claims asserted in any pending lawsuits, including class actions
which have not yet been certified." Id. at 642.
23. See infra notes 289-308 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding, in class action, that
school segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause); Youngbergv. Bank ofAm., 119 F.3d
6 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing class action brought against bank for overcharging $24 million
in transactional fees); Ridgewayv. Flagstar Corp., Nos. C 93-20202 JW, C 93-20208 JW, 1994
WL 525553, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1994) (approving $27 million consent decree in class
action brought against Denny's for failing to serve African American customers); Martarella
v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding, in class action, that detention facility
for persons in need of supervision violated the Eighth Amendment because the facility failed
to provide adequate rehabilitative programs); Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
97-L-114, 1999 WL 955543, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999) (approving jury verdict of over
$456 million in class action brought by State Farm customers who had been given nonfactory
authorized replacement parts). For discussion of the arguments made in defense of class
actions in further detail, see infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
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consumers and others to a forum in which they cannot achieve a
just result, and may potentially prevent such claimants from
pursuingvalid claims.25 Specifically, these plaintiffs' advocates urge
that many cases may not be resolved economically on an individual
basis, even though the defendant has allegedly engaged in illegal
conduct causing substantial economic harm to a group of persons.2 6
Thus, they assert that class actions must, at a minimum, be
permitted in arbitration, if not in litigation."
To support the point that some claims are viable only if brought
as class actions, defenders of class actions might cite numerous
cases that have already arisen in the arbitration context.28 For
25. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 12, at B1 (citing comments of Patricia Sturdevant, who
represented Californian Trial Lawyers Association and Consumer Action in a lawsuit
challenging the validity of arbitration for bank customers).
26. See, e.g., Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9 (Ala. 1998). The plaintiffs in this
case argued that individual damages were too small for individuals to justify paying a $500
arbitration fee. See id. at 19-20. The defendant was accused of fraudulently selling extended
service contracts on automobiles. See id. at 11.
27. See infra notes 135-95 and accompanying text (discussing virtues and failings of
classwide arbitration); infra notes 357-72 and accompanying text (suggesting that companies
should not be able to foreclose entirely the use of class actions in all cases).
28. It is easy to find other examples in addition to those discussed in the text. In
Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1997), the plaintiff class
challenged consumer finance practices which cost each class member approximately $15 per
year. See id. at 1415. Although the district court ordered arbitration and denied the plaintiffs'
right to proceed by way of class action either in litigation or in arbitration, see id. at 1425,
the Eleventh Circuit refused to enforce the arbitration clause on the ground that the clause's
allocation ofcosts violated the Truth in Lending Act. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.,
178 F.3d 1149, 1157-59 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (No. 99-1235).
Similarly, in Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 147 (Ct. -App. 1975), two
plaintiffs attempted to bring a class action for fraud and deceit against brokerage firm Drexel
Burnham on behalf of approximately 100,000 people who had purchased securities on margin
during a certain time period. See id. at 148-49. The court ordered that the class action be
resolved through arbitration, and failed to address the question of whether arbitration could
or should be resolved as a class action. See id. at 152-53. The two named plaintiffs alleged
that Drexel had improperly calculated interest charges, that they personally had been
'damaged in the amount of $266.82, and that the class as a whole had been overcharged in
excess of $1,000,000. See id. at 149. This certainly appears to be a case that would not and
could not have been brought, except as a class action. Even though the two named plaintiffs
were attorneys, see id. at 148, they likely would not have thought it worth their while to
pursue their own claims through arbitration to obtain a mere $133 apiece. Imagining the
lowest possible filing fees and arbitrator salaries, and the most seemingly simple facts and
law, only an independently wealthy attorney with lots of free time could afford to take on
such a claim. Understanding the magnitude of such fees, certainly each of us has chosen not
to file larger claims. Seegenerally Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'Y REV. 525, 534-60 (1980-81)
(presenting empirical evidence showing that persons choose to litigate only a very small
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example, in Lopez v. Plaza Finance Co.,29 the plaintiff filed a class
action alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), the
Illinois Consumer Installment Loan Act, and the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act. 0 Jeremias Lopez claimed that when he took out an
installment loan for $300 to purchase a television, he was also
forced to purchase nonfiling insurance for seven dollars, which was
not included in the finance charge. 1 The Lopez opinion does not
reflect whether the plaintiff sought return of the entire seven
dollars, or only a portion thereof. Either way, certainly few rational
plaintiffs or attorneys would seek individual relief on such a small
claim, whether through arbitration or litigation, even given the
possibility of recovering an additional $200 for statutory damages,
or costs and attorney fees.32 While recognizing that the plaintiff
would be unable to bring the claim without the class action, and
that this would mean plaintiffs' rights under TILA would go
unenforced,33 the federal district court nonetheless found this
ground insufficient to prevent it from ordering the dispute to
individual arbitration. 4 Similarly, in Med Center Cars, Inc. v.
percentage of what they perceive to be legitimate grievances). Even if the two attorneys in
Vernon had filed their own claims, at most they would have secured individual rather than
class relief. The company could have continued to pursue its arguably illegal course of action,
and benefited substantially. The public interestin compensatingvictims, deterringwrongful
conduct, and securing enforcement of the laws would be ill served.
29. No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL 210073, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 1996).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Litigants who would choose to file such actions would have to be very wealthy and also
quite driven by principle. For example, once credit card company First USA imposed binding
arbitration, just four consumers chose to bring arbitration claims. See Mayer, Win Some,
Lose Rarely?, supra note 11, at El.
33. See Lopez, 1996 WL210073, at *3.
34. See id. Even if one or two independently wealthy or fanatically committed persons
chose to bring such actions, despite the economic costs, TILA would be severely under-
enforced. A company will not be deterred from acting illegally when it knows that, at worst,
a handful of customers may bring an arbitration action seeking a refund of improper fees.
However, the Lopez court did refuse to enforce the arbitration clause on other grounds,
specifically that it was unconscionable because itwas nonmutual in that it preserved the
company's right to litigate claims arising out of the debtor's alleged default. See id at *3-6.
Cf Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264, 266 (D. Del. 1999) (refusing to compel
arbitration of claim brought under TILA on ground that doing so would violate the statute).
EDITOR'S NOTE: As this Article was going to press, the United States Court ofAppeals
for the Third Circuit reversed Johnson v. Tele-cash, Inc. in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank,
No. 00-5047 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 2000). The Third Circuit held that neither the TILA nor the
EFTA are inherently inconsistent with a contract that eliminates plaintiffs' right to proceed
in a class action. The court reasoned that plaintiffs' rights under the statutes were
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Smith, 5 named plaintiff Gregory Tapscott alleged that defendant
car dealers and insurance companies "had violated the Alabama
Mini-Code and had committed common law fraud by financing the
sale of automobile 'extended service contracts' as part of the
purchase of their automobiles, without including the cost of the
contracts in the 'finance charge' section of the sales documents."36
Plaintiffs sought classwide arbitration, observing that "actual
damages recoverable by each individual are too small tojustify the
cost of commencing an arbitration proceeding."17 Plaintiffs hoped
that if class arbitration were permitted, only the named plaintiffs,
and not each class member, would be required to pay the minimum
$500 arbitral filing fee. 8 Nonetheless, while recognizing that
plaintiffs' contentions were "practically appealing,"39 the Alabama
Supreme Court reversed the lower court and ordered plaintiffs to
proceed to arbitration on an individual basis.4"
It is rather amazing that, despite its clear importance, the
phenomenon of using arbitration to avoid class actions has received
scant public attention. It has not been focused upon in Congress,
in the popular press, or even among arbitration scholars.41 For
sufficiently protected by the right to proceed individually in arbitration, and by ihe
administrative enforcement mechanisms available under those Acts. The court also observed,
in dicta, that it "appears impossible" for class actions to be pursued in arbitration, but made
no ruling on this issue. However, the court did state that a different result might have been
reached if plaintiff had shown that the arbitral forum selected was inadequate to vindicate
his statutory rights, and the court also found that arbitration clauses can be struck down.as
unconscionable. It is also important to note that the Third Circuit recognized that Congress
has the power to prohibit use of arbitration agreements to eliminate class actions, even if it
did not do so under TILA or EFTA. This decision will no doubt focus further attention on the
issues raised in this Article.
35. 727 So. 2d 9 (Ala. 1998).
36. Id. at 11.
37. Id. at 19-20. While the court does not specify the amount of each plaintiffs alleged
injury, certainly it must have been quite small in dollar terms in that it represented only a
portion of the finance charge on what would have been a several hundred dollar transaction.
38. See id. at 20.
39. Id.
40. The court held:
While we can understand and applaud the efforts of the trial court to seek a
method that would allow those parties claiming small amounts of individual
damages to obtain a remedy, we are persuaded by the federal authority on this
issue and hold that class-wide arbitration should not be permitted in this case.
Id.
41. The few law review articles directly addressing this phenomenon are no longer
entirely current. See Note, Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural
Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV. 787, 814 (1981) [hereinafter Quagmire] (suggesting that class
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example, the relationship between class actions and binding
arbitration has not been addressed in the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA) 42 or in the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA7). 4 Similarly,
no state arbitration statute contains specific provisions dealing with
the treatment of class actions. 4 Significantly, however, the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, recently adopted by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), 45
indicates in its draft Reporter's notes that where arbitration
provisions use the elimination of class actions to undermine
consumer rights, it may be appropriate for courts to deny enforce-
ment of the clause.46
arbitration is feasible, and that allowing such claims is the best means of protecting all
relevant policy interests); Daniel R. Waltcher, Note, Classwide Arbitration & 10b-5 Claims
in the Wake of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 380,403-
05 (1989) (arguing that securities class actions should be allowed to proceed by way of
arbitral class action, and advocating a model whereby the court would certify the class and
then allow the arbitrator to manage the class action). For a brief but current analysis, see
Georgene M. Vairo, Classwide Arbitration: The Possibility of a Hybrid Procedure, ADR
CURRENTS, June 1999, at 19, 19-22 (concluding that contractual clause which either allows
or disallows arbitral class action should be honored, summarizing conflicting cases regarding
proper interpretation of silent clauses, and suggesting that those seeking to avoid class
actions should draft a clause in order to accomplish that goal).
42. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1994)).
43. 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
44. I base this statement on an analysis of all 50 states' arbitration statutes. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1290 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-
682.22 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-23 (West 1999 & Supp.
2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7501-7514 (Consol. 1988 & Supp. 1999); TEx. CIrv. PRAC. &REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 171.001-171.023 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
45. The Act was adopted at the NCCUSL Annual Conference, July 28-Aug. 4, 2000. See
National Conference ofComm'rs on Unif. State Laws, UniformArbitrationAct (2000) (visited
Aug. 4, 2000), <http'/www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arb00ps.pdf>.
46. The draft Reporter's notes to section 10, governing Consolidation, contains the
following:
[Clourts might closely scrutinize anti-consolidation provisions in adhesion
contracts. There is evidence that a growing number of arbitration provisions in
standardized consumer services agreements purport to prohibit class actions or
consolidation. See Christopher R. Drahozal, UnfairArbitration Clauses 2001 U.
Ill. L. Rev. (manuscript at 41). In some cases, such provisions may effectively
undermine consumers' rights by making the relative cost of arbitrating or of
securing effective legal representation cost-prohibitive. In such cases, it maybe
appropriate for a court to refuse to enforce the term prohibiting class actions or
consolidation under Section 4(a) and 6(a) of this Act. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tele-
Cash, Inc., 82 F.Supp2d 264 (D.De. 1999) (sic) (court refuses to require
arbitration of claims because it would deprive plaintiffs of right to use class
actions in contravention ofcongressional intent under Truth in LendingAct and
Electronic Funds Transfer Act); Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d
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Moreover, few cases deal with the questions that arise when class
actions must be reconciled with binding arbitration, although it is
possible that the Supreme Court will address the issue this term in
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph.47 While the class action
issue is not among the "questions presented" set out by the Court
in Green Tree,48 and while it was not addressed in the decision
issued by the Eleventh Circuit,49 the district court opinion did reject
plaintiffs' argument that their claim under TILA was exempt from
arbitration because it was brought as a class action.5° Further, the
issue has been briefed already by the Petitioners-although they
note that the Court need not reach the argument 5 1 -and by
respondants and some amici.52 Still, it is rather unlikely that the
916 (Cal. App. 1999) (sic) (arbitration clause voided as unconscionable, in part,
because it deprives arbitrator of authority to hear classwide claim); Powertel v.
Bexley, 743 So.2d 570 (Fla.App.1999) (court refuses to enforce arbityration
clause because of its retroactive application to claim and because it was
unconscionable to deprive plaintiff of opportunity to proceed by way of class
action); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory BindingArbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the ClassAction Survive?, 42 William & Mary L. Rev., issue #1 (due
out in October, 2000) (sic).
National Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Proposed Revisions of the Uniform
ArbitrationAct, DraftforApproval 36-37 (lastvisitedAug. 24,2000) < http//www.law.upenn.
eduibll/ulcluarbal arb0500.pd6
47. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120
S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (No. 99-1235).
48. See 68 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Apr. 4,2000) (No. 99-1235). The questions presented are:
(1) Did court of appeals err in concluding that order compelling arbitration and
dismissing lawsuit's underlying claims is "final decision with respect [to] an
arbitration" appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3)?
(2) Did court of appeals err in concluding that arbitration provision that was
"silent" on issue of costs and fees was unenforceable under Federal Arbitration
Act because risk that plaintiff "might" be required to bear unknown costs and
fees potentially undermined her ability to vindicate statutory rights?
Id.
49. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1157-59. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of a motion to compel arbitration, concluding that because the arbitration clause failed
to allocate fees among disputants, it failed to guarantee plaintiff could "vindicate her
statutory rights' under the TILA and was unenforceable. See id.
50. See 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1418-19 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
51. See Brief of Petitioners, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph (U.S. June 8, 2000) (No.
99-1235), available in 2000 WL 744132, at *42-43.
52. See Brief of Respondent, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph (U.S. July 24,2000) (No.
99-1235), available in 2000 WL 1086800, at *39-45; Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States ofnAmerica as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Green Tree Fin. Corp.
v. Randolph (U.S. June 8, 2000) (No. 99-1235), available in 2000 WL 744157, at *6-29; Brief
Amici Curiae of AARP and the National Consumer Law Center in Support of Respondent,
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Court will reach out to decide this issue. First, one of the questions
the Court is considering is whether it was appropriate for the
Eleventh Circuit to consider an appeal from the district court's
grant of the motion to compel arbitration."3 If the Court decides the
appeal was not appropriate, it presumably would not go on to
consider whether the district court erred. Second, even if the Court
determines that the appeal was permissible, it likely would not
choose to decide a question that was not addressed by the appellate
court and thus not adequately developed in the record.'
In previous decisions the U.S. Supreme Court has made no
definitive rulings in the area, but Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.55 contains some relevant dicta.56 While confusing, this
dicta seems to state that the Court would not necessarily be
troubled by an arbitration clause that effectively required an age
discrimination plaintiffto resolve a dispute on an individual basis,57
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph (U.S. June 24,2000) (No. 99-1235), available in 2000 WL
1014563, at *19-24.
53. See supra note 48.
54. In similar circumstances the Court has declined to address issues falling outside the
questions presented. See, e.g., Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1999)
(declining to address issues for which certiorari was not granted, and also noting that the
claims were not "sufficiently developed" in the lower court); National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470 (1999) (refusing to "decide in the first instance issues not
decided below").
55. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
56. Plaintiff, who brought suit under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
argued that the unavailability of class action procedures in arbitration was one reason the
Court should not compel him to arbitrate. See id. at 32. The Court's rejection of the argument
is dicta because the Court found that plaintiff was wrong on the facts, stating that the New
York Stock Exchange Rules provide for "collective" proceedings. See id. The Court seemingly
assumed that NYSE "collective proceedings" were equivalent to class actions. Although this
premise may be false, in that collective or consolidated proceedings are quite different from
the representative suit that allows a few named plaintiffs to carry the brunt of plaintiffs'
burden, it apparently does form the basis for the Court's holding. See id. A second decision,
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), failed to address the issue of whether courts
may allow class arbitrations to proceed, instead ruling that the Court lacked jurisdiction to
address the issue given the context of the case. See id. at 7-9 (observing that because
Southland did not argue in state court that federal law preempted state law class action
arbitration procedures, and because the California Supreme Court did not pass on thatissue,
the Supreme Court "[was] without jurisdiction to resolve this question").
57. Specifically, the Court opined that "even if the arbitration could not go forward as a
class action or class relief could not be granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA
provides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does not mean that individual
attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (alteration in
original) (quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J.,
dissenting)). This language will be examined and critiqued later in the Article. See infra
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at least where classwide relief would be available through the
EEOC.58
Even those few lower court cases that address the issue directly
provide mixed results. In several cases defendants have proved
successful in using pre-dispute arbitration agreements to eliminate
the class remedy.59 While courts have not thus far allowed
companies to impose arbitration after the filing of a class suit,6 0
several have implicitly accepted the idea that consumers,
employees, and others can be deprived entirely of the opportunity
to proceed by way of class action.6' On the other hand, two courts
have recently found that the use of arbitration to eliminate the
class action remedy can be unconscionable.6 2 in addition, a third
court has refused to apply an arbitration clause to claims brought
under the Truth in Lending Act and the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act, reasoning that because the clause would deprive plaintiffs of
the opportunity to proceed by way of class action, it was in-
consistent with those statutes.6 3
This Article offers a comprehensive analysis of how the con-
fluence of arbitration and class actions has been and ought to be
notes 414-17 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the language cited by the Supreme Court
is itself dicta, in that Judge Becker concluded in his dissent that "arbitrations may in fact go
forward as class actions." Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 240 (Becker, J., dissenting).
58. The Court noted "it should be remembered that arbitration agreements will not
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief." Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 32. Note, however, that subsequent to Gilmer, several appellate courts have
issued decisions holding that, regarding an individual who has signed an agreement to
arbitration, the EEOC maynotpursue damages claims on thatindividual's behalf. See EEOC
v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999) (barring the EEOC from seeking
"make whole" relief; EEOC v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 301-03 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that an arbitration agreement precludes the EEOC from seeking purely monetary.
relief). But see EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448,459-68 (6th. Cir. 1999)
(holding that neither the FAA nor principles of preclusion limit the EEOC's right to pursue
all remedies, even where employee agreed to arbitration).
59. See infra notes 211-25, 262-81 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 289-308 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 262-81 and accompanying text.
62. See Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 919-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding unconscionable a mandatory arbitration clause imposed on employees, in part
because the clause deprived employees of the opportunity to bring class actions); Powertel
v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to enforce arbitration
clause imposed on consumer by phone company in part because elimination of class action
remedy contributed to unconscionability). For further discussion of the unconscionability
argument, see infra notes 420-27 and accompanying text.
63. See Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264, 266 (D. Del. 1999). For more
discussion of this case, see infra notes 385-99 and accompanying text.
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addressed. In doing so, it attempts to clarify and distinguish crucial
legal and policy issues that too frequently have been blurred or
ignored by the few courts and commentators that have begun to
address these questions. Specifically, this Article considers the
implications of contractual doctrines, federal statutory provisions,
and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution for courts' handling
of arbitrations and class actions.
The basic array of options facing courts is straightforward.
Assuming that the traditional prerequisites for a class action have
been met,6 courts have four choices: (1) order the dispute to be
resolved in an individualized arbitration, thereby denying plaintiffs
either a litigation or arbitration venue for their class claims; (2)
refuse to mandate arbitration, and instead allow plaintiffs to
litigate their class claims; (3) order that the dispute be resolved
through an arbitral class action, also known as classwide
arbitration; or (4) order the dispute to arbitration but allow the
arbitrators to make the determination as to whether the dispute
should be resolved individually or on a class basis.
After exploring the relevant legal and policy arguments, this
Article makes four major points. First, it concludes that federal
statutes and contractual doctrines, particularly unconscionability,
will sometimes, but not always, bar companies from entirely
precluding plaintiffs from proceeding by way of class action. To
determine whether the wholesale elimination of class actions is
proscribed by statute or contractual doctrines, courts will need to
examine the language of the arbitration agreement, the text of
relevant statutes, the provisions of state contract law, and the
feasibility of pursuing the suit on a nonclass basis. Second, this
Article argues that while parties may elect to pursue their claims
in classwide arbitration rather than through class action litigation,
the Due Process Clause, federal statutes, and contractual doctrines
will constrain this choice. Courts may not compel and should not
permit classwide arbitration when the due process rights of class
members would be jeopardized. Third, courts should interpret
64. In federal court, one or more persons may sue or be sued as representatives of a larger
group only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See FED.
R. CIrv. P. 23(a).
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arbitration clauses that do not expressly deny the availability of
class actions to permit classwide arbitrations. Fourth, to the extent
that courts do not step in to prevent companies from using
mandatory arbitration clauses to eliminate class actions, Congress
should enact legislation to protect the use of this important
procedural device.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I examines the law and
policy underlying arbitration, class actions, and arbitral class
actions. Part II then summarizes the decisions courts have issued
in cases involving arbitration and class actions.65 Next, Part III
advises courts on how they ought to be analyzing these issues,
focusing particularly on the policies underlying both class actions
and arbitration. Finally, Part IV alerts Congress to the possible
need for legislative action in order to protect the pivotal class
action.
I. EXPLORING THE RELEVANT POLICY UNDERLYING BINDING
ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTIONS
Because existing statutes offer no explicit guidance on how to
reconcile class actions and arbitration, courts and legislators
inevitably will turn to policy arguments as they attempt to resolve
the clash between these competing procedural devices. Inter-
estingly, binding arbitration and class actions share a few
attributes: both are intended to be efficient; both are claimed by
their supporters to be fair; and both have been attacked rather
viciously for being unfair and not serving the public interest. This
section will quickly explore the law and policy underlying each
technique in order to examine whether and how it might be possible
to protect the interests that are served by each device.
A. Law and Policy Underlying Binding Arbitration
Supporters of binding arbitration have long praised the technique
for purportedly being quicker and cheaper than litigation, for
65. For purposes of completeness, Part H will briefly summarize the cases in which
defendants have sought to impose arbitration after the filing of a class action. Parts I, II,
and IV will not address these issues for two reasons. First, to date, courts have been united
in rejecting defendants' attempt to impose arbitration after the fact. Second, these'cases
involve entirely different bodies of law than those discussed in the rest of this Article.
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allowing disputants to select decisionmakers with special expertise,
and for allowing parties to design a dispute resolution process that
best serves their needs.66 Recognizing these potential benefits,
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act 7 ("FAA) in 1925 so
that businesses would have the capability of entering into binding
agreements to resolve future disputes through binding arbitration.68
Where parties have contracted to arbitrate a dispute, this statute
requires courts to compel arbitration and to stay litigation 9 unless
the arbitration clause at issue is void according to standard contract
law principles.70
The Supreme Court, while initially reluctant to mandate binding
arbitration in contexts in which it felt the technique might be
contrary to the public interest,7' has now become an extremely
66. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 234 (3d ed. 1999) (noting theoretical advantages of
arbitration); Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at
3, 6 ("[Iln terms of cost, time, and human wear and tear, arbitration is vastly better than
conventional litigation for many kinds ofcases."); DwightGolann, Developments in Consumer
Financial Services Litigation, 43 BuS. LAW. 1081, 1091 (1988) (arguing that arbitration is
potentially faster, cheaper, and more private for all parties). See generally Edward Brunet,
Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39
(1999) (arguing that the traditional, or "folklore," form of arbitration, characterized by
informality, speed, and low cost, is being replaced by a form in which parties draft provisions
often calling for complex and expensive procedures).
67. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1994)).
68. For an excellent history of the circumstances leading to passage of the FAA, see IAN
R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 3-83 (1992). For an argument asserting that although Congress
intended to help businesses enter into enforceable arbitration agreements, it never intended
to allow a business to force its customers or employees to arbitrate, see Jean R. Sternlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 644-49 (1996) [hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea].
69. Sections 3 and 4 of the statute provide the mechanisms for stays of litigation and for
motions to compel arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1994).
70. Section 2 provides that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." Id. § 2.
71. In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), a 7-2 majority of the Court interpreted the
Securities Act of 1933 to preclude a brokerage firm from requiringits customers to arbitrate
disputes, reflecting a concern that arbitration was desirable only if it was genuinely
consented to and served the public interest. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), held that an employee whose union contract contained an arbitration clause could
bring a statutory race discrimination claim in court, even if he had already lost that claim
in arbitration. For a discussion of Wilko, Gardner-Denver, and subsequent cases limiting the
use of the FAA in the civil rights context, see Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 68, at 652-55.
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strong advocate of binding arbitration.72 In decision after decision
since 1983, 7" the Court has praised the technique, stated it is
"favored," and ensured that arbitration clauses will be enforced in
a vast array of situations.74
At the same time, courts, arbitral organizations, and com-
mentators7 5 have increasingly recognized that companies can
72. For a discussion of the evolution of the Supreme Court's thought process regarding
arbitration, see id. at 644-74. The growth in the Court's enthusiasm for binding arbitration
paralleled Chief Justice Burger's statements that binding arbitration might be used to
decrease the burdens on an overloaded judiciary. See Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000
AD.-ANeedforSystematicAnticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83,93-96 (1976); Warren E. Burger, Isn't
There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 277 (1982); Burger, supra note 66, at 4-6; see also
William H. Rehnquist, A Jurist's View of Arbitration, 32 ARB. J. 1, 3-4 (concluding that
arbitration is less costly than litigation).
73. In Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the Court
enunciated, for the first time, the concept that arbitration serves the public interest and
should thus be favored:
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration .... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as
a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation ofwaiver, delay, or
a like defense to arbitrability.
Id. at 24-25.
74. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1996) (reversing a
Montana Supreme Court decision that refused to enforce an arbitration clause for-failure to
comply with Montana's statutory notice requirement, and further holding that the statute
was preempted by the FAA); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,281 (1995)
(holding that the FAA applies to the full extent of Congress' permitted regulation under the
Commerce Clause); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing
federal policy favoring arbitration in holding that claims brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act may be required to be arbitrated); Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (taking note of federal policy
favoring arbitration in holding that federal securities fraud claims may be required to be
arbitrated); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,227 (1987) (holding
that securities fraud and RICO claims can be arbitrated, and stating that in light of federal
favoritism toward arbitration, tlhe burden is on the party opposing arbitration... to show
that Congress intended to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue'); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)
(stating that while "the parties' intentions control... those intentions are generously
construed as to issues of arbitrability"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984)
(holding that the FAA applies in state as well as federal court, and that it preempts
conflicting state statutes).
75. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in
American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1955-67 (1996) (arguing that the institution of
arbitration is being exploited in ways detrimental to justice); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 S. CT. REV. 331, 401 (1996) (concluding that
Supreme Court's arbitral jurisprudence allows "birds ofprey" to "sup on workers, consumers,
shippers, passengers, and franchisees"); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect
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sometimes use arbitration clauses abusively to achieve unfair
advantages over consumers, employees, or others.76 Courts have
thus refused to enforce particularly egregious arbitration
clauses on such grounds as unconscionability," lack of considera-
Big Business: Employee and Consumer Right Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration,
1997 WIs. L. REv. 33, 36 (stating that the "Supreme Court has created a monster");
Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 68, at 641-44 (arguing that as a matter of both legislative
history and public policy, it is inappropriate for courts to apply a preference for arbitration
over litigation when interpreting arbitral contracts of adhesion imposed on customers,
employees, franchisees, or other "little guys"); Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 10-14
(urging that courts' preference for arbitration over litigation at times violates constitutional
rights to jury trial, to an Article III judge, and to due process).
76. See generally Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 68, at 680-86 (discussing the economic
incentives which may lead companies to draft unfair arbitration clauses). Moreover, it is not
at all clear that imposing binding arbitration makes it easier for consumers to state their
claims against a company. See Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?, supra note 11, at El (stating
that in the period since credit card company First USA imposed binding arbitration, the
process was used 51,622 times by the company to state claims against consumers, and only
four times by consumers to state claims against the company).
77. See Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 837-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999)
(refusing to enforce arbitration clause in which debtor/auto purchaser would be required to
pay the costs of arbitration, partly on ground of unconscionability); Hooters of Am., Inc. v.
Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614 (D.S.C. 1998) (holding arbitration clause unconscionable in
part because employee was "stripped of numerous substantive remedies under Title VII [in
that] . . . compensatory damages, backpay relief, frontpay relief, punitive damages, and
attorney's fees are either eliminated or substantially curtailed. . . " and also because
procedural rules were biased against the employees and in favor of the company because the
company had total control over the selection of arbitrators, employees had severely limited
discovery, and witness disclosure and sequestration were one-sided), affd on other grounds,
173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that employer had breached arbitration agreement by
issuing biased rules); Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft Employees Fed. Credit Union, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 763, 766-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (voiding, as substantively unconscionable, clause
which shortened statute of limitations, allowed employer to continue to seek judicial relief,
and severely limited employee's discovery rights), review granted and opinion superseded,
978 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1999), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 990 P.2d 504 (Cal. 1999);
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 266-68 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding unconscionable arbitration clause that limited plaintiffs' remedies
to wages lost between date of discharge and date of arbitration, but severing that remedial
restriction rather than voiding the entire arbitration clause), review granted and opinion
superseded, 973 P.2d 51 (Cal. 1999); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 150-52
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding unconscionable contract which, inter alia, precluded plaintiff
from recovering damages other than actual damages for breach of contract); Patterson v. ITT
Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to enforce
arbitration clause imposed by a financing organization upon California consumers which
required arbitration to be heard in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and required plaintiffs to pay
substantial filing fees, and further observing that procedures that might be fair as applied
to business entities are not necessarily fair as applied to consumers); Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 246 A.D. 2d 246,252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding unconscionable, on ground of
cost, clause which both required computer purchasers to arbitrate disputes in Chicago and
also required arbitration according to the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce,
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tion,78 or on the ground that the clause is inconsistentwith the partic-
ular statute under whichthe plaintiffs'claimisbrought. 9 In making
which impose high administrative costs).
78. See, e.g., Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding arbitration clause invalid in which current employee was required to sign
clause providing for arbitration of future claims butwas not given any compensation or other
consideration in return and further holding that continued employment alone did not
constitute adequate consideration); cf Michalski v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 634,
636-37 (7th Cir. 1999) (refusing to void arbitration agreement imposed upon existing
employee for lack of consideration on the ground that company agreed to be bound by
arbitration process, even though employee but not employer was required to arbitrate
claims).
79. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 1158 (11th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (No. 99-1235) (refusing to compel arbitration of claims
brought under Truth in Lending Act because clause failed to specify allocation of costs, and
court therefore feared that plaintiffs burden of costs might be so high as to render claim not
feasible); Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230,1234-35 (10th Cir.
1999) (denying employer's motion to compel arbitration of claims under Title VII, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act where
employee was required to pay half of arbitrator's fee, because that requirement denies
employee an effective and accessible alternative forum to litigation); Paladino v. Avnet
Computer Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 1054,1059-60 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusingto compel arbitration
of Title VII claims because clause did not clearly cover noncontractual claims and arbitrator
was only permitted to award contract damages); Cole v. Burns Int' Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d
1465, 1467-69 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that a race discrimination claim brought under Title
VII was arbitrable only if the employer paid the cost of the arbitration and a meaningful
opportunity to appeal was afforded); see also Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211
F.3d 306, 314-15 (6th Cir. 2000) (expressing doubts that the particular arbitral forum wai
sufficient to allow for enforcement of claims under FLSA, and holding clause unenforceable
on contractual ground that provider's promise of arbitral forum was "fatally indefinite"). The
above decisions, which void onlyparticularly unfair arbitration clauses under a given statute,
are distinct from other cases in which the Ninth Circuit has held that claims under certain
statutes are never subject to mandatory arbitration, or that such arbitration is acceptable
only if entered"knowingly." See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182,1189-
90 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 precluded employer from using pre-dispute arbitration agreements to compel employee
to arbitrate Title VII claims because the employee was not given the choice of whether to
accept arbitration); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 758, 763 (9th Cir.
1997) (refusing to enforce agreement to arbitrate ADA claim because, although the employee
signed an acknowledgment that he had received an Employee Handbook, and although the
Handbook contained a provision describing the grievance process as "sole and exclusive
procedures for the processing and resolution of any problem," the employee did not
"knowingly waive his statutory rights to a judicial forum). Other courts have refused to go
this far, while remaining open to the case-by-case challenge. See, e.g., Hooters, 173 F.3d at
937 (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not bar all mandatory arbitration but
affirming the district court's refusal to compel arbitration because of the terms of clause);
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1999)
(stating that "neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history demonstrates an
intent in the 1991 CRA to preclude pre-dispute arbitration agreements," but nonetheless
holding the clause unenforceable due to lack of notice).
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such fairness determinations courts have been particularly con-
cerned with those aspects of arbitration clauses that would, as a
practical matter, preclude plaintiffs from pursuing their claims or
deprive them of remedies provided by statute. Such terms have
included high filing fees and costs, distant locations, and explicit
limitations on available relief. o As well, several of the key
arbitration organizations have adopted "due process protocols,"81
attempting to distinguish between fair and unfair arbitration
agreements, and have stated that they will not assist in enforcing
those agreements which fail to comply with the protocols.82 These
80. See supra notes 77-79.
81. Three Due Process Protocols have been drafted under the auspices of the American
Arbitration Association: Due Process Protocol for Employment Disputes [hereinafter
Employment Protocol]; Consumer Due Process Protocol [hereinafter Consumer Protocol]; and
the Commission Health Care Dispute Resolution Draft Final Report [hereinafter Health
Protocol]. These protocols, however, are in different stages of adoption. The Employment
Protocol, dated May 9,1995, has been adopted by many organizations including the AAA, the
ABA Section on Labor and Employment, the National Academy of Arbitrators, and the
National Employment Lawyers Association. See ABA LAB. & EMP. L. NEWSL. (Winter 1996).
The Consumer Protocol, datedApril 17,1998, was drafted bypersons designated by avariety
of governmental, arbitral, and consumer organizations, but to this author's knowledge has
not been adopted officially by such organizations. The Health Protocol, dated July 27, 1998,
was drafted by representatives of the AAA, the ABA, and the AMA. This Protocol goes the
furthest, in that its Recommendation 3 permits only post-dispute agreements to binding
arbitration in disputes involving patients. It has been adopted by the ABA. See AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, REPORT 114, at 4 (Feb. 8, 1999). All of
the protocols are available online at http'//www.adr.org/protocol.html. Several courts have
looked to the protocols in attempting to rule on whether they should compel arbitration
according to a particular agreement. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,
1483-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F.
Supp. 190, 208 (D. Mass. 1998) (relying in part on Employment Protocors requirement that
parties have a role in selecting arbitral in refusing to compel arbitration where this
requirement was not met), affd on other grounds, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); Hooters ofAm.,
Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 598-601 (citing extensively testimony alluding to
Protocols to support conclusion that clause was void for unconscionability and other reasons),
affd on other grounds, 173 F.3d 933, 937 (4th Cir. 1999). Organizations other than the AAA
have also adopted special fairness protocols. For example, JAMS publishes a fairness protocol
concerning financial services arbitration on its website. See JAMS Minimum Standards of
Procedural Fairness Policy on Financial Services Arbitrations (visited Aug. 25, 2000)
<http'//www.jamsadr.con/finminimum-stds.asp>. Similarly, the National Arbitration
Forum (NAF) also makes available a fairness protocol. SeeArbitration Bill ofRights (visited
Aug. 25, 2000) <http'//www.arbforum.com/otherrmdex.html>. Nonetheless, the neutrality of
the NAF has been challenged in litigation involving First USA. See Mayer, Win Some, Lose
Rarely?, supra note 11, at El (recounting allegations that NAF procedures are biased in favor
of First USA, which is NAFs largest client); cf. Marsh v. First USA Bank, NA, 103 F. Supp.
2d 909, 924-26 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that National Arbitration
Forum is biased based on its ongoing financial relationship with defendant).
82. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Behind the Neutral: A Look at Provider Issues: Due
20001 WILL THE CLASS ACTION SURVIVE?
protocols mandate that a fair process should provide that partic-
ipants should be assured adequate choice of representative,83 that
fees and costs should not be excessive,8 that some discovery is
desirable,"5 and that neutrals should be skillful and impartial and
apply relevant law."
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that its "favoritism" or
"preference" for arbitration must be tempered by other factors. It
has stated that as arbitration is a creature of contract, parties
should not be compelled to arbitrate disputes they have not agreed
to arbitrate.8 7 As well, the Court has recognized that agreements
which are not sufficiently clear will not be enforceable,8 8 and that,
at least in the collective bargaining context, it may be inappropriate
to apply a presumption in favor of arbitrability to statutory as
opposed to contractual issues.8 9
Process Protocol Protects ConsumerRights, 1102 PRACTISINGL. INST. 813,823 (1999) ("If the
AAA determines that a particular consumer dispute resolution program substantially and
materially deviates from the minimum standards of the protocol, it will decline to administer
cases under the program.").
83. See Consumer Protocol, supra note 81, at Principle 9; Employment Protocol, supra
note 81, at B1; Health Protocol, supra note 81, at Principle 6.
84. See Consumer Protocol, supra note 81, at Principles 6 & 7; Employment Protocol,
supra note 81, at B2.
85. See Consumer Protocol, supra note 81, at Principle 13; Employment Protocol, supra
note 81, at B3; Health Protocol, supra note 81, at Principle 7.
86. See Consumer Protocol, supra note 81, at Principles 3-4; Employment Protocol, supra
note 81, at C1-6; Health Protocol, supra note 81, at Principles 4 & 5.
87. See First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,942 (1995) (stating that"a party who
has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court's decision about the merits
of its dispute" and holding that parties may choose whether a court or an arbitrator
determines arbitrability); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52,57-64
(1995) (holding that because arbitration turns on parties' choices, it is up to them to
determine whether punitive damages are available in arbitration); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,479 (1989) (stating that
"[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion," and holding that parties
could elect to be bound by state arbitration statute); see also United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (stating that in the collective bargaining
context, "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit"). There is some tension
between the principle of"favoring" arbitration over litigation, because it is supposedly better
for society, and the principle of enforcing arbitration contracts only to the extent that they
are agreed to by the parties. See Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 68, at 662-63.
88. See Wrightv. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,82 (1998) (holding that a
union member could not be required to arbitrate hisADAclaim against the employer because
the CBA provision did not contain a "clear and unmistakable waiver of the covered
employees' rights to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination).
89. See id. at 77-80 (interpreting contract governed by the Labor Management Relations
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In sum, although binding arbitration is still popular and although
courts are still enforcing many clauses, they are now beginning to
distinguish between fair and unfair clauses and to refuse to enforce
those clauses which are blatantly unfair.
B. Law and Policy Underlying Class Actions
1. Nature and Benefit of Class Actions
The class action is a procedural device which allows a small
number of "named" persons to represent their fellow plaintiffs or
defendants in litigation.90 What the representatives win, the class
wins; what the representatives lose, the class loses.9 ' While the
roots of the class action can be traced back to the Middle Ages, 2
modern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was adopted in 1966. 9'
Act, but not necessarily by the FAA).
90. For a sample of some of the most useful sources on class actions, see HERBERT
NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (3d ed. 1992); 7A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (2d ed. 1986); STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343
(1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict
oflnterest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975); Eric D. Green, Advancing IndividualRights Through
Group Justice, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791 (1997); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield,
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941); Linda S.
Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 ClassActionAmendments, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 615 (1997); Thomas D. Rowe Jr., Beyond the Class Action Rule: An Inventory of
Statutory Possibilities to Improve the Federal Class Action, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186 (1996);
David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913
(1998); Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving Up Just Desserts, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995)
(including articles by Roger C. Cramton, William W. Schwarzer, Jack B. Weinstein, John C.
Coffee, Jr., Richard L. Marcus, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judith Resnik, Peter
H. Schuck, John A. Siliciano, James H. Henderson, Jr., Francis E. McGovern, Robert L.
Rabin, Susan P. Koniak, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, John Leubsdorf, and Charles W. Wolfram);
Brian Wolffmnan & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in ClassActions Seeking
Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439 (1996); Arthur R. Miller, Comment, OfFrankenstein
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the 'Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L.
REV. 664 (1979).
91. The preclusion of the absent class members' claims raises due process concerns. See
infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
92. For discussions of the history of the class action, see generally YFAZELL, supra note
90; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An HistoricalAnalysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits,
146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849 (1998).
93. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966 amendment), 28
U.S.C. app. 695-99 (1994); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967).
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Its provisions are familiar.94 Aspiring class representatives must
demonstrate that they meet each of the Rule 23(a) requirements of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and fair and adequate repre-
sentation.95 In addition, they must establish that they meet the
requirements of one of the three types of classes set out in Rule
23(b): that the class would avoid inconsistent or varying adjudi-
cations with respect to individual class members,96 or the practical
disposition of the interests of nonparties;97 that the action seeks
injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole;98 or simply that questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and
that the class action is a superior method for obtaining fair and
efficient adjudication of such issues.99
Class actionshave been praised widely for a variety of attributes
including efficiency,"'0 improving access to the litigation system, 01
94. The Supreme Court recently sketched out the general requirements in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-17 (1997); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 30 (3d ed. 1995) (providing detailed guidance for courts and attorneys on how
to apply law of class actions).
95. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
96. See id. 23(b)(1)(A); see also Anchem, 521 U.S. at 614 (explaining that 23(b)(1) class
actions are designed for situations in which separate actions would risk "'incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,'" either because the class members
must by law be treated alike or because a limited fund is available to satisfy class claims)
(quoting FED. R. C1V. P. 23(b)(1)(A)).
97. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1)(B); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295,
2308-12 (1999) (explicating history and purpose of 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class actions).
98. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614 (observing that civil
rights cases are "prime examples" of appropriate 23(b)(2) classes).
99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Armchem, 521 U.S. at 614-15 (calling 23(b)(3)
classes the "most adventuresome" in that they are designed for situations in which, although
a class action is not clearly mandated, it may nonetheless be desirable) (citing Benjamin
Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497,497 (1969) and 7A WRIGHTET
AL., supra note 90, § 1777, at 517). Amchem also observed that the primary purpose of Rule
23(b)(3) class actions was to allow persons to bring suit who otherwise would not be able to
do so. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617.
100. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,809 (1985) ("Modern plaintiff
class actions ... permit[ ] litigation of a suit involving common questions when there are too
many plaintiffs for proper joinder."); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 n.1l (1981)
("Rule 23 expresses 'a policy in favor of having litigation in which common interests, or
common questions of law or fact prevail, disposed of where feasible in a single lawsuit.'")
(citation omitted); see also Developments, The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1783, 1805, 1810 (2000) (discussing efficiency savings).
101. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980) (observing
that class actions make it possible to bring claims that otherwise would not be economically
possible); Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (noting that without class action, "[n]o
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and serving the public interest."2 In terms of efficiency, it is
claimed that they allow issues involving multiple persons or
institutions to be resolved more cheaply and expeditiously. 0 3 As to
access, numerous courts including the Supreme Court have
emphasized that the class mechanism can make possible suits
which otherwise would have been logistically or economically
impossible. The Court famously stated in Eisen:
A critical fact in this litigation is that petitioner's individual
stake in the damages award he seeks is only $70. No competent
attorney would undertake this complex antitrust action to
recover so inconsequential an amount. Economic reality dictates
that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or not at all. 04
competent attorney would undertake [petitioner's] action to recover so inconsequential an
amount"); see also Developments, supra note 100, at 1808-10 (discussing how class actions
seem to "enhance procedural fairness by ensuring that people who have been wrongly
harmed have access to the judicial system").
102. This public interest includes compensating injured plaintiffs and deterringwrongful
conduct. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 514
(1996) ("The class action, because it can dispose of multiple claims in a single proceeding,
represents a potentially effective mechanism for privately enforcing the law, deterring
wrongful conduct, and compensating victims."); Wolfinan & Morrison, supra note 90, at 441
(observing that while class actions serve these important purposes, they can also be
problematic when applied in complex cases).
103. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617-18 (noting that class actions allow parties with
numerous claims to obtain a "Just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of rights)
(quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 1).
104. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 161. Years later, the court opined about this policy inAmchem:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something
worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.
1997); see also Phillips, 472 U.S. at 809 ("Class actions... may permit the plaintiffs to pool
claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit
involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no
realistic day in court if a class action were not available."). Significantly, and despite the
recognition that the suit could only be brought as a class action, the Eisen Court mandated
that the representative plaintiff would have to give individualized notice to each of the 2
million or so identifiable members of the Rule 23(b)(3) class. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-79.
The Court fully realized that imposing this requirement would prevent the class action from
being brought. See id. at 179 (remanding action with instructions to dismiss).
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Finally, the use of class actions to fight racial discrimination, 0 5
to achieve prison reform,0 6 and to tackle consumer fraud,
07
illustrates that these suits can often be used to achieve public goals,
both by compensating victims and deterring future wrongful
conduct. 1
0 8
105. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding, in class action, that
school segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause); Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F.
Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (approving $115 million settlement and attorneys fee award
against Texaco in class action by employees alleging race discrimination); Ridgeway v.
Flagstar Corp., Nos. C 93-20202 JW, C 93-20208 JW, 1994WL 525553, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
22, 1994) (approving $27 million consent decree in class action brought against Denny's for
failing to serve Afican American customers); Haynes v. Shoney's, Inc., No. 89-30093-RV,
1993 WL 19915, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 1993) (approving consent decree against chain of
restaurants for failure to hire African Americans); cf Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)
(concluding that because prior challenge to racially restrictive covenant was not class or
representative suit, Hansberry family was not precluded from bringing own challenge). For
a discussion of the underlying story of Hansberry, which is also recounted in Lorraine
Hansberry's play, "A Raisin in the Sun," see generally Allen R. Kamp, The History Behind
Hansberry v. Lee, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 481 (1987).
106. See, e.g., Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding, in class
action, that detention facility for persons in need of supervision violated Eighth Amendment
by failing to provide adequate rehabilitative programs).
107. See, e.g., Nickel v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, No. 96-16497, 1997 WL
419113, at *1 (9th Cir. July 25, 1997) (discussing class action brought against bank for $24
million overcharge of trustee fees); In re Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm. Sales Practices Litig., 962
F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1997), affd in relevant part, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998) (approving
settlement of class action in which life insurance policy holders brought suit against
Prudential for engaging in churning and fraud in sale of replacement policies); Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973) (holding, in class action by owners
of savings and checking accounts, that permanent garnishment of accounts without hearing
violated Due Process Clause); Sampson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 552 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (approving settlement of $150 million in class action brought by purchasers of instant
cameras alleging injury as a result of injunction secured by Polaroid to prohibit use of Kodak
camera); Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 97-L-114, 1999 WL 955543, at *1 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999) (approving award of more than $456 million to automobile policy
holders who were provided with nonfactory authorized replacement parts). See generally
JONATHAN SHELDON& DANIELA. EDELMAN, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER
CLASS ACTIONS (4th ed. 1999) (detailing procedures involved in consumer class actions);
Robert C. Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 663, 663-64 (1970)
(urging the passage of legislation to allow consumers to join together in class actions,
"because existing private legal remedies cannot meet the needs of a consumer having a
litigable claim," and suggesting that companies may deliberately defraud individuals out of
small rather than large amounts of money to avoid legal consequences); Steven B. Epstein,
Synthetic Stucco Suits Swarm Southeast-and Spread, THE BRIEF, Winter 2000, at 10
(discussing class actions brought in multiple states on behalf of home owners who installed
defective siding that caused damage to their homes); James E. Starrs, The Consumer Class
Action-Part I: Considerations ofProcedure, 49 B.U.L. REV. 407 (1969) (explaining that class
actions, used successfully in a variety of civil rights and other contexts, would be a valuable
tool for consumer claims, providing economic, strategic, and psychological benefits).
108. For a discussion of the public purposes of litigation, see Owen M. Fiss, Against
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2. Due Process Concerns Raised by Class Actions
The Supreme Court has recognized that while class actions can
serve many desirable goals, they also raise due process concerns
because they are "representative" litigation.109 In particular,
because class actions are an exception to the general rule that one
cannot be bound to a judgment unless one was a party to that
suit,11 special measures are necessary to protect the interests of the
non-named class members."' Thus, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts,"' the Court explained that, at least in an action for money
damages or similar relief, due process requires that "absent" class
members be afforded notice of the suit,"' an opportunity to be
heard and participate in the litigation, and a chance to opt out,
114
and also requires that the named plaintiff "at all times adequately
represent the interests of the absent class members.""'
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
109. See Phillips, 472 U.S. at 811-12 (stating that if ajurisdiction seeks to bind an absent
class member concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief at law, "it must provide
minimal procedural due process protection"); Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-74 (observing that the
notice requirement of Rule 23(c)(2) fulfills the Due Process Clause's requirement of notice
and an opportunity to be heard); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295,2314-15
(1999) (explaining that due process concerns generally implicated in damages class actions
are magnified when class members are not given an opportunity to opt out); Hansberry, 311
U.S. at 42-43,45 (holding that Due Process Clause requires that named plaintiff adequately
represent the interests of absent class members). For an interesting discussion of the
implications of Phillips for preclusion of absent class members' claims, see Henry Paul
Monaghan,Antisuit Injunctions and PreclusionAgainstAbsent Nonresident Class Members,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1148 (1998) (arguing that absent class members should not be precluded,
by an antisuit injunction, from filing a subsequent action in a new jurisdiction, if the initial
class action did not adequately protect their due process rights). See generally Linda S.
Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs'Due Process: Implications for
Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871 (recommending alternative due process
protections for plaintiffs in mandatory class actions).
110. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40-41; Mullenix, supra note 109, at 884.
111. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
112. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
113. See id. (holding that notice of class action sent by first-class mail, and including
notification of opt out right, satisfied due process); see also Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-76 (holding
that representative plaintiff must pay costs of providing adequate notice to class members,
even when such costs are so high as to make litigation infeasible).
114. See Phillips, 472 U.S. at 798; see also Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
115. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 812. The Phillips decision does not clearly state whether the due
process requirement applies to both in-state and out-of-state class members. Its holding
seems limited to "absent" class members, a term the Court defines at one point as referring
to out-of-state plaintiffs. See Phillips, 472 U.S. at 802. In some places, however, the Court
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Thus, while the Court has not specified that Rule 23 is
constitutionally required, certainly elements of that Rule appear to
be mandated by the Due Process Clause.116 Rule 23 builds
protective measures directly into its provisions, not only by
requiring the court to certify the class," 7 but also by allowing the
court to divide a class into subclasses where appropriate,"' to
mandate notice to class members,. 9 to require opportunities be
afforded for directly participating in the action,2 and to approve or
disapprove any settlement that is reached in a class action.' 2 ' In
short, not only are court supervision of notice and opt out
mandatory as to those actions for damages brought under Rule
23(b)(3), the Supreme Court also has made clear that court
supervision of the class mechanism is crucial to its legitimacy under
the Constitution.
22
apparently uses the term "absent" more broadly, to refer to non-named plaintiffs. See id. at
812 (observing that named plaintiffs must "adequately represent the interests of the absent
class members"). The Court's more recent decision in Ortiz is also ambiguous on the question
of whether in-state as well as out-of-state class members are entitled to notice and an
opportunity to participate or remove themselves from the class. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2315.
See generally Arthur R. Miller and David Crump, Jurisdiction andChoice of Law in
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 52-55 (1986)
(observing that Shutts can variously be interpreted as a case about "distant forum abuse,"
or "as a decision protecting the right to opt out for its own sake").
116. It is not clear, for example, where the Due Process Clause compels the contents of
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e), which provides that class actions may not be dismissed or settled
without court approval, and also mandates that all class members be afforded notice of a
proposed compromise.
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). This certification requires the court to find that the
named plaintiffs are suitable representatives of the class and that the matter is appropriate
for resolution by a class action. See id. 23(b).
118. See id. 23(c)(4).
119. See id. 23(d)(2); see also id. 23(c)(2) (mandating notice as to 23(b)(3) class actions);
id. 23(c)(1) (mandating notice of proposed dismissal or settlement).
120. See id. 23(d)(2).
121. See id. 23(e). For a discussion of the steps courts should follow in determining
whether to approve a proposed class settlement, see Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based
Approach to ClassActionSettlement.'ImprovingAmchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHio
ST. L.J. 1155, 1165-69 (1998).
122. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809-11 (explaining that because
Rule 23 and its state law equivalents safeguard the interests of absent class members by
requiring a court to inquire into commonality of claims and the adequacy of representation,
mandating notice and opt out, and requiring court approval of settlements, absent class
members are less burdened than defendants who are sued in foreignjurisdictions); see also
id. at 809 ("[Uinlike a defendant in a civil suit, a class-action plaintiff is not required to fend
for himself ... The court and named plaintiffs protect his interests."); StevenT. 0. Cottreau,
Note, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 480 (1998)
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3. Criticisms of Class Actions
Although popular among many, class actions have been criticized
widely, particularly of late. One frequent refrain is that class
actions serve the interests of plaintiffs' attorneys more than those
of plaintiffs themselves. 2 ' The "coupon" class actions have become
symbolic of this concern, with class members receiving a few
coupons toward the purchase of a new car, airline ticket, or dog
food, while class attorneys reap large fees.'24 Some have highlighted
the inherent conflicts of interest that exist between class attorneys
and their clients, in that dollars paid in fees will not be available to
the class. 2 ' Class action attorneys also have been accused of driving
(arguing that due process requires that nonresidents, and in some instances even residents,
should have the option to opt out of a class action).
123. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model
of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 245 n.72 (1983)
(describing class settlement of antitrust suit in which plaintiffs received 5% discount on
brokerage services connected with sale of next home, and plaintiffs' counsel received
$350,000); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 168 (1997) (discussing situation wherein class members receive
little or nothing but counsel are compensated handsomely); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While
the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1138-51
(1995) (suggesting that settlement in asbestos class action ill-served the interests of class
members, and that the attorneys may have breached their fiduciary duties or engaged in
malpractice); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak ofSettlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1053-54 (1996) (discussing class action settlements in which class lawyers negotiated
or requested multimillion dollar fees while class members received minimal in-kind
compensation); Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARV. L. REV. 810, 810 nn.3-8
(1996) (providing examples of in-kind class action settlements such as coupons for food
processors, groceries, air travel, or bar review courses).
124. See Robert Mauk, Lawsuit Abuse: Public's Welfare Hurt When Lawyers Help
Themselves, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Apr. 28, 1997, at AS, available in 1997 WL
7098327 (criticizing coupon settlements); Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 1995, at D1 (observing that while class action plaintiffs who settle receive little, their
attorneys walk away with millions); cf Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary
Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 99 (1997) (arguing that not all
nonpecuniary settlements are undesirable).
125. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, ClassAction Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVISL. REv. 805 (1997)
(arguing that despite their risks, class actions must exist in order to counter problems such
as transaction costs and barriers to entry); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) (analyzing consequences of
divergent interests between plaintiffs and their attorneys); Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in
Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement
Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308 (1985) (arguing that the conflict of interest between
plaintiffs' attorneys and class members calls for the appointment of a guardian to protect
class members' interests). The fear is that most class members lack a sufficient incentive to
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their own litigation. 126
Given these concerns, some suggest that the costs of class actions
exceed their benefits. Professor Christopher Drahozal has argued
that it could be rational for individuals to give up their right to
proceed in a class action. 127 He suggests that, given the conflicts of
interest inherent in class actions and given the high costs of class
litigation, individuals might be better off giving up the possible
deterrence or other benefits of a class action in return for reduced
dispute resolution costs. 28 As well, these criticisms of class actions
sometimes have been tied to calls for "tort reform." Corporate
defendants and their attorneys claim that class actions are being
used to effectively blackmail defendants into paying out unduly
high settlements in weak cases, and that these settlements are
raising costs for all consumers. 29
monitor whether the attorney is adequately representing their interests.
126. See generally Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 202
(regarding the prevention of lawyer-driven litigation); NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT
WITH AMERICA 147-55 (1994) (critiquing attorneys' control of litigation). The charge is that
plaintiffs' attorneys are not sought out by plaintiffs, but rather that the attorneys use a ready
stable of named plaintiffs or advertisements to solicit plaintiffs to support lawsuits
envisioned by the attorneys. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 123, at 171 (describing the
phenomenon of plaintiffs' attorneys initiating class suits) (citing Stephen E. Frank, First
USA Settles Lawsuit Alleging It Switched Rates, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 1997, at B8); Richard
M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and
Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAV. 1009, 1011 (1996) (describing class action attorneys' use of
"professional" plaintiffs).
127. See Drahozal, supra note 5, at 62-63.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms.
and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong. 22 (1994) (statement
of Sen. Dodd) ("[Miany cases are filed just to coerce a settlement."); Janet Cooper Alexander,
Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV.
497, 500 (1991) (arguing that most securities suits settle, and that such settlements are not
based upon the merits); Peter M. Saparoff, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Illusion orReality, SA90ALI-ABA 505 (1996) (contending that securities litigation has
a "blackmail effect" that forces "innocent companies to settle cases); Ralph K. Winter,
Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of
Capital inAmerica, 42 Duke L.J. 945, 976 (1993) (concluding that derivative suits and class
actions benefit only lawyers and raise the cost of capital in America); cf James Bohn &
Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class
Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 905 (1996) (discussing the "phenomenon" of "frivolous"
lawsuits whereby "[opportunistic plaintiffs' attorneys continuouslymonitor securities prices,
probing for recent offerings that perform poorly in the aftermarket," then filing suit "[o]nce
a security's price suffers a decline sufficient to generate a potential damages award large
enough to cover the expected costs of litigation").
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Perhaps responding to such criticisms, both courts and Congress
have recently placed limitations on class actions. The Supreme
Court, in two decisions, has made clear that the normal class action
certification requirements may not be relaxed merely because a
settlement has already been reached between the class and the
defendants.3 0 In the securities context, Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,' s ' specifically seeking,
inter alia, to "transfer control of litigation away from lawyers and
back to clients." 32 Other statutory limitations to the class action
are under consideration.
33
130. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2316-23 (1999) (overruling
certification of settlement class action brought against asbestos manufacturers, because the
applicants for certification failed to show adequately that the fund was limited by more than
the agreement of the parties, or that conflicts of interest among class members had been
addressed adequately in the allocation process); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 628-29 (1997) (affirming appellate court's reversal of asbestos settlement class action,
explaining that class "cannot satisfy the requirements of common issue predominance and
adequacy of representation").
131. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1
(Supp. IV 1998)). While the Reform Act limited only securities actions brought in federal
court, Congress acted quickly to close the perceived loophole allowing plaintiffs to file their
securities class actions in state court. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (Supp. IV 1998)); Rachel
Witmer, Congress Focuses on Closing "Loophole" in 1995Act Barring Vexatious Class Suits,
66 U.S.L.W. 2131, 2131 (Sept. 9, 1997).
132. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 533, 533 (1997). See generally Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference-The"Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995," H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-
369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. H13692, H13699 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995)
(discussing "abusive practices committed in private securities litigation includ[ing] ...
manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent"); Joel
Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995,38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1996) (discussing
the enactment of the Reform Act, including the provisions to prevent complete control of the
class action by the attorney). The Act took such steps as granting special "lead plaintiff"
control to the largest investor in the class (provided she has not played such role too
frequently), limiting damages under some circumstances, mandating disclosure ofsettlement
terms to the class, restricting attorney's fees, and limiting the lead plaintiffs share of
recovery. The Act also imposes conflict of interest provisions on attorneys and prescribes
guidelines for imposition of sanctions for abusive litigation. See Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act § 77z-1.
133. One measure, the Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999), was
introduced by legislators who suggested it was needed to contend with "unscrupulous
lawyers" who settle class actions in a way that provides few benefits for class members and
large benefits for themselves. See Susan J. McGolrick, DOJ Official Tells Senate
Subcommittee of Opposition to Class Action Reform Bill, 67 U.S.L.W. 2694 (May 25, 1999).
The Act would allow nearly any class action brought in state court to be transferred to
federal court because supporters contend that class actions are being used in state court to
abuse hapless defendants in meritless cases, that elected state court judges cannot be relied
20001 WILL THE CLASS ACTION SURVIVE?
In short, while class actions are still tremendously popular in
many quarters, they also have their critics. Some see them as
essential to secure fair and efficient justice, while, conversely,
others see them as undercutting these very goals.
C. Pros and Cons of Classwide Arbitrations
At first blush the hybrid variously known as a "classwide
arbitration" or an "arbitral class action" may seem to be the ideal
way to have one's cake and eat it too-that is, to reconcile the
policies favoring both arbitration and class action. As will be seen,
however, participants, courts, and commentators differ sharply
regarding the desirability and feasibility of such an amalgam."" If
the hybrid proves unworkable or undesirable, then one. must
seriously consider the other two major alternatives: allowing
companies to eliminate class actions altogether, or permitting class
actions to be handled in court.
upon to stop this phenomenon, and that federal courts should be empowered to remedy the
situation. See Congress, Judicial Conference Mull Changes to ClassAction, Mass Tort Rules,
67 U.S.L.W. 2723 (June 8, 1999). The Senate Bill also would attempt to limit recoverable
attorney fees and would require very detailed notice to class members in the event of a
proposed class settlement. The bill was reported by the Judiciary Committee to the Senate
on July 27, 2000. See S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999), WL 1999 US S.B. 353 (SN). Another
measure, the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106th Cong., is
somewhat more limited in scope. It would essentially allow for expanded removal of class
actions to federal court. This Act was passed by the House on September 23, 1999, and
awaits consideration by the Senate. See Civil Procedure-Class Actions: House Approves
Class Action Measure Moving Many State Suits to Federal Court, 68 U.S.L.W. 2168 (Sept.
28,1999). By broadening federal courts'jurisdiction to hear class actions, the Act potentially
would prevent state courts from hearing class actions that did not meet the stricter federal
standards. Also, serious revisions to Rule 23 itself were considered but ultimately rejected
within the last few years. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 23, Class Actions, 167 F.R.D. 559 (1996) (proposing that the "practical ability of
individual class members to pursue their claims without class certification" and the question
of "whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies the costs and burdens
of class litigation" be made elements considered in Rule 23(b)(3). The changes proposed by
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules were published and considered at public hearings but
ultimately withdrawn by the Committee, which concluded further study was needed. See
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of the Meeting of June 19-20, 1997,
1997 WL 1056244, at *12-14 (J.C.U.S.); see also Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to
the RulemakingProcess, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1996) (cautioning against making substantial
revisions to Rule 23 before learning more about how class actions are currently being
handled); Fisch, supra note 123 at 176-83 (summarizing various proposed class action
reforms).
134. See infra notes 138-95 and accompanying text.
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This discussion of classwide arbitrations will draw upon a few
real life experiences from California,"' but also will address
hypothetical uses of classwide arbitration. Only a few courts in
California and Pennsylvania have, at least in reported decisions,
ordered or allowed arbitrations to proceed on a classwide basis, and
several of these cases settled before classwide arbitration could
actually take place.'36 Moreover, this author has uncovered just one
instance in which an arbitrator independently ordered a dispute to
be resolved as a class action.137
1. Purported Virtues of Classwide Arbitration
The California Court of Appeals, in Keating v. Superior Court,138
seems to have been the first court or commentator to consider
seriously the desirability and feasibility of a classwide arbitration.
Its conclusion, that there was "no insurmountable obstacle" to such
135. I was able to gain this information only by doing some academic detective work, as
it seems no prior articles have discussed the actual handling of arbitral class actions. Other
commentators have had similar difficulty finding examples of classwide arbitrations. See C.
Evan Stewart, Are Class Actions Appropriate in Arbitrations?, N.Y. L.J., June 13, 1991, at
5 (stating "in no case to date, where a court has embraced the 'ybrid' approach, has
anything actually taken place or been done beyond the certification decision"). In fact, it is
noteworthy that the two main law review articles advocating the use of the hybrid approach
were written by law students, who presumably had no personal experience in litigation,
much less in handling classwide arbitrations. See Quagmire, supra note 41; Waltcher, supra
note 41. Nor do either of these notes discuss any claims that were actually handled as
classwide arbitrations.
136. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text. It should be noted that several
governments also have adopted arbitration for resolving certain local disputes, and that their
rules occasionally allow for class actions. See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
137. A recent press report discussed a case in which an arbitrator purportedly awarded
more than $20 million to a class of customers who had borrowed money from Consec
Financial Inc. See Douglas J. Fisher, Conseco Finance to Pay $2OMin S.C., AP ONLINE, July
26, 2000, auailable at 2000 WL 24550570. Apparently, the class action was ordered by the
arbitrator. See Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions, supra note 10, at 632-33
(discussing ruling of "renegade" arbitrator who ordered class action). The company
reportedly is contending that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to consider a class action. See
Fisher, supra. Other than this case, I did not find any reports of such orders in any articles,
and also uncovered none in the course of conversations with Professor Tom Stipanowich (co-
author of a leading arbitration treatise), Dean Tim Heinsz (Reporter for the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act), Gene Truncellito of AAA, and Bill Baten of JAMS.
138. 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (concluding franchisees' claims against
franchisor were arbitrable, and that trial court erred in failing to consider class action issues
before sending dispute to arbitration), vacated, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
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a device,13 9 is typical of the reaction of many to the technique.
Without raving about the benefits of classwide arbitration, these
courts and commentators in esssence state that the hybrid can best
preserve the benefits of both the class action and the arbitration;14
that logistically the hybrid is workable, 4 particularly so long as the
court determines the major class action issues;142 and that while
perhaps not ideal, the hybrid is superior to either barring
arbitration or barring classwide relief.143
Significantly, all of the supportive court decisions call upon the
court to play an extremely active role in resolving the class action
issues relevant to the classwide arbitration. For example, the
Keating court stated:
139. See Keating, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 492 ("In an appropriate case, such a procedure
undoubtedly would be the fairest and most efficient way of resolving the parties' dispute. The
initial determinations regarding certification and notice will not unduly burden the
arbitration because those matters must be resolved by the trial court before arbitration
begins.").
140. For example, the California Supreme Court in Keating stated:
This court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the class action device
for vindicating rights asserted by large groups of persons. We have observed
that the class suit "both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and
provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which
would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation."
Keating, 645 P.2d at 1206 (quoting Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1981));
see also Quagmire, supra note 41, at 787-96 (summarizing the benefits of both class actions
and arbitration). In Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986),
the California Court of Appeals reiterated this praise for class actions and also praised
arbitration, which it stated "is generally considered to be a mutually advantageous process,
providing for resolution of disputes in a presumptively less costly, more expeditious, and
more private manner by an impartial person or persons typically selected by the parties
themselves." Id at 320 (quoting Keating, 645 P.2d at 1198).
141. See Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.
142. See infra notes 438-71 and accompanying text (discussing what steps would be
necessary for classwide arbitration to comply with due process).
143. The Izzi court was particularly damning with its faint praise, recognizing that the
argument that class actions and arbitration are incompatible has considerable support,
entertaining some thought that the two techniques might possibly be irreconcilable, but
ultimately concluding it was bound by the Keating precedent to accept the possibility of the
hybrid. SeeIzzi, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 321; see also Dicklerv. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596
A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. 1991), in which the court stated:
Given the three paths down which this litigation can be directed-compelled
individual arbitration, class action in a court of law, or compelled classwide
arbitration-the last choice best serves the dual interest of respecting and
advancing contractually agreed upon arbitration agreements while allowing
individuals who believe they have been wronged to have an economically
feasible route to get injunctive relieffrom large institutions employing adhesion
contracts.
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Without doubt a judicially ordered classwide arbitration would
entail a greater degree ofjudicial involvement than is normally
associated with arbitration, ideally "a complete proceeding,
without resort to court facilities."... A good deal of care, and
ingenuity, would be required to avoid judicial intrusion upon
the merits of the dispute, or upon the conduct of the proceedings
themselves and to minimize complexity, costs, or delay.'
The court went on to explain:
The court would have to make initial determinations regarding
certification and notice to the class, and if classwide arbitration
proceeds it may be called upon to exercise a measure of external
supervision in order to safeguard the rights of absent class
members to adequate representation and in the event of
dismissal or settlement.'45
In Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,146 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court similarly stated that the trial court would not only
need to certify the class, insure that proper notice is provided, and
review any proposed settlement, but also deal with such
eventualities as conflict among multiple class representatives as to
selection of arbitrators.147
The attorneys who have participated in hybrid class action
arbitrations report that courts have, in fact, retained the respon-
sibility for resolving all of the major class action issues. In every
class action arbitration as to which this author was able to obtain
information,148 it was the court that decided whether the matter
could proceed as a class action, defined the class, and approved the
144. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209 (citations omitted) (citing Quagmire, supra note 41, at
789).
145. Id. at 1209.
146. 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. 1991).
147. See id. at 866.
148. I made an extensive effort to locate and speak to attorneys who had been involved
with arbitral class actions. I not only contacted attorneys who, according to published
decisions, represented parties in class actions that were ordered to arbitration, but I also
made calls to numerous arbitration experts and organizations in an attempt to identify
participants in nonpublished cases. Still, after all this, I found just a handful of attorneys,
which I believe is reflective of the fact that very few arbitrations have been handled as class
actions.
[Vol. 42:1
20001 WILL THE CLASS ACTION SURVIVE?
notice to the class.149 In the instances in which the suits settled, the
court approved the settlement. 150 In several cases, the court
149. Attorney Gordon Bosserman represented Blue Cross in Blue Cross of California v.
Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (Cal. App. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2338 (1999),
and in an unpublished case, Harder v. Blue Cross. He reported that in the Superior Court
case, the class action dispute was ordered to arbitration. The parties then conducted
discovery under the supervision of the judge. Prior to either class certification or selection
of arbitrators, the dispute was settled. In Harder, arbitrators were selected only after the
court had handled class certification and notice issues. Telephone Interview with Gordon
Bosserman (Oct. 11, 1999).
Attorney John F. Wells represented the plaintiff-franchisees in Keating, 645 P.2d 1192
(Cal. 1982). He reported that the judge decided all the class issues, including defining the
class and determining the contents of the notice. The court also decided an important
evidentiary issue, in connection with defining the class, and the arbitrators refused to revisit
the ruling. Certain other motions were decided by the arbitrators, subject to appeal to the
court. Telephone Interview with John F. Wells (Sept. 29, 1999).
Jon A. Shoenberger represented the plaintiffs in Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). He reported that the trial judge made all of the orders to
define the class and to provide notice to class members, retained jurisdiction over all
discovery matters, and handled all pleadings such as motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment. Arbitrators were not selected until the point at which the dispute was
ready to be tried. Once the arbitrators issued an award, the court retained jurisdiction to
distribute the money and approve a final accounting. The court also ruled on plaintiffs'
petition for attorney fees. Telephone Interview with Jon A. Shoenberger (Sept. 22, 1999).
Steven J. Nelson represented the plaintiffs in Gainey v. Occidental Land Research, 231
Cal. Rptr. 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Although the merits of the dispute were handled by the
arbitrators, the judge decided the class certification and notice issues. Nelson also opined
that if the plaintiffs had prevailed, it would have been the responsibility of the court, not the
arbitrators, to divide up the winnings. Telephone Interview with Steven J. Nelson (Sept. 13,
1999).
Steven G. Zieff represented the plaintiffs in Kerr v. Snap.On, Inc., No. CV758116 (Cal.
Super. 1997), a wage and hour class action brought under California law. Although the court
ordered that the dispute be resolved through class action arbitration, the court itself handled
all issues relatingto class certification, including relevant discovery, and also supervised and
approved the class notice. The American Arbitration Association handled opt-outs from the
class. Telephone Interview with Steven G. Zieff (Aug. 25, 1999). Zieff also supplied this
author with an order from the court which authorized the classwide arbitration. The order
stated that the court would retain jurisdiction over disputes concerning issues of class notice,
final approval of class settlement, enforcement of the arbitrators' decision, and other issues
that may be appropriate for resolution by the court. Letter from Steven G. Zieff to Jean R.
Sternlight (Sept. 20, 1999) (on file with author).
150. Telephone Interview with John F. Wells (Sept. 29,1999) (observing that the Keating
case was eventually settled after the arbitrators had made factual findings, and that the
settlement was approved by the court); Telephone Interview with Steven G. Zieff (Aug. 25,
1999) (stating that once the dispute settled, the court approved the process that would be
used to assess its fairness, and that after the arbitrators held a substantive fairness hearing,
the court itself held its own hearing as to which class members were provided notice); see also
Letter from Steven G. Zieff to Jean R. Sternlight (Sept. 20, 1999) (on file with author)
(stating that the settlement was approved "following a fairness hearing under procedures
approved by the [court]").
42 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1
assumed even more responsibilities, such as resolving all discovery
issues and motions leading up to the point of trial.151
In accord with the decisions discussed above, student com-
mentator Daniel Waltcher contends that courts would have to play
a very active role in deciding "class" issues.112 Without discussion,
he assumes that the court, rather than the arbitrator, will make the
initial certification decision. 153He then asserts that due process also
requires the court to play some kind of ongoing role in ensuring
adequacy of representation. He concludes that the most permissible
way to do so would be for the arbitrator to handle the post-
certification class issues without allowing interlocutory appeals to
the court, but then to allow challenges to adequacy of repre-
sentation after the arbitrators issued their decision.'
14
Not all supporters of the hybrid advocate heightened judicial
involvement. Another student note suggests that courts should play
151. E.g., Telephone Interview with Jon A. Shoenberger (Sept. 22, 1999) (discussing
procedure used in Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club). In this action, the arbitrators were not
even selected until all of the pretrial motions had been resolved, all of the discovery had been
completed, and only the trial remained.
152. Waltcher suggests that this active role is necessary in order to protect due process
interests. See Waltcher, supra note 41, at 401-02 (explaining that because the majority of
class action participants are absent from the classwide arbitral proceedings, due process
concerns are raised as to notice and adequacy of representation). AttorneyJames Sturdevant
similarly suggests that courts need to play an active role in supervising the class in order to
comport with due process:
Under the special rules and procedures established by the courts for cases that
are filed as class actions and that are also subject to arbitration, the court may
compel arbitration of the merits of the action, but must retain jurisdiction to
allow class discovery, to rule on the plaintiffs' class certification motion, to order
class notice, and to supervise the proceedings as otherwise necessary to protect
the due process rights of absent class members.
James C. Sturdevant, Current Issues inArbitration, Recent Developments in Deposit/Retail
Banking, 1114 PRACTISING L. INST. 846, 848 (1999).
153. See Waltcher, supra note 41, at 403.
154. See id. at 403-05. Waltcher rejects the possibility of interlocutory appeals as too
inefficient, and rejects the elimination of court review as violative of due process. He states:
[D]ue process issues connected with class action aspects ofclasswide arbitration
are simply too important to be relegated to arbitrators. While the panelists in
a 10b-5 arbitration may be experts in securities regulation, they are not experts
in the constitutional concerns attached to class certification. As a result, they
cannot ensure the fairness of the proceedings to all absent class members.
Id. at 404-05. Waltcher does not address specifically who would review the adequacy of a
proposed class settlement, nor who would deal with issues such as propriety of
communication with class members or division of a class into subclasses.
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a far more limited role in classwide arbitration. 5 This com-
mentator prefers that the certification determination be made by
the arbitrator, with court review only following the termination of
the arbitration. 56 This commentator further envisions that while
class members would be afforded individual notice157 and provided
a right to appear in certain situations,'58 the matter would not differ
too much from a typical arbitration. The arbitration would remain
private,159 and if too many class members disagreed on the choice
of arbitrator or sought to participate directly, the matter would be
denied certification 6 ° or those persons would have to opt out of the
class. 6 The Note suggests that the arbitral model would be
sufficient to protect any due process property interests,162 and that
"arbitrators can deal with potential abuses as effectively as can
courts."
1 63
In short, none see arbitral class actions as a panacea,164 and
155. See Quagmire, supra note 41, at 806-09.
156. See id. "If the arbitrator decides the class arbitration issue and if that decision is
not immediately reviewable by the court, arbitral independence will not be compromised."
Id. at 809. The author is, however, open to court determination of certification or more
immediate review. See id. at 806.
157. See id. at 804.
158. See i&
159. See id.
160. See id. at 800.
161. See id, at 799.
162. See id. at 800-04. The author expresses uncertainty as to whether due process would
attach to private arbitral proceedings, see id. at 800-01, but concludes that assuming due
process were required, "the procedural flexibility inherent in the arbitration mechanism
would prove to be an asset." Id. at 803.
163. Id. at 811. The Note's author does not, however, provide any detailed analysis
regarding how the court or arbitrator would ensure ongoing adequacy of representation, nor
who would rule on the adequacy of any settlement.
164. Blue Cross attorney Gordon Bosserman stated that the company decides whether to
compel arbitration in a particular dispute on a case-by-case basis. Stating that he saw no real
cost difference between class action litigation and arbitration, Bosserman explained that the
company weighs its interest in avoiding a jury trial against its interest in preserving full
appellate rights. Telephone Interview with Gordon Bosserman (Oct. 11, 1999). In a separate
interview, Jon Schoenberger noted that the arbitral class action was little different from a
litigated class action, except that arbitrators replaced a judge, and that the parties were
provided with the convenience of certain dates for the trial. He further noted that class action
issues are generally poorly suited for arbitration. Telephone Interview with Jon
Schoenberger (Sept. 22, 1999). Several of the interviewed attorneys stated that the arbitral
class action seemed to work reasonably efficiently in their particular cases, but did not
suggest that the process in general was preferable to class action litigation. Telephone
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opinions differ on precisely how arbitral class actions can or should
be handled. Summing up its less than enthusiastic endorsement of
classwide arbitration, the California Supreme Court stated:
Classwide arbitration, as Sir Winston Churchill said of
democracy, must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but
in relation to its alternatives. If the alternative in a case of this
sort is to force hundreds of individual franchisees each to
litigate its cause with Southland in a separate arbitral forum,
then the prospect of classwide arbitration, for all its difficulties,
may offer a better, more efficient, and fairer solution."
2. Purported Failings of Classwide Arbitration
The hybrid arbitral class action has been subjected to criticism on
several fronts. In the securities industry, both self-regulated
organizations ("SROs") and the SEC have concluded that the
arbitral class action is not an acceptable means of dispute
resolution. 66 Also, several academics and dissenting or concurring
judges have concluded that the technique is inherently flawed,
raising both logistical and due process concerns. 167 Finally, several
Interview with Steven J. Nelson (Sept. 13, 1999); Telephone Interview with John F. Wells
(July 29, 1999); Telephone Interview with Steven G. Zieff (Aug. 25, 1999).
165. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982). This quote is cited
approvingly by one commentator. See Waltcher, supra note 41, at 403; see also Lewis v.
Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("mhe alternative to
class arbitration here is to force each Prudential customer to individually arbitrate claims,
most of which probably cannot justify the time and money required to prove."); Dickler v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super 1991) ("The availability of class
suits in arbitration proceedings precludes either party from forcing the other to litigate in
a position less advantageous than that for which they contracted" by either defeating
arbitration altogether or "forc[ing] individuals already straitjacket[ed] by an industry-wide
practice of arbitration agreements to fight alleged improprieties at an exorbitant economic
cost.").
166. See infra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
167. See Keating, 645 P.2d at 1210 (Richardson, J., concurring and dissenting); Harris v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 70, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (Bloom, J.,
dissenting); Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman III, Selected Topics in Securities
Arbitration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class Arbitration,
Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1547
(1991); Stewart, supra note 135, at 5; Elizabeth P. Allor, Note, Keating v. Superior Court:
Oppressive Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1983).
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attorneys who have actually participated in classwide arbitrations
have found that the procedure, at least as used to date, differs very
little from litigation and thus offers few, if any, advantages.168
a. The Securities Industry's Rejection of Classwide
Arbitration
Although the securities industry has long been a major proponent
and advocate of binding arbitration in general,' its policies
foreclose arbitration of class actions and instead allow investors to
litigate such claims.'70 In adopting the exclusion, both the SROs and
168. E.g., Telephone Interview with Gordon Bosserman (Oct. 11, 1999) (reporting no real
difference in terms of cost or speed between the two processes, but observing that arbitration
can be desirable in order to avoid a jury trial); Telephone Interview with Steven J. Nelson
(Sept. 13, 1999) (stating that while he saw no particular problems in his case, which was
largely documentary, he could imagine that arbitral class actions would sometimes be
problematic); Telephone Interview with Jon A. Shoenberger (Sept. 22, 1999) (reporting no
significant efficiency differences between litigated and arbitrated class actions, and noting
that the only difference was a final hearing before arbitrators instead of before ajudge; also
concluding that although arbitral class action worked fine in the Izzi case, the mechanism
"doesn't make a lot of sense"); Telephone Interview with John F.wells (Sept. 29, 1999)
(stating that he was very pleased with the result of arbitral class action in which the judge
first decided major class issues, and further observing that the hearing was probably more
thorough before arbitrators than it would have been before a court, but failing to set out
efficiency advantages); Telephone Interview with Steven G. Zieff (Aug. 25, 1999) (observing
that he was pleased with the process and result, but failing to identify any major efficiency
or other savings).
169. For over one hundred years, so-called self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") such as
the New York Stock Exchange have established arbitration programs for resolution of
consumer claims against brokerages. See PHIup J. HoBuN, SECURITIES ARBrITRATION:
PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES 1-2 (2d ed. 1992); Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA. The First
Twenty Years, 23 FODHAMi URB. L.J. 483, 485 (1996); Norman S. Poser, WhenADR Eclipses
Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROoK. L. REv. 1095, 1103
(1993). Moreover, the Supreme Courthas explicitly upheld the use ofarbitrationwith respect
to both customer and employee claims in the securities context. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that employee who had agreed
to be bound by arbitration rules of exchange could be required to arbitrate claim under Age
Discriminationin EmploymentAct); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490
U.S. 477 (1989) (upholding use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements with respect to claims
brought under the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987) (ruling that companies could compel arbitration of claims brought under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). These decisions reflected a reversal of Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953), which had refused to enforce pre-dispute arbitration as to claims brought
under the 1933 Act.
170. The history of excluding arbitration of class actions can be traced to 1988, when SEC
Chair David S. Ruder asked all the SROs "to consider adopting procedures that would give
investors access to the courts in appropriate cases, including class actions." Self-Regulatory
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the SEC foreclosed the possibility that companies might be
permitted to deprive customers of the class action device
simultaneously in both litigation and arbitration forums.' The
rule barring arbitral class actions was unanimously adopted in 1992
by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICAf).' 2
Organizations; Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
Relating to Improvements in the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,519,
30,520 (1992).
171. While this alternative was not discussed in detail, both the SEC and NASD rejected
it in responding to a letter submitted during the comment period. The SEC explained that
although a letter from Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittman & Hutchinson stated that it favored
the NASD rule proposal, "in direct opposition to the rule, Stone, Pigman suggested that the
NASD and Commission both should adopt a policy that would provide that any claim
governed by an arbitration agreement should be arbitrated pursuant to the terms of the
agreement, regardless of whether the claim is subject to the class action." Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From Arbitration
Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,659, 52,660 (1992). Rejecting this interpretation, "the NASD
stated that the proposed rule change will ensure that class actions and the claims of
individual class members are not eligible for arbitration at the NASD, regardless of any
previously existing agreement to arbitrate." Id. The exception, as noted in the rule itself, is
that an investor may individually arbitrate a claim once the court has refused to certify the
class or once the investor has chosen not to participate in the class action. See id. The SEC
similarly stated: "[tihe comments of Stone, Pigman misconstrue the intent of the NASD
proposal. As approved, the rule will exclude all class actions from arbitration at the NASD."
Id. at 52,661. Interestingly, the drafters of the Stone, Pigman letter were Stephen
Kupperman and George C. Freeman III, who also wrote an article arguing that persons who
agree to arbitration should be foreclosed from participating in class action litigation or
arbitration. See Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 167, at 1583-84 ("In light of the Supreme
Court's trend away from judicial activism and its embracement of literalism and the concept
of sanctity of contracts, the arbitration process should prevail."). The authors suggest that
"even without the class action device, arbitration provides a reasonable forum for persons
with small claims." Id. at 1591. The authors would, however, permit arbitration tribunals to
"fashion their own rules concerning classwide actions, although the ultimate wisdom of any
rule permitting class arbitration is questionable." Id. at 1592.
172. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions
from Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,660. The NASD's Rule 10301(d) and the
NYSE's Rule 600(d) are virtually identical. The NASD Rule states:
(d) Class Action Claims.
(2) Any claim filed by a member or members of a putative or certified class
action is also ineligible for arbitration at the Association if the claim is
encompassed by a putative or certified class action filed in federal or state
court, or is ordered by a court to an arbitral forum not sponsored by a self-
regulatory organization for classwide arbitration. However, such claims shall
be eligible for arbitration in accordance with paragraph (a) or pursuant to the
parties' contractual agreement, if any, if a claimant demonstrates that it has
elected not to participate in the putative or certified class action or, if
applicable, has complied with any conditions for withdrawing from the class
prescribed by the court.
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One by one the various individual brokerages secured SEC approval
for the same rule. 7 '
The SEC opposed arbitration of class actions because whereas
courts already had developed rules for handling class actions,
arbitral organizations had not. It found that allowing arbitration of
class actions would be wasteful and duplicative. 7 4 In approving
(3) No member or associated person shall seek to enforce any agreement to
*arbitrate against a customer, other member or person associated with a
member who has initiated in court a putative class action or is a member of a
putative or certified class with respect to any claims encompassed by the class
action unless and until: (A) the class certification is denied; (B) the class is
decertified; (C) the customer, other member or person associated with a
member is excluded from the class by the court; or (D) the customer, other
member or person associated with a member elects not to participate in the
putative or certified class action or, if applicable, has complied with any
conditions for withdrawing from the class prescribed by the court.
NASD MANUAL & NOTICES TO MEMBERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 10301(d)
(visited Apr. 4,2000) <http://www.nasd.com>. The NYSE Rule similarly provides that"[a]ny
claim filed by a member.., of a putative or certified class action is also ineligible for
arbitration at the New York Stock Exchange." NYSE, Constitution of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., Article IX, Rule 600(d) (visited Aug. 25, 2000) <http://www.nyse.
com/about/about/html> [hereinafter NYSE Rule 600(d)]. For a discussion of the complex self-
governance structure of the securities industry, see generally Katsoris, supra note 169.
173. Each exchange first published a proposed rule change for public comment and then
secured SEC approval for the requisite changes to its internal rules and handbooks. See
Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exchange's Arbitration
Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 2849 (1996); Filing of Proposed Rule Change by National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Exclusion of Class Action Claims from Arbitration, 59
Fed. Reg. 4299 (1994) (clarifying that exclusion applies to actions brought by employees, as
well as bycustomers); OrderApprovingProposed Rule Change byAmerican Stock Exchange,
Inc. Relating to Arbitration, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,680 (1993); Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to Rule 12, Arbitration, of the Rules of the
PSE, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,588 (1993); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Exclusion of Class Actions from Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,659; Proposed
Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to Improvements
in the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,519 (1992); see also NASD
MANUAL& NOTICES TO MEMBERS, CODE OFARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 10301(d), supra note
172 (stating that a "claim submitted as a class action shall not be eligible for arbitration");
NASD, Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 21(f)(6), (visited Jan. 27, 2000)
<http'J/www.nasd.com>
(noting that all agreements shall include a statement that "No person shall
bring a putative or certified class action to arbitration, nor seek to enforce any
pre-dispute arbitration agreement against any person who has initiated in court
a putative class action; or who is a member of a putative class who has not
opted out of the class with respect to any claims encompassed by the putative
class action [until certification is denied or customer opts out or is excluded]").
NYSE Rule 600(d), supra note 172 (stating that a claim submitted as a class action is not
eligible for arbitration at the NYSE).
174. It stated:
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later versions of the exclusion of class actions from arbitration, the
SEC frequently reiterated that it "is an important initiative to
protect investors and the public interest."175 Interestingly, the SEC
chose not to opine on whether the exclusion was also mandated by
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, nor on whether
arbitrators lack the experience and qualifications necessary to
decide class action issues,'76 although both arguments had been
offered during the notice and comment period. 77 Meanwhile, the
NASD believes, and the Commission agrees, that the judicial system has
already developed the procedures to manage class action claims. Entertaining
such claims through arbitration at the NASD would be difficult, duplicative and
wasteful.... The Commission agrees with the NASD's position that, in all
cases, class actions are better handled by the courts and that investors should
have access to the courts to resolve class actions efficiently. In the past,
individuals who attempted to certify class actions in litigation were subject to
the enforcement of their separate arbitration contracts by their broker-dealers.
Without access of class actions in paragraph cases, both investors and broker-
dealers have been put to the expense ofwasteful, duplicative litigation. The new
rule ends this practice.
Over the years of the evolution of class action litigation, the courts have
developed the procedures and expertise for managing class actions. Duplication
of the often complex procedural safeguards necessary for these hybrid lawsuits
is unnecessary. The Commission believes that investor access to the courts
should be preserved for class actions and that the rule change approved herein
provides a sound procedure for the management of class actions arising out of
securities industry disputes between NASD members and their customers.
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From
Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,661.
175. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by American Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating
to Arbitration, 58 Fed. Reg. at 48,681; see also Self-Regulatory Organizations; Pacific Stock
Exchange, Inc., Order GrantingApproval to Proposed Rule Change Relatingto Amendments
to Rule 12, Arbitration, of the Rules of the PSE, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,588, 42,589-90 (1993)
(observing that the measure "should increase customer confidence in the markets and
promote the efficient resolution of disputes for both investors and broker-dealers").
176. The SEC simply set out both positions without choosing a side. See Arbitration
Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,660-61.
177. The comments were offered by Nikko Securities Co. International, which stated that
it favored the class action exclusion because
(i) The procedures mandated by rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have due process implications and require extensive judicial involvement
throughout the entire class action process; (ii) class actions in arbitration
proceedings would be contrary to the arbitration policy goal of having a prompt
resolution of disputes; and (iii) arbitrators do not have the background, training
or expertise to address class actions.
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From
Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,660. The author of the comment letter was Evan
Stewart, who also penned an article criticizing classwide arbitration. See Stewart, supra
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NASD rejected both the due process and the inexperience
arguments, but nonetheless agreed that class actions would be
better handled by the courts than by arbitrators.178
b. Logistical Concerns
Outside the securities context, critics of classwide arbitration
have similarly focused on logistics.179 One logistical difficulty deals
with who chooses the arbitrator, and when this choice is made.
Unlike with individual arbitrations, where a purported advantage
is that all disputants can play a role in selecting the arbitrator, this
advantage is not feasible in the class setting. Rather, the
arbitrators would presumably be selected by the named plaintiffs
or by class counsel, acting as agents for the plaintiff class, and by
defendant or its counsel. In this event, one of the purported virtues
of arbitration is lost, in that the individual disputants have not
directly selected the decisionmaker. In addition, it would be
inappropriate to allow the named plaintiffs or class counsel to make
such a choice unless and until the class was certified.
More generally, critics of classwide arbitration have argued that
the process necessarily will be awkward, inconvenient, and perhaps
inefficient because of the need for extensive coordination between
the judge and the arbitrators in a classwide arbitration.180 This
note 135.
178.
Tihe NASD does not agree that the arbitration process would provide less due
process protection than the courts. Similarly, the NASD did not believe that
arbitrators lack the training and expertise to deal with class action disputes.
Finally, the NASD stated that it did not propose the ban on-class actions in
arbitration proceedings because they might be more time consuming, but rather
because it believes that they are better handled by the judicial system.
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From
Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,660.
179. As will be discussed, these logistical concerns are closely tied to due process concerns.
See infra text accompanying notes 191-95.
180. Commentator Allor stated that "when conducted on a classwide basis, arbitration is
unlikely to remain inexpensive and efficient. It will increase the burden on the judge and
divide authority between the judge and the arbitrator.... [Tihe division of authority over
the proceedings between the judge and the arbitrator would entail many procedural
complications." Allor, supra note 167, at 1253. Justice Richardson of the California Supreme
Court stated: "class procedures would tend to make arbitration inefficient instead of efficient,
lengthy instead of expeditious, and procedural instead of informal.... In my view, because
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criticism is premised on the idea that the Due Process Clause, or
perhaps other policy concerns, will require judges to play a far more
active role in a classwide arbitration than they would play in an
individual arbitration. Specifically, the critics suggest that because
the court must be heavily involved in certification, 8' including
relevant discovery, 112 supervision of notice, 11 ongoing monitoring ofthe adequacy of class representation,'84 providing notice of and
of the complications resulting from continued judicial monitoring, the imposition of class
action procedures on the arbitration process would be self-defeating." Keating v. Superior
Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1215-16 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Similarly, Judge Bloom concluded:
Arbitration does not lend itself to the many subsidiary proceedings incident to
an ongoing class action, e.g. determination ofwhether class action status should
be granted, definition of the class, determination of the nature and kind of
notice and by whom it should be sent, provision for opting out, etc.
Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 70, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (Bloom,
J., dissenting).
181. Attorney C. Evan Stewart explained that the court's determination of certification
must be based on a "rigorous analysis" of whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been
met. See Stewart, supra note 135, at 5 (quoting General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 161 (1982)). Stewart cited a number of additional cases to support his point that parties
seeking certification must satisfy a difficult legal burden: Rosini v. Ogilvy & Mather Inc., 798
F.2d 590, 597 (2d Cir. 1986); Roby v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 775 F.2d 959, 962 (8th
Cir. 1985); Walker v. Jim Dandy, 747 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 1985). See Stewart, supra
note 124, at 6 n.7; see also Keating, 645 P.2d at 1215 (Richardson, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citations omitted) (explaining that to determine whether class proceedings are
appropriate "a court must carefully evaluate the nature of the proof that will be presented
by the parties, and the parties are likely to devote extensive resources to developing the facts
and arguments fully in regard to the usually complex certification issues").
182. In order to make its certification decision, the court must allow sufficient discovery
to support the parties' arguments on certification, and parties often engage in lengthy,
complex battles over the appropriate scope of discovery. See Kupperman & Freeman, supra
note 167, at 1579. Moreover, depositions are often required. See id. at 1583. If standard
arbitration procedures were followed this might be problematic, in that less discovery is
typically available in arbitration. See id. at 1580. Instead, Commentators Kupperman and
Freeman explain that"[ci areful court supervision and monitoring ofa purported class action,
even at the initial stage regarding certification,... is essential." Id. at 1579-80.
183. If the class is certified, the court in most cases must supervise the provision of notice
to absent class members. This function, too, is complex, as parties may battle over who
should receive notice, the form of notice (e.g. mail v. newspaper), the precise wording of the
notice, and the availability of opt-in or opt-out mechanisms. See id.; see also Harris, 441
N.Y.S.2d at 79 (Bloom, J., dissenting) (arguing that a court must be involved in complex
notice issues).
184. Critics believe that this ongoing monitoring will again result in confusion and
inefficiency. See Stewart, supra note 135, at 5 ("[Gliven that judicial involvement would in
fact be required beyond the certification stage, there would be obvious duplication of effort,
as well as confusion for the parties over to whom they should focus their energies."). Justice
Richardson stated that "substantial judicial involvement by the court will be required to
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approving any settlement,'85 and postjudgment determinations of
the scope of class relief,"8 6 it would be extremely confusing and
inefficient to allow an arbitral class action. 8 7 Some critics further
explain that judicial involvement is necessary because arbitrators
lack the qualifications and experience to decide complicated class
issues. 8
monitor the progress of the arbitration and potentially will undermine the arbitrator's
discretion." Keating, 645 P.2d at 1215 (Richardson, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice
Richardson goes on to explain that the Due Process Clause requires the court to examine the
adequacy of representation on a continuing basis, and that this examination must be
stringent. See id.
185. If, as in most cases, a settlement is reached, the court must hold a hearing to allow
any objecting class members to voice their concerns with the settlement, and the court must
ultimately rule on whether the settlement is acceptable. Stewart explained that the judge's
role in approving or disapproving settlements is complex.
A judge must take into account: the distribution of monetary relief and its
appropriateness; other class relief; the completeness of the settlement; the
participation of class members in the settlement, or lack thereof, and the
reasons therefore; the interests of each segment of the class, as well as the class
as a whole; and, the appropriateness of counsel fees.
Stewart, supra note 135, at 5 (citing MANUALFOR COMPLEXLITIGATION § 30.41 (2d ed. 1985)).
He further observed "it is extremely difficult to envision arbitrators dealing with objecting
class members." Id. at 6. Justice Richardson, similarly, explained that in ruling on the
propriety of a settlement, "[tihe court must review the entire proceedings to determine if the
settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate in light of the strength of each party's case,
and take evidence on any substantial objection to the proposed settlement brought by any
class member." Keating, 645 P.2d at 1215 (citation omitted) (Richardson, J., concurring and
dissenting). He emphasized that the traditional absence of a transcript or record in arbitral
proceedings will be problematic, "because without a record... objection to settlements would
be difficult to assess." Id.
186. In instances in which the case does not settle, Justice Richardson foresees that the
absence of a transcript may pose logistical difficulties. "[A] court may have difficulty in
applying an arbitrator's decision to all class members, since it could not determine whether
the arbitrator's judgment was applicable to each member of the class, or based on equities
applicable only to the individual claimant." Keating, 645 P.2d at 1215 (Richardson, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
187. "What sense... would it make to have a court, after it has made a'rigorous analysis'
of the case at the certification stage, bow out and hand over the case for a de novo 'merits'
determination by a panel?" Stewart, supra note 135, at 6.
188. See, e.g., Keating, 645 P.2d at 1215 (Richardson, J., concurring and dissenting)
("[A]rbitrators, of course, are not necessarily either lawyers or judges. Requiring the
administration of complex class procedures during arbitration may either make lay experts
unavailable as arbitrators as a practical matter, or result in intrusive judicial participation
and supervision."); Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 167, at 1591-92 (questioningwhether
arbitrators have experience and qualifications to decide not only class issues, but also
substantive legal issues in complex cases); cf Order Approving Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg.
52,659, 52,660 (1992) (summarizing the NASD's rejection of the argument that arbitrators
lack requisite expertise to resolve class action issues); Stewart, supra note 135, at 5
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Interestingly, interviews with several attorney participants in
some of the few classwide arbitrations that have taken place to date
did not tend to support these concerns. The attorneys uniformly
reported that the hybrid process had worked relatively smoothly,
and that they had not found the combination ofjudicial and arbitral
decisionmaking to be inefficient as compared to class action
litigation."i 9 However, it should also be noted that none of the
attorneys reported that the arbitral class action was particularly
more efficient than class action litigation.19
c. Due Process Concerns
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
class actions raise due process concerns.' 9 ' Specifically, a class
action cannot be held to be binding as to nonparticipating class
members unless, because of the structure and supervision of the
class action, their interests were adequately protected.' 92 A number
of critics of arbitral class actions have suggested that these due
process concerns pose a major hurdle for arbitral class actions.
Specifically, they contend that while substantial court supervision
and involvement will purportedly pose major logistical problems, as
discussed above, that such involvement is nonetheless mandated by
the Due Process Clause."' Evan Stewart makes the point bluntly:
(asserting that the argument that arbitrators lack sufficient expertise and training to decide
class action issues is a "red herring," in that although the author believes arbitrators lack
such experience, the Supreme Court has already ruled that they may decide statutory claims
under RICO, ERISA, and the securities acts, which are equally complex).
189. See supra note 168.
190. See id.
191. See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
193. Not everyone accepts the proposition that arbitral class actions raise due process
concerns, or certainly that such concerns mandate intensive court involvement. See Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From Arbitraion
Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,660-61 (summarizing the NASD's view that arbitration
process would not be less protective of due process than the courts); Quagmire, supra note
41, at 800-04 (expressing ambivalence as to whether constitutional concerns would apply to
private classwide arbitration).
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The fundamental problem is more basic: the procedures
mandated by Rule 23 have due process implications and require
extensive judicial involvement throughout the entire class
action process. The court's role at the certification stage can not
suddenly be stopped; it must carry on to such stages as notice,
settlement, protection of class members, etc. It is inconceivable
to believe that non-Article IH arbitrators could properly
oversee, for example, the notice procedures mandated by the
Supreme Court. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to envision
arbitrators dealing with objecting class members. Other and
equally obvious problems (e.g., fairness of settlement, protection
of absent class members, etc.) are no less daunting."9
Similarly, Justice Richardson stated:
Because of the due process safeguards required to keep class
members apprised of the course of the litigation, substantial
judicial involvement by the court will be required to monitor the
progress of the arbitration and potentially will undermine the
arbitrator's discretion. In fact, the court's due process
responsibilities include the duty to "undertake a stringent and
continuing examination of the adequacy of representation by
the named class representative at all stages of the litigation."'95
I argue within that these due process concerns must be carefully
considered in determining how courts should handle the confluence
of class actions with binding arbitration.
II. THE CURRENT LAW: WHEN ARBITRATION MEETS THE CLASS
ACTION
Courts that have considered questions relatingto arbitration and
class actions have not typically focused on the "big picture" issue of
whether companies should be permitted to use binding arbitration
194. Stewart, supra note 135, at 6.
195. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1215 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting National Ass'n ofReg'l Med. Programs, Inc. v. Mathews,
551 F.2d 340, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977)).
2000]
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to eliminate the class action remedy. Instead, likely because of the
litigation approaches of the attorneys, most courts have addressed
these cases on a piecemeal basis, taking on only one issue at a time,
as discussed below. That is, courts have not typically addressed the
fact that if class actions are referred to arbitration, and if arbitral
class actions are prohibited, plaintiffs will not be permitted to
proceed by way of class action in any venue.
196
A. Effects of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements Upon Class
Actions
When companies have sought to use arbitration agreements to
prevent consumers or others from bringing class actions, plaintiffs
have typically offered three responses: (1) the arbitration agree-
ment, virtually always imposed as a contract of adhesion, 197 is
invalid; (2) arbitration is not appropriate for their class claims; and
(3) if arbitration is appropriate, the court ought to order that class
arbitration is permissible. 198 To date, none of these arguments has
proved particularly successful, although each has prevailed on
occasion.
196. There are a few exceptions. See infra notes 231-45 and accompanying text (discussing
three courts' decision to void, on unconscionability or federal statutory grounds, arbitration
agreements that would have prevented plaintiffs from proceedingbyway of class action); see
also infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text (discussing opinions stating that class actions
should not be required to be arbitrated because this would deprive plaintiffs of the ability to
obtain effective relief); cf Thompson v. Illinois Title Loans, Inc., No. 99 C 3952, 2000 WL
45493, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that mandating
arbitration of Truth in Lending Act claim would violate that statute by depriving plaintiff of
the right to proceed by way of class action); Sagal v. First USA Bank, N.A., 69 F. Supp. 2d
627, 631-32 (D. Del. 1999) (same); Lopez v. Plaza Fin. Co., No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL 210073,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 1996) (same).
197. By contract of adhesion I mean nothing more than a term that is imposed, typically
in a form in small print, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. See supra note 3.
198. Note that it may be difficult for a plaintiff to attempt to argue both that arbitration
should not be permitted, because class litigation is essential, and that if arbitration is
ordered the court should order classwide arbitration. To prevail on the first argument,
plaintiff will try to convince the court that arbitration is not an effective remedy. But, to
prevail on the second, plaintiff will try to convince the court that classwide arbitration is
workable and desirable. In short, there is some tension between the two arguments, which
may explain why most plaintiffs choose only one.
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1. Mandatory Binding Arbitration may be Imposed by
Contracts of Adhesion
Despite - the arguments of this author199  and many
others,220 most courts are currently willing to enforce arbitration
agreements that are imposed as contracts of adhesion, absent other
problems with the clause. Inspired by the Supreme Court's
201heightened enthusiasm for arbitration, in case after case, most
federal and state courts have found that arbitration may be
compelled based on clauses contained in small writing and
inconspicuous locations in form contracts,2 2 in employee handbooks
199. See Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 68, at 637-74 (1996) (arguing that, as a matter
of legislative history and policy, courts should not enforce arbitration clauses imposed by
companies on consumers, employees, franchisees, or other "little guys" through contracts of
adhesion); Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 47-48 (arguing that courts have been too
willing to reject constitutional challenges to mandatory binding arbitration, and suggesting
that some clauses may be subject to challenge); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Compelling
Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have
Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273 (1999) (using historical arguments to contend that claims
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, should not be subject to
mandatory arbitration).
200. See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 75, at 333 (critiquing Supreme Court's
arbitrationjurisprudence as hostile to consumers and employees); Schwartz, supra note 75,
at 60-61 (arguing that big business is using arbitral contracts of adhesion to gain unfair
advantages); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah. Arbitral
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996) (arguing for a
reinvigoration of consent concepts that would invalidate some arbitration clauses).
201. As discussed above, see supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to favor arbitration, not only where
it is entered into knowingly by two businesses, but also where it is imposed by a company
through a contract of adhesion on its customers or employees.
202. See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the fact that the arbitration clause imposed on borrowers was contained in
fine print on the back of a form contract does not render that term unconscionable); Adams
v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696, 700-01 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the arbitration clause imposed by brokerage on customers is not unenforceable merely
because it is "form boilerplate"); Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282,287-88
(9th Cir. 1988) ("We know ofno case holding that parties dealing at arm's length have a duty
to explain to each other the terms of a written contract .... We see no unfairness in
expecting parties to read contracts before they sign them .... We are unable to understand
how any person possessing a basic education and fluent in the English language could fail
to grasp the meaning of that provision."); McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C94-0627
FMS, 1994 WL 387852, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994) (compelling arbitration based on
clause contained in forms used for "reverse mortgage loans," though plaintiffs were a group
ofsenior citizen homeowners who claimed theyhad no idea that theywere waiving important
rights); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Vintson, No. 1972191, 1999 WL 778496, at *1 (Ala. Oct. 1,
1999) (holding enforceable arbitration clause contained in paragraph 14 of financing
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or related documents,2 0 3 in flyers contained in mailings with bills or
other statements, °4 in packaging that arrives with a computer,0 5
or in medical consent or HMO forms or contracts.20 6 Courts and
commentators have defended such clauses on the ground that form
contracts of adhesion are common, efficient, and generally accepted
in today's economy.20
documents accompanying purchase of mobile home).
203. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 17
(1st Cir. 1999) ("Absent a showing of fraud or oppressive conduct," Form U-4 was not
unenforceable on grounds that it was a contract of adhesion); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital
Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366-67 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 44 (1999) (holding
that pursuant to Illinois law, brokerage employee could not avoid arbitral provision merely
by arguing that it was imposed on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis); Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that arbitration clause
contained in handbook was an enforceable contract, where employee signed acknowledgment
form including arbitration provision-even though the handbook contained a clause stating
that it was not a contract); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (holding that securities industry employee who had been required to sign Form U-4
calling for arbitration would have to arbitrate rather than litigate ADEA claims, but failing
to address adhesion argument).
204. See, e.g., Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., No. CIVA. 2:98CV231GR, 2000
WL 424232, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 2000) (compelling arbitration where bank imposed
arbitration by enclosing clause as part of change of terms notice, although account did not
originally require arbitration and customer signed nothing calling for arbitration); Perry v.
Beneficial Nat'l Bank USA, No. Civ. A. CV97-218, 1998 WL 279174, at *1 (Ala. Cir. Ct. May
15, 1998) (stating that although the credit card agreement did not contain an arbitration
provision when initially obtained, when the new Bank purchased the accounts receivable and
amended the terms of the credit card to require arbitration, customer was bound by such).
But see Long v. Fidelity Water Sys., Inc., No. C-97-20118 RMW (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2000)
(finding plaintiffs had failed to "agree" to arbitration where defendants imposed arbitration
by mailing clause as part of change of terms notice) (on file with author).
205. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (mandating
arbitration which was imposed by the company via a clause included as part of the "terms
and conditions" clause contained in the box with the computer ordered by mail, when
consumer failed to reject arbitration by returning computer within 30 days). See generally
Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on
Consumers, FLA. B. J., Nov. 1997, at 8 (critiquing Gateway on statutory, contractual, and
constitutional grounds).
206. See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 361-62 (Utah 1996) (refusing to void an
arbitration agreement that required a medical malpractice claim to be heard by a panel of
board-certified ortholpedic surgeons, in that patient had two-week period to reject clause); cf
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 917-21 (Cal. 1997) (holding that
arbitration clause imposed by HMO potentially could be voided for fraud because company
gave false assurances as to speed of arbitration).
207. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 5, at 51-81; Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration
as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29
MCGEORGE L. REv. 195, 196, 210-13 (1998) (arguing that law governing arbitration ought to
be"an island of contract in a sea of anti-contract" law often governing consumer transactions,
and urging that providing consumers with the ability to contract away the right to litigate
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There are some rare exceptions. In a few highly-publicized cases,
several courts have recently relied on a combination of statutory,
policy, and constitutional analyses to refuse to enforce at least
certain arbitration clauses imposed through contracts of ad-
hesion. o0 Even these cases, however, have not voided the clauses
simply because they were imposed as contracts of adhesion, but
rather relied on other factors and arguments.0 9 Thus, while a
company would be well advised to give its customers or employees
the clearest notice possible, and to explain the scope of the
arbitration clause with particularity, companies in most
jurisdictions in this country can feel comfortable that if they use a
form contract to impose arbitration on their customers or patients,
a court will not refuse to enforce the clause on that ground alone.210
2. No General Class Action Exemption from Arbitration
Some plaintiffs have attempted to argue that even though it
may be permissible for companies to impose binding arbitration
will enhance their freedom and autonomy and add value to their transactions); see also
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,593-95 (1991) (noting that form contracts
often provide benefits for all concerned, and upholdingthe validity ofaforum selection clause
contained in small print on a boat ticket).
208. See, e.g., Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 20-21 (holding that 'where appropriate" language
of Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be interpreted to preclude mandatory arbitration of
employment claims by a securities employee who, although she signed a Form U-4 calling
for arbitration of claims required to be arbitrated by stock exchange rules, was never
provided with a copy of those rules); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182,
1189-90 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 525 U.S. 982 (1998), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996
(1998) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 precluded employer from using pre-dispute
arbitration agretiments to compel employee to arbitrate Title VII claims, where employee was
not given the choice of whether to accept arbitration); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d
273, 277 (1998) (finding that bank customers had not consented to arbitration merely by
agreeing that the bank could unilaterally change any"term, condition, service or feature" of
the account); see also Seifertv. United States Home Corp., 1999 WL 1044175, at*1 (Fla. Nov.
18, 1999) (taking notice of policy arguments opposing deprivation of jury trial rights in
holding that agreement to arbitrate contained in purchase and sales agreement did not
mandate arbitration of subsequent tort action based on common law duties).
209. See, e.g.,Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 16-17 (rejecting the argument that arbitration clause
imposed on employee was void on unconscionability grounds because it was a contract of
adhesion); Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288 (implying that it might have been permissible for
the bank to include a mandatory ADRprovision in the account agreement, had it done so in
the first instance).
210. Cf In re Turner Bros. Trucking Co., 1999 WL 1054787, at *1 (Tex. App. Nov. 23,
1999) (refusing to compel arbitration that was mandatorily imposed on functionally illiterate
employee).
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through contracts of adhesion, arbitration cannot ever be re-
quired when it would deprive plaintiffs of their right to proceed
by way of class action in court.21' Generally, as will be discussed,
this broad argument has not proved successful.212 Nonetheless,
the argument that class actions are never arbitrable has been
accepted by a few lower courts, although two of these three
decisions have been reversed on appeal.21 For example, in In re
Knepp, 214 the one decision which was not reversed, plaintiffbrought
a consumer class action in the bankruptcy context21 5 and opposed
binding arbitration in part because it "interferes with class action
relief and consequently eliminates any reasonable opportunity for
211. In the cases discussed here, the arbitration clause and accompanying rules did not
expressly allow or disallow class actions. Where the rules explicitly prohibit class actions or
state that class actions may not be arbitrated, a plaintiff can make a separate and stronger
argument that it would be inappropriate to mandate arbitration. See infra text accompanying
notes 357-59.
212. See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text. However, other more narrow
arguments have worked, based on the language of the clause, a particular statute, or
unconscionability. See infra notes 226-45 and accompanying text.
213. In Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975),
plaintiffs brought a class action against 25 stock brokerages, alleging overcharges on margin
accounts. Although the named plaintiff who maintained an account with Drexel Burnham
had signed an arbitration agreement, the trial court refused to compel arbitration, in part
on the ground that
[w]hile the policy of the law is in favor of arbitration, it is also the policy of the
law that class actions shall not be subverted by depriving the class of its
representative, and in a case such as this the two policies clash. The policy
which should prevail is the one against subversion of class actions.
Id. at 150 (alteration in original). The appellate court reversed, finding that "in the instant
case, the policy of law favoring arbitration prevails over the policy of law pertaining to class
actions." Id. at 152. The court expounded on this policy at some length, stating, "[tihe
sanctity of valid contractual agreements in a free society, such as ours, is of paramount
importance and is rooted in both the United States and California Constitutions, which
predate and outweigh the body of law on class actions as presently evolving." Id. at 153.
Similarly, in Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), a suit in
which a class of condominium purchasers sued vendors for failing to disclose that various
fees would be assessed in the future, the lower court refused to compel arbitration based on
a clause found in the escrow agreement, observing that"the Court is unable to find any cases
in which a class action lawsuit was ordered into arbitration." Id. at 316. On appeal, the
Superior Court rejected this analysis, remanding the dispute so that the trial court could
consider whether itwould be appropriate to resolve the dispute through class arbitration. See
id. at 320-22.
214. 229 B.R. 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
215. The case was a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding in which debtors filed an
adversary complaint against the creditor that had financed the purchase of their car, alleging
fraud, civil conspiracy, and violations of the Alabama Mini-Code. See id. at 827.
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effective redress."216 The bankruptcy judge accepted the argument,
explaining:
If [courts continue to preclude the use of class actions in
arbitration] the pervasive use of arbitration agreements in
consumer contracts could have the effect of eliminating class
actions as an option available to aggrieved consumers. If class
actions are no longer an option, the vast majority of consumer
claims involving relatively small sums of money on an
individual basis will be left without a remedy.217
Similarly, while several individual judges have accepted the
argument, all either wrote in concurrence or in dissent.21 8 For
216. Id. at 841.
217. Id. at 842. The court further stated: "This Court concludes that the Plaintiff would
be prejudiced in prosecuting this action as a class action if arbitration were enforced." Id.
218. Two judges, dissenting in Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 70
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981), reasoned that it would be inappropriate to compel arbitration of
plaintiffs' consumer class action. Judge Sandier stated:
As the majority opinion acknowledges, absent the arbitration agreement,
"plaintiffs might have a strong case for class action certification since the
institution of an individual lawsuit for the paltry sum at issue would be self-
defeating."
mhe sum in question is likely to discourage most if not all of the allegedly
aggrieved persons from incurring the expense of prosecuting even an
arbitration proceeding. The nature of arbitration proceedings makes it unlikely
that a successful determination in favor of one person would result in
restitution to the others. Indeed there is no assurance that a successful
determination in favor of a single complainant would alter the practices here
challenged.
In short, not only does a class action appear to be the most suitable means
for addressing the issues presented, but there are compelling reasons to believe
that individual arbitration proceedings would be wholly ineffective to redress
whatever wrongs may be found to have occurred.
Id. at 76-77 (Sandler, J., dissenting). Judge Sandier also expressed concern with the fact that
the practice of mandating arbitration was industrywide, stating that this fact bolstered the
public policy argument for favoring the class action over an arbitration. See id. Judge Bloom
similarly reasoned that the class action should prevail over arbitration to ensure that the
wrongdoer was not favored. See id. at 77-79 (Bloom, J., dissenting). He stated:
While the loss to the class by reason of Shearson's actions may aggregate
millions of dollars, the loss to each member of the class may well be so
miniscule as to make it scarcely practical to resort to arbitration with the
expense incident thereto. Indeed, were it not for the class action the practicality
of litigation would be substantially non-existent.
Id. at 79. Judge Bloom also rejected the feasibility of "class arbitration." See id.
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example, California Supreme Court Justice Richardson, concurring
and dissenting in Keating v. Superior Court,19 suggested that even
though it might generally be appropriate to mandate individualized
arbitration of claims brought as class actions, it would not be
appropriate "where an arbitration clause in an adhesion contract
would allow the stronger party to evade responsibility for its
acts."220
Far more courts have explicitly held that the mere fact that a suit
is captioned as a class action does not render it exempt from being
sent to arbitration. For example, although the California Supreme
Court in Keating considered the possibility of ruling that
"arbitration agreements contained in contracts of adhesion may not
operate to stay properly maintainable class actions, 2 1 it ultimately
concluded: "The statutes and public policy supportive of arbitration
require.., that [litigation] be avoided if means are available to give
expression to the basic arbitration commitment of the parties. 22
219. 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982).
220. Id. at 1217. Justice Richardson was concerned about"a case where class proceedings
provide the only economical method of presenting a claim." Id. In such a situatibn, he opined
that the clause should "be found oppressive and... invalidated. In instances where an
arbitration clause would effectively deny relief to the weaker party in an adhesion contract,
relief under settled principles of law would potentially be available." Id. Rejecting the
broader suggestion made by some, that "arbitration agreements contained in contracts of
adhesion may not operate to stay properly maintainable class actions," id., Richardson
instead proposed using a"reasonable expectations" analysis to void those clauses which were
particularly oppressive. See id. In the instant case, a group of franchisees had failed to allege,
much less prove, that they would be unable to pursue their claim against the franchisor
without the class action procedure. See id.
221. Id. at 1207.
222. Id. The court went on to remand the dispute to the trial court so that it could rule
on whether plaintiffs should be permitted to proceed with an arbitral class action. See id. at
1209-10; see also Nielsen v. Greenwood, No. 91C6537, 1993 WL 144857, at *6 (N.D. IlM. Feb.
26, 1993) (holding that "[tihe strong federal policy in favor of arbitration is not outweighed
by Plaintiffs' desire for class treatment of their claims against PJH"), vacated, 873 F. Supp.
138 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (ruling that subsequent adoption by the NASD of rule prohibiting
arbitration of class actions should be applied to allow plaintiffs to pursue their claims in
court), and affd sub nom. Nielsen v. Piper, 66 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1995); Erickson v.
PaineWebber Inc., No. 87C10592, 1990 WL 104152, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1990) (holding
that class action brought on behalf of purchasers of allegedly fraudulent investment and tax
shelter program could not evade arbitration required by Client Commodity agreement, even
though plaintiffs asserted that arbitration would deprive them of an appropriate forum to
hear their class claims); Perry v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank USA, No. CIV.A.CV97-218, 1998 WL
279174, at *1 (Ala. Cir. Ct. May 15, 1998) (stating class action allegations do not defeat
arbitration clause because any person who agreed to arbitrate cannot be part of class);
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Several other courts similarly have emphasized that where the
arbitration agreement is silent, it cannot be assumed that the
parties meant to exclude a class action from arbitration.223 A
number of courts have expressed a concern that making class
actions nonarbitrable would make it too easy for persons to evade
arbitration, simply by constructing their claim as a class action.2"
Some of the courts that ordered class claims to be arbitrated did so
Steinberg v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 1986 WL 5024, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 1986)
(compelling arbitration of class claims because arbitration is favored); Harris v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (mandating arbitration of
class claim brought by customers against brokerage because state law does not justify
avoiding arbitration on such a basis, and because policy arguments favor arbitration).
223. See, e.g., Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (observing that a plaintiff "who has agreed to arbitrate all claims arising out
of her employment may not avoid arbitration by pursuing class claims"); Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77, 84 (D. Conn. 1996) (concluding that class actions are
not excluded from arbitration by terms of arbitration clause between franchisor and
franchisees); Coleman v. National Movie-Dine Inc., 449 F. Supp. 945, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(concluding that class action brought on behalf of movie distributors must be arbitrated,
given the broad arbitration clause, which lacked an express provision excluding class
actions).
224. See, e.g., Meyers v. Univest Home Loan, Inc., No. C-93-1873, 1993 WL 307747, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1993). The court compelled arbitration of a consumer class action and
stated:
To rule otherwise would be to carve a gaping exception into the Arbitration Act:
any California consumer could circumvent an agreement to arbitrate by
bringing her claim "on behalf of the general public" and praying for injunctive
relief. Such an exception would plainly undermine Congress's policy to promote
the enforceability of such agreements.
Id. at *5 n.8; Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)
("A class action cannot be used to subvert an otherwise enforceable agreement to arbitrate
contained in a valid contract merely because other individuals, who might qualify as
members of a class, were subject to the same provision."); Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (requiring that employee
arbitrate claim for unfair business practices and observing that class members should not
be allowed "to evade the terms of the [arbitration] agreement simply by bringing their action
together as a'class' rather than as individuals"); Leason v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, No. 6914, 1984 WL 8232, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 23, 1984) (compelling arbitration of
class claim on ground that "responsibility to arbitrate cannot be evaded by asserting claims
through a class," even while recognizing that "the arbitration defense might prove a potent,
and decisive economic barrier to obtaining complete legal relief'); see also Coleman, 449 F.
Supp. at 948 ("Arbitration should not be foreclosed simply by adding persons to a civil action
who are not parties to the arbitration agreement because such an inclusion would thwart the
federal policy in favor of arbitration."). But see Harris, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (Sandler, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that there is a risk that rule of excluding class actions from
arbitration would be abused, but doubting that risk is "substantial" in that "[tihe common
run of arbitration litigation involves commercial disputes between business entities of a kind
clearly unsuited to class action").
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based on the reasoning that the two techniques are not
inconsistent, and that a class action could be conducted in the
arbitration context.225
3. Specific Wording of Arbitration Clauses and Relevant Rules
Most of the arbitration clauses that have been litigated to date do
not expressly address the availability of class action relief, but the
precise wording of those that do may prove critical to courts'
decisions. In the securities industry, arbitration rules since 1992
have stated that class action claims are not arbitrable.22 Numerous
courts have interpreted these rules to mean that plaintiffs may
litigate class action claims, and need only arbitrate individual
claims. 27 By contrast, in a recent case in which the arbitration
clause expressly prohibited class action, except with all parties'
consent, the court compelled individual arbitration.22 It rejected
plaintiffs' argument that the prohibition was void based on public
225. See, e.g., Keating, 645 P.2d at 1206-10 (ordering arbitration but remanding to trial
court the question of whether arbitration should proceed by way of class action); Izzi v.
Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320-23 (Cal. App. 1986) (ordering arbitration of
class claims brought by condominium purchasers, and remanding to trial court the question
of whether arbitration itself should proceed byway of class action).
226. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of these
rules.
227. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that contract prohibited compelled arbitration); Olde Discount Corp. v. Hubbard,
4 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1271 (D. Kan. 1998) (concluding that because "[t]he plain language of the
arbitration agreements and incorporated rules dictates that Mr. Hubbard's [class action race
discrimination] claim is ineligible for arbitration at this time," it would be inappropriate for
court to compel arbitration of such claim), aftd, 172 F.3d 879 (10th Cir. 1999); Martens v.
Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding class action claim not
arbitrable because U-4 forms signed by plaintiffs stated that class actions suits are not
subject to NASD arbitration); In re Regal Communications Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 94-179,1995
WL 550454, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1995) (holding plaintiffs class action claim was not
subject to mandatory arbitration because "[bloth the NYSE and NASD have promulgated
rules which make any claim filed as a class action ineligible for arbitration"); Scher v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 866 F. Supp. 776, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that class
actions are not subject to compulsory arbitration under NASD rules); Berger v. E*Trade
Group, Inc., No. 600721/99, 2000 WL 360092, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Mar. 28, 2000) (holding class
action securities claims could not be arbitrated until class certification was denied).
228. See Zawikowski v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, No. 98C2178, 1999 WL 35304, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. 1999) (involving a consumer class action brought against H&R Block).
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policy grounds, 229 instead stating "[n]othing prevents the Plaintiffs
from contracting away their right to a class action."230
4. Recent Decisions Voiding Arbitration Agreements that
Prohibited Class Actions
Two cases have applied unconscionability concepts to void
arbitration clauses in part because they would have denied
plaintiffs the chance to litigate as a class.231 Powertel, Inc. v.
Bexley,2 2 a Florida decision, involved a plaintiff who filed a class
action claiming that her cellular phone service had improperly
charged her $4.50 for long distance calls when in fact the calls were
made within the local area.233 The day after plaintiff filed a
complaint, she received her bill and a new mandatory arbitration
provision.' The court refused to enforce this provision not only
because it was retroactive, but also because it was
unconscionable-in part because it deprived plaintiff of the
opportunity to proceed by way of class action.23 5 The court
explained:
The arbitration clause also effectively removes Powerters
exposure to any remedy that could be pursued on behalf of a
class of consumers .... Class litigation provides the most
economically feasible remedy for the kind ofclaim that has been
229. See id. at *2.
230. Id.; see also Doctor'sAssocs., Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77, 80 (D. Conn.
1996) (stating that dispute was arbitrable because arbitration agreement required individual
arbitration and precluded consolidation, emphasizing that defendant had demanded separate
arbitrations and had not sought to consolidate them, and implying that classwide arbitration
would not be available).
231. A third decision held that plaintiff, a putative class member, had not "agreed" to
arbitration imposed through a change in terms notice, in part because the company did not
adequately inform him of the pending class action. See Long v. Fidelity Water Sys., Inc., No.
C-97-20118 RMW (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2000) (on file with author). Not all courts have found
the use of arbitration clauses to eliminate class actions unconscionable. See In re
RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (rejecting
argument that arbitration clause was unconscionable because it would preclude bringing
claims on a class basis).
232. 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
233. See id at 572.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 574.
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asserted here. The potential claims are too small to litigate
individually, but collectively they might amount to a large sum
of money. The prospect of class litigation ordinarily has some
deterrent effect on a manufacturer or service provider, but that
is absent here. By requiring arbitration of all claims, Powertel
has precluded the possibility that a group of its customers
might join together to seek relief that would be impractical for
any of them to obtain alone. Again, this is an advantage that
inures only to Powertel. The arbitration clause precludes class
litigation by either party, but it is difficult to envision a scenario
in which that would work to Powertel's detriment."6
Similarly, in Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.2"' a California
court of appeal voided as unconscionable an arbitration clause
imposed by an employer on its employees, relying in part on the fact
that the clause expressly deprived the arbitrator of the power to
hear class actions.38
Another decision, Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc.," relies on two
federal statutes, rather than unconscionability doctrine, to void an
arbitration clause as applied to a putative class action. Plaintiff
Terry Johnson had filed suit under both the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA)24 ° and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA)2" alleging
that defendants violated the rights of class members "by failing to
properly disclose the excessively high rates of interest which they
charge for their short-term loans and by requiring borrowers to
consent to a complicated electronic fund transfer scheme in order
236. Id. at 576. The court also noted that the clause limited defendant's liability to actual
damages, and forced plaintiffs to waive statutory remedies of injunctive and declaratory
relief. See id.
237. 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal.
2000).
238. See id. at 918-19. The court also found other aspects of the clause unfair, in that it
limited discovery, shortened the statute of limitations, and limited available damages. See
id.
The limitations imposed by the arbitration agreement on class actions and on
the rights and remedies available to its employees and prospective employees
are relevant to the question of the agreement's unconscionability. We need not
and do not here determine if, in and of themselves, they provide alternative
bases for upholding the trial court's ruling.
Id.
239. 82 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D. Del. 1999) [See EDITOR'S NOTE, supra note 34].
240. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67 (1994).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1994).
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to obtain these loans." 2 The court held that because a ruling
compelling arbitration of claims brought under these statutes
"would contravene the express congressional intent to 'encourage
the use of class actions as an important tool for enforcing
Truth in Lending"' 4 and also the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act,2' it would not enforce the arbitration clause as applied to
claims brought under those statutes. 45
5. Class Actions Frequently are Ordered to Arbitration
In sum, with certain important exceptions noted above, most
courts have been willing to order cases styled as class actions to
arbitration. Thus, the next question becomes whether the
arbitration itself will be handled as a class action, or as an
individual claim. This seemingly straightforward issue has many
aspects, as will be discussed below. It should also be noted that
many courts have compelled arbitration of putative class actions
without addressing the question of whether the arbitration will
potentially proceed as a class action or only as an individual suit. 6
242. Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
243. Id. at267 (quotingBantolinav. AlohaMotors, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1116,1120 (D. Haw.
1976)). Note that several other courts, most in the Northern District of Illinois, have rejected
the argument that courts cannot compel arbitration of class actions brought under TILA. See
Brown v. Surety Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 99 C 2405, 2000 WL 528631, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24,
2000); Thompson v. Illinois Title Loans, Inc., No. 99 C 3952,2000 WL 45493, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 11, 2000); Sagal v. First USA Bank, NA, 69 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (D. Del. 1999);
Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1418 (M.D. Ala. 1997), rev'd on other
grounds, 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (No. 99-1235);
Lopez v. Plaza Fin. Co., No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL 210073, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 1996); see
also Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., No. CIV. A. 2:98CV231GR, 2000 WL 424232,
at *6-7 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 2000) (rejecting argument that imposition of arbitration would
violate the Truth in Savings Act by eliminating the opportunity to proceed by class action).
244. The court found that although EFTA itself had no legislative history explicitly
spelling out the importance of class actions, the fact that Congress had chosen to use the
same language as in TILA allowed the court to presume that Congress was similarly trying
to encourage class actions. See Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
245. See id. at 272. This Article will discuss the court's reasoning in more detail. See infra
text accompanying notes 385-99.
246. See, e.g., Zawikowski v. Beneficial Natl Bank, No. 98 C 2178, 1999 WL 35304, at *2
n.2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1999) (noting that because agreement precluded class actions, court
ordered arbitration but stating that "[t]he parties have not briefed, and I do not reach,
whether the class's claims may be consolidated in arbitration"); Erickson v. PaineWebber
Inc., No. 87C 10592,1990 WL 104152, at *1 (N.D. I1. July 13,1990) (holding that class action
claims must be arbitrated given wording of clause, but failing to address whether arbitration
would be handled individually or as class action); Coleman v. National Movie-Dine, Inc., 449
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6. Class Actions in Arbitration
The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on whether arbitrations
may be handled as class actions, but has suggested, in dicta, that
such a proceeding might be possible.247 In Gilmer, the plaintiff in an
ADEA suit opposed arbitration partly on the ground that he would
be deprived of the opportunity to proceed by way of class action."8
The Court rejected plaintiffs argument without issuing a holding
on the subject of arbitral class actions. It implied, first, that
arbitrators might have the authority to allow for a class action
under the NYSE rules. 49 In so stating, the Court suggested that
class actions and arbitration are not entirely incompatible. Second,
the Court explained that even if plaintiff were deprived of the
opportunity to proceed by class action, this deprivation would not
necessarily violate the ADEA.250 Third, the Court emphasized that
the arbitration agreement would not, in any event, prohibit the
EEOC from bringing an action seeking, classwide relief.251 Thus,
while Gilmer leaves unanswered many questions regarding the
availability of classwide arbitration, it hints that the resolution may
depend upon the wording of the arbitration clause and upon the
language of the relevant statute under which plaintiffs claim is
brought.
In determining whether an arbitration may be handled as a class
action, one -would expect courts to have addressed the subsidiary
but seemingly crucial question of whether this decision should
be made by a court or by the arbitrators. That is, does the court
F. Supp. 945, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (same); Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 125 Cal. Rptr.
147,152 nn.4, 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (same); Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (same); Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 70, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (same).
247. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
248. See id. Plaintiffcontended that if he were denied the right to proceed by class action,
he would be deprived of his rights under the ADEA. See id.
249. See id. (stating that the NYSE rules "provide for collective proceedings").
250. See id. ("[elven if the arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief
could not be granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility
of bringing a collective action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were
intended to be barred.") (quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221,241 (3d Cir. 1989)
(Becker, J., dissenting)). Interestingly, Judge Becker's dissent itself stated that"arbitrations
may in fact go forward as class actions." Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 240 (Becker, J., dissenting).
251. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
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have the authority to order that a dispute either shall or shall
not be handled as a class action by the arbitrators? Or, is this an
issue that should be resolved by the arbitrators themselves?
Unfortunately, courts typically have not focused on this distinction,
instead generally making the ruling themselves without even
addressing the question of leaving it to the arbitrators.252
Addressing the availability of an arbitral class action, lower
courts have often stated that the answer varies depending upon the
language of the arbitration agreement as well as any rules that are
adopted by that agreement. The following section will therefore first
summarize extant law regarding when the clause is silent, and then
when the clause explicitly addresses the availability of classwide
relief.
a. Interpreting Silence in Agreements
i. Classwide Arbitration Permitted
Several courts-almost all state courts in California-have held
that a court may order an arbitration to be handled as a class
action, even though the arbitration clause is silent on the issue. 53
252. The few courts that have addressed the question have reached disparate conclusions.
Compare Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(observing that while in theory court could allow arbitrator to make class determinations,
it would seem preferable to have court do so, in order to be less disruptive to arbitral
proceeding), with McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C 94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL 387852, at
*8-9 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994) (stating that while court lacks authority, absent explicit
language, to order arbitration to proceed on class basis, arbitrators themselves are free to
decide whether arbitration rules permit class actions). Cf SterlingTruck Corp. v. Allegheny
Ford Truck Sales, No. 1:00-CV-565 (N.D. Ohio May 23, 2000) (holding that only the
arbitrator may decide whether 21 disputes should be consolidated or handled individually)
(on file with author).
253. The question of whether the FAA might preempt this California interpretation was
flagged but not resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 8-9 (1984), in which the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to address the question. The
California appellate court later reasoned that the FAAdid not preempt California's decisional
law allowing classwide arbitration where the agreement is silent, because California's
approach "neither contradicts the contractual terms nor contravenes the policy behind the
act." Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779,790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 2338 (1999). While recognizing that one federal circuit and several federal district
courts had ruled that classwide arbitration was impermissible, absent an express agreement
to arbitrate class claims, see id. at 788-89, the California court emphasized that it was not
bound by those decisions and that the U.S. Supreme Court had not ruled on the question. See
id. at 788. Keating was reversed on other grounds in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1 (1984), in which the Supreme Court held that the California Supreme Court had erred in
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The leading case is Keating v. Superior Court,254 in which the
California Supreme Court developed a balancing test that trial
courts should apply in deciding whether to permit an arbitration to
proceed as a class action.255 In so doing, the court drew on policy
arguments supporting class actions256 and favoring the protection
of weaker parties against unfair treatment.257 Keating also cited the
policies favoring arbitration in refusing to eliminate arbitration of
class claims.258 Keating recognized that classwide arbitration would
holding that claims brought under the California Franchise Investment Law were
nonarbitrable.
254. Keating was reversed on other grounds in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984). See supra note 253.
255. The Keating court envisioned that the trial court would exercise its discretion to
decide whether classwide arbitration would be appropriate, weighing the administrative
costs of necessary court involvement in the arbitral process against the likely costs and
unfairness which would ensue if all of the claimants were required to arbitrate their claims
individually. See id. at 1209-10. "If the alternative in a case of this sort is to force hundreds
of individual franchisees each to litigate its cause with Southland in a separate arbitral
forum, then the prospect of classwide arbitration, for all its difficulties, may offer a better,
more efficient, and fairer solution." Id. at 1209. Keating also asserted that the trial court
should consider whether any other options, such as consolidation of individual claims, might
be superior. See id. at 1209-10. Thus, having laid out this balancing test the California
Supreme Court remanded the dispute to the trial court to make a determination on classwide
arbitration. See id. at 1210. Earlier in its opinion, the court suggested that if the lower court
decided that classwide arbitration were appropriate, it should condition the order to arbitrate
on Southland's acceptance of arbitration. See id. at 1195. The court never explained why such
"acceptance" should be required.
256. The court emphasized the importance of the class action for allowing large groups
to vindicate rights that otherwise might not feasibly be asserted: "We have observed that the
class suit 'both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small
claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small
to warrant individual litigation."Id at 1206 (quoting Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d
23, 27 (Cal. 1981)).
257. The court expressed considerable concern that companies might impose arbitration
through contracts of adhesion in order to block an otherwise appropriate class action: "If the
right to a classwide proceeding could be automatically eliminated in relationships governed
by adhesion contracts through the inclusion of a provision for arbitration, the potential for
undercuttingthese class action principles, and forchillingthe effective protection ofinterests
common to a group, would be substantial." Id. at 1207. The court went on to state, "[ilf...
an arbitration clause may be used to insulate the drafter of an adhesive contract from any
form of class proceeding, effectively foreclosing many individual claims, it may well be
oppressive and may defeat the expectations of the nondrafting party." Id. The court also
explained that an "unscrupulous wrongdoer" should be proscribed from benefiting from its
own wrongdoing. See id.
258. The court seriously considered but ultimately rejected the argument that companies
should be barred from using arbitral contracts of adhesion to eliminate litigated class actions.
See id. The court found that such a result should be avoided, if possible, in order to support
public policies favoring arbitration. See id.
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require courts to play an active role in such issues as class
certification, notice, adequacy of representation, and fairness of any
class settlement.259 Subsequent to Keating, several other courts, all
but one in California,260 also published decisions recognizing the
propriety of arbitral class actions.26'
ii. Classwide Arbitration Prohibited
Several federal and state courts have reached precisely the
opposite conclusion, holding that when an arbitration agreement is
silent, it -is impermissible for a court to order, or perhaps even to
allow, the arbitration to be handled as a class action. The leading
259. See id& at 1209.
260. The one non-California decision to the same effect is Dickler v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860,866-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), in which the Pennsylvania Superior
Court ordered the trial court to mandate classwide arbitration ifit found the prerequisites
for a class action had been established. It concluded that the arbitral class action "best serves
the dual interest of respecting and advancing contractually agreed upon arbitration
agreements while allowing individuals who believe they have been wronged to have an
economically feasible route to get injunctive relieffrom large institutions employing adhesion
contracts." Id. at 867.
261. See Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding California decisional law permitting classwide arbitrations not preempted by FAA);
Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (remanding
determination of classwide arbitration to trial court); Gainey v. Occidental Land Research,
231 Cal. Rptr. 249,253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (resolving various issues as to class notice which
arose after court certified class in arbitration matter); Lewis v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc.,
225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Dickler, 596 A.2d at 867 (stating that "there is
no policy reason so paramount in this state which would preclude class action proceedings
from being imposed on an arbitration agreement"). The Lewis court ordered the trial court
to take steps to certify the class, and rejected defendant's arguments that the matter was too
complex:
The alternative to class arbitration here is to force each Prudential customer
to individually arbitrate claims, most of which probably cannot justify the time
and money required to prove. This case appears to offer no great difficulty in
adapting arbitration to fit the class action mold, with adequate judicial
supervision over the class aspects.
Id. at 75. Likewise, in Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., Judge Becker opined in dissent that
arbitrations "mayin fact go forward as class actions," where such procedure is not specifically
barred by the arbitration clause. 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., dissenting).
While Nicholson has agreed to arbitrate his claims pursuant to the rules of the
American Arbitration Association, he has not agreed to go forward alone and
has not agreed not to proceed on the basis of a class action arbitration. In fact,
the agreement does not speak to the form his arbitration may take.
Id. at 240-41 n.12.
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case is Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.,262 a consumer class action 263
in which the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
ordering plaintiff to arbitration and refusing to certify an arbitral
class action.2" The Seventh Circuit supported its decision by
citing federal appellate cases holding that a trial court lacks
the power to consolidate arbitral proceedings when the parties'
arbitral agreement does not allow for consolidation, even when
consolidation would be expeditious. 265 Finding "no meaningful
basis to distinguish between the failure to provide for con-
solidated arbitration and class arbitration,"266 the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that the FAA's concern "to enforce the parties' arbitration
as they wrote it" 267 should be given priority even over efficiency
concerns. 261 Champ has been followed by another Seventh Circuit
panel, 269 by several federal district courts both within270  and
262. 55 F.3d 269 (7th. Cir. 1995).
263. The plaintiff class alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, RICO, and
several state laws. See id. at 271.
264. See id. at 271-72.
265. See id. at 274-75 (citing Government of United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68,
74 (2d Cir. 1993)); American Centennial Ins. v. National Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107,108 (6th Cir.
1991); Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Protective Life
Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam);
Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987);
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984).
266. Champ, 55 F.3d at 275. This reasoning will be critiqued in Part III. See infra text
accompanying notes 328-40.
267. Champ, 55 F.3d at 275.
268. While recognizing the possibility that "various inefficiencies and inequities" might
result from the refusal to certify an arbitral class, id. at 277, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless
concluded that even if that were the case it was bound to enforce the parties' agreement. See
id. at 275. The court stated: "For a federal court to read such a term into the parties'
agreement would 'disrupt[ ] the negotiated risk/benefit allocation and direct[ I] [the parties]
to proceed with a different sort of arbitration." Id. (quoting' New England Energy, Inc. v.
Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir., 1988) (Selya, J., dissenting)). The Seventh
Circuit also rejected the argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3) justifies a
district court in certifying an arbitral class action. The court found 81(a)(3) inapplicable in
that, whereas the Rule is only intended to fill gaps, the parties purportedly left no gap but
rather chose to prohibit class arbitration. See Champ, 55 F.3d at 276. The court insisted that
by failing to expressly provide for class arbitration the parties elected nonclass arbitration.
See id. Further, the court found Rule 81(a)(3) entirely inapplicable, in that it applies only to
judicial and not arbitral proceedings under the FAA. See id. The court also rejected the idea
that the district court could certify an arbitral class using its "inherent equitable powers."
Id. at 277 n.4.
269. See Iowa Grain Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 509 (7th. Cir. 1999).
270. See, e.g., Lopez v. Plaza Fin. Co., No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL 210073, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill.
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without 271 the Seventh Circuit, as well as by a few state courts.
272
However, even assuming that the consolidation cases are relevant
to the class action issue, 7 it may prove significant that the Seventh
Circuit has recently limited the holding of Champ. In Connecticut
General Life Insurance Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.,274 the court
held that a silent and ambiguous contract could be interpreted to
allow consolidation. 5
Apr. 25, 1996).
271. See Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., No. CIV. A. 2:98CV231GR, 2000 WL
424232, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 2000); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977
F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 173 F.3d 844 (2d Cir. 1999); McCarthy v.
Providential Corp., No. C 94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL 387852, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994);
Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993), appeal
dismissed, 15 F.3d 93 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Collins v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., 169
F.R.D. 690 (M.D. Ga. 1997) (stating that the franchisees who were subject to mandatory
binding arbitration would not receive notice of class action); Sanders v. Robinson
Humphrey/American Express, Inc., 1990 WL 105894, at *2 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (certifying suit
as class action, for settlement purposes only, but observing that absent agreement, "those
purchasers who signed arbitration agreements likely would be required to adjudicate their
claims individually in separate proceedings").
272. See Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998); Exparte Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 723 So. 2d 6,10 n.3 (Ala. 1998); Steinbergv. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 1986 WL
5024, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 1986). Most of the courts that have adopted the Champ
holding have emphasized that by ordering a dispute to classwide arbitration, a court would
impermissibly alter the agreement entered into by the parties. See, e.g., Iowa Grain, 171 F.3d
at 510 (observing that "[blecause arbitration is based fundamentally on an agreement
between the parties, the kind of class action contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b) is normally
unavailable in arbitration"); Howard, 977 F. Supp. at 665 n.7 (observing that a plaintiff"who
has agreed to arbitrate all claims arising out of her employment may not avoid arbitration
by pursuing class claims"); McCarthy, 1994 WL 387852, at *8 (stating that the court lacks
authority, absent specific language, to order arbitration to proceed on class basis); Gammaro,
828 F. Supp. at 674-75 (holding that the court may not order class arbitration and dismissing
plaintiffs class allegations because agreement did not provide for class arbitration); Med Ctr.
Cars, 727 So. 2d at 20 ("Although the plaintiffs' contentions are practically appealing, after
reviewing the authorities we conclude that to require classwide arbitration would alter the
agreements of the parties, whose arbitration agreements do not provide for classwide
arbitration."); Exparte Green Tree, 723 So. 2d at 10 n.3 (stating, in dicta, that"[a]rbitration
agreements cannot be forced into the mold of class action treatment without defeating the
parties' contractual rights"); Steinberg, 1986 WL 5024, at *5 (holding that to order classwide
arbitration "would amountto rewriting the contract between the plaintiff and Prudential-
Bache. That contract provides for arbitration under specific and well-established rules that,
insofar as this record shows, do not provide for class arbitration."). It is not clear to this
author, however, why a silent agreement should be interpreted as foreclosing an arbitral
class action. See infra text accompanying notes 328-54.
273. The relevance is questioned infra notes 334-40 and accompanying text.
274. 210 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2000).
275. See id. at 774-76.
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b. Agreements Addressing Class Actions
i. Agreements Precluding Arbitral Class Actions
Companies seeking to avoid being sued in a class action may
draft an arbitration clause or incorporate arbitral rules276 that ex-
plicitly exclude arbitration of class actions.2 77 Indeed, one arbi-
tration provider, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), has
marketed its rules to corporations in part with the assurance that
its rules do not allow for class actions.278 Some commentators have
assumed that such a clause is valid and must be respected by the
courts;279 however, companies that employ such a clause may be
unpleasantly surprised. Depending upon the specific wording, some
courts may interpret such a clause to allow litigation of class
claims.28 On the one hand, several courts have stated or implied
that a company may use explicit language in the arbitration clause
276. This Article assumes that when an arbitration clause explicitly adopts particular
arbitral rules, those rules are effectively part of the contract. Conceivably, a contrary
argument might be made under the contract law of certain jurisdictions.
277. Companies typically have not sought to use a form contract other than an arbitration
clause to eliminate class action. In fact, this author found no cases discussing such a practice.
At least one company, however, now has issued an envelope "stuffer" seeking to eliminate
customers' opportunity to sue in a class action, without agreeing to arbitration. See Sprint
PCS Terms and Conditions of Service effective Apr. 1, 2000 (on file with author).
278. NAF Rule 19.A provides that "consolidations" are permitted only with the consent
of all parties. The NAF has relied on this Rule in assuring potential company clients that
NAF rules will prevent signatories from being sued in class actions. See Letter from Edward
C. Anderson, Attorney, NAF (Oct. 20, 1997) (enclosing memorandum of law assuring that
courts will not order class treatment pursuant to NAF rules) (on file with author); Letter
from Curtis D. Brown, V.P. and General Counsel, NAF, to Robert S. Banks, Jr., (Jan. 14,
1999) (noting that numerous courts have held that arbitration clauses can be used to
eliminate class actions and including attachment designed to show NAF rules are more likely
than competitor rules to preclude class actions) (on file with author); Letter from Roger S.
Haydock, Director of Arbitration, NAP, to Alan Kaplinsky, Attorney, Ballard, Spahr,
Andrews & Ingersoll (Apr. 16, 1998) ("Mhe only thing which will prevent Tear 2000' class
actions is an arbitration clause in every contract, note, and security agreement.") (on file with
the author).
279. See Vairo, supra note 41, at 19.
280. This Article urges such an interpretation where the clause does not clearly bar class
actions in both litigation and arbitration. See infra text accompanying notes 357-59.
Moreover, as will be discussed, even a clause which clearly is intended to deprive plaintiffs
ofall class remedies conceivably may be voided on statutory or contractual grounds. See infra
notes 360-432 and accompanying text.
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to deny plaintiffs the opportunity to proceed by class action.28' By
contrast, the Seventh Circuit, in Nielsen v. Piper, Jaffray &
Hopwood, Inc.," 2 interpreted the securities industry's rules
prohibiting arbitral class actions28 3 to allow the plaintiff class to
pursue its claims of securities fraud through litigation rather than
arbitration.2 Other courts have similarly held that clauses
prohibiting classwide arbitration should be interpreted to permit
class action litigation of the claim, both in the securities28 and
281. For example, Zawikowski v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, No. 98 C2178, 1999 WL 35304,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1999), ordered a consumer class action to be arbitrated, even though
the arbitration clause expressly prohibited class actions absent the parties' consent. The
court stated "[nlothing prevents the Plaintiffs from contracting away their right to a class
action." Id. In Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77, 80 (D. Conn. 1996),
involving a class action brought by Subway sandwich shop franchisees against the franchisor,
the franchise agreements provided: "[elach claim or controversy will be arbitrated by the
Franchisee on an individual basis and shall not be consolidated in any arbitration action with
the claim of any other franchisee." Id. The court compelled arbitration even though the
clause excluded class arbitration, implying but not holding that the arbitration would have
to be conducted individually. The franchisee attempted to argue that given this clause, the
class action claims that had been filed in court fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause
and could not be litigated. See id. The district court rejected this argument, however, stating
that because the franchisor had demanded 18 separate arbitrations and had not sought to
consolidate them, the arbitration was permitted by the arbitration clause. See id.
282. 66 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court's prior decision in the same case is
reported at Nielsen v. Greenwood, 873 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (adopting magistrate's
report and holding that where SEC had approved new NASD rule excluding class actions
from arbitration, plaintiff class would not be required to arbitrate their class claim against
brokerage).
283. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
284. Rejecting the brokerage's argument that plaintiffs should be compelled to resolve
their claim through individualized arbitration, the court stated that the contrary result was
compelled by straightforward contract interpretation. See Nielsen, 66 F.3d at 148 ("This case
does not present us with difficult interpretive questions."). Explainingthat the brokerage had
agreed to be bound by the NASD Code of Arbitration, and that this Code prohibited
arbitration ofclass claims, the court summarized that "the contract expressly prohibited PJH
from compelling arbitration of this claim." Id. TheNielsen case was more complex than most
in that it involved a transitional situation. The parties had originally agreed to arbitrate
their disputes prior to when the NASD and the NYSE adopted the prohibition on arbitrating
class actions. See id. at 146-49. Nonetheless, the court found that the new rule was applicable
in that the original arbitration agreement had provided that disputes would be governed by
rules "then in effect," id at 146, and in that the new rule applied to 'all open arbitrations."'
Id. at 149.
285. See, e.g., Olde Discount Corp. v. Hubbard, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1271 (D. Kan. 1998)
(concluding that because "[t]he plain language of the arbitration agreements and
incorporated rules dictate that Mr. Hubbard's [class action race discrimination] claim is
ineligible for arbitration at this time," it would be inappropriate for the court to compel
arbitration of such claim), affd, 172 F.3d 879 (10th Cir. 1999); Martensv. Smith Barney, Inc.,
181F.R.D. 243,252 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding class action claim not arbitrable because U-4
74 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1
nonsecurities context. 86
ii. Agreements Allowing Class Arbitration
It is highly unlikely that companies that use contracts of
adhesion to impose binding arbitration on their customers would
draft a contract explicitly allowing for class arbitration.8 Several
governments have adopted arbitration programs for resolving
taxation or other disputes, however, and their rules at times allow
for class arbitration. Where they do, courts have allowed arb-
itrations to proceed on a class basis.
2 18
forms signed by plaintiffs stated that class actions suits are not subject to NASD arbitration);
In re Regal Communications Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 94-179, 1995 WL 550454, at *11 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 14,1995) (holding plaintiffs class action claimwas not subject to mandatory arbitration
because "[bloth the NYSE and NASD have promulgated rules which make any claim filed as
a class action ineligible for arbitration"); Scher v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 866 F.
Supp. 776, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that class actions are not subject to compulsory
arbitration under the NASD rules). This author did not locate any decisions reaching the
contrary result, of requiring plaintiffs asserting class claims in the securities context to
arbitrate such claims on an individual basis. It should be noted, however, that a person who
is a member of a class action will not be required to arbitrate her claim. Putative class
members still have the option to arbitrate their claim if they choose to pursue an individual
claim through arbitration, rather than participatingin a class action. See NYSE Rule 600 (d);
NASD Rule 12 (d)(3); see also In re Piper Funds Inc. v. Piper Capital Management, Inc., 71
F.3d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that investor who elected not to participate in class
action and instead preferred to arbitrate claim could not be enjoined from arbitrating its
claim, pending the finalization of the class action settlement).
286. See, e.g., Minge v. Cohen, No. Civ.A. 98-2352, 1999 WL 1021836, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov.
9,1999) (denying motion to compel arbitration where plaintiffbrought a putative class action
and where customer agreement stated "[n]o person shall bring a putative or class action to
arbitration"); Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 918-19 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (observing that mandatory arbitration clause imposed on employees-which deprived
arbitrator of power to hear class actions-had been interpreted by trial court to allow
litigation of such claims, and concluding that the clause was, in any event, unconscionable),
review granted, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. 2000).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10 (discussing companies' opposition to class
litigation); supra note 278 (discussing National Arbitration Forum's use of marketing
boasting of the unavailability of class actions under their rules); see also Vairo, supra note
41, at 19 (observing that "[i]t is rare for drafters of arbitration agreements to include a
provision that explicitly allows for classwide arbitration" since 'business entities are not
inclined to provide for the aggregation of claims because of the potential for greater
exposure"). Indeed, I have located no examples of such a clause.
288. See, e.g., Callaway v. Carswell, 242 S.E.2d 103, 106-07 (Ga. 1978) (stating that class
arbitration would not be permitted in the future with respect to the purely legal question of
whether county could assess property piecemeal, but implying that class arbitrations might
still be permitted as to valuation issues); Boynton v. Carswell, 233 S.E.2d 185, 186-87 (Ga.
1977) (approving use of arbitral class actions to resolve taxpayer claims ofoverassessment);
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B. Imposition of Binding Arbitration Subsequent to Filing of
Class Action
An entirely different set oflegalissues is raised when a putative
class action has already been filed, and a company attempts to
apply a binding arbitration provision to the putative class members
and then use this provision to prevent such persons from partici-
pating in the class action."' Thus far, courts have not looked
favorably on this strategy. In Carnegie v. H&R Block, Inc.,2 90
customers of the H&R Block "Rapid Refund" program filed a class
action claiming that they were lured to take out loans and pay
finance charges.29' Prior to certification of the class, the company
imposed an arbitration clause and sought to apply it to the putative
class members.292 A New York court ruled that the clause adopted
by H&R Block could not be used by the company to prevent
customers' participation in the class action, unless those customers
were provided a separate form advising them of their rights and
then chose arbitration over the class action by signing the form.293
Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 413 A.2d 667, 668 (Pa. 1980) (permitting maintenance of
arbitral class action against state because the rules adopted pursuant to statute governing
Board of Arbitration Claims provided that proceedings should be handled, "'as nearly as
possible, in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure relating to.the action
of Assumpsie").
289. Companies' deliberate imposition of arbitration, after the filing of a class action must
be distinguished from a situation in which a defendant may inadvertently, or as a matter of
administrative simplicity, impose binding arbitration on putative class members, but does
not actually seek to use the arbitration clause to defeat the class action. In other words, a
defendant may occasionally decide to impose binding arbitration on all current customers,
a group which inadvertently includes putative class members. One author found that at the
time Bank of America imposed its binding arbitration clause on its customers, the bank had
seven class actions pending against it. See Davis, supra note 12, at B3. The author noted,
however, that the bank had not yet attempted to arbitrate any of the pending actions nor'to
use the clause to eliminate the class actions. See id.
290. 687 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
291. See id. at 530.
292. See id. Specifically, the loan application form used in connection with these
transactions was revised to include a clause requiring arbitration of past as well as future
claims, and to explicitly prohibit class actions absent H&R Block's consent. See id. H&R
Block's attorney drcfted a letter stating that "'the claims of that portion of the putative class
who were recipients of RALs in 1997 ... shall be arbitrated individually... and cannot
proceed in'this putative class action.'" Id.
293. See id. at 533. The court explained that while class actions "serve an important
function in our system of civil justice," they also present "opportunities for abuse," and that
"[b]ecause of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad
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Relying on cases restricting communication between defendants
and putative class members, in which those communications are
found to interfere impermissibly with the class or to violate relevant
attorney disciplinary rules,294 the court concluded that "the
enforceability of the arbitration clause in the revised RAL form
must be conditioned on steps to protect the fairness of the
class action process in this case."295 The notification and opt-
out296 process imposed by the court was designed to reconcile these
concerns for fairness with the court's recognition of the general
support for arbitration,297 and the fact that some customers might
prefer arbitration to the class action.298
authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing
the conduct of counsel and the parties." Id. at 531 (citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S.
89, 99-100, 101 (1981)).
294. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d 671, 681-83 (3d Cir. 1988); Erhardt
v. Prudential Group, Inc., 629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980); Hampton Hardware, Inc. v.
Cotter & Co., 156 F.R.D. 630,634 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Hafferv. Temple Univ. of Commonwealth
Sys. of Higher Educ., 115 F.R.D. 506, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97
F.R.D. 370, 377 (W.D. Mo. 1983). The Carnegie court explained that "[t]he test for whether
a party, with or without aid of its counsel, has had impermissible contact with potential
members of the plaintiff class, is whether the contact is coercive, misleading, or an attempt
to affect a class member's decision to participate in the litigation." Carnegie, 687 N.Y.S.2d
at 531 (citing Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1203 (11th Cir. 1985)).
295. Id. at 532. The court explained that "those who signed the RAL application
containing the arbitration clause were completely unaware of this litigation and that by
signing the RAL form, they were waiving their right to participate in this class action." Id.
It further opined that H&R Block's tactic of requiring customers to sign the form, without
informing them about the existence of the class action and the company's refusal to consent
to class certification, was "patently deceptive." Id.
296. It is significant that as the procedure devised by the court was an "opt out," those
putative class members who ignored the supplemental notice or chose to take no action
would remain members of the class, and would not be precluded from participation by the
new arbitration clause. See id. Had the court instead required such persons to "opt in" to the
class, or "opt out" of the arbitration, it is likely that many more customers would have ended
up arbitrating rather than litigating their claims. See generally HENSLER ETAL., supra note
1, at 26 (observing that"[t]he social science research on active versus passive assent suggests
that minority and low-income individuals might be disproportionately affected by an opt-in
requirement"); Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in
Bunches: BringingRule 23 Into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLAL.REV. 1773,1782 (1997)
(stating that while theoretically there may be no difference between opt-in and opt-out class
actions, testimony before the Advisory Committee in 1997 showed that in fact there is an
enormous difference); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397-98 (1967)
(arguing for opt-out rather than opt-in class actions, to better serve the interests of class
members).
297. See Carnegie, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
298. See id. at 533; see also H&R Block, Inc. v. Haese, No. 13-97-673-CV, 2000 WL
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Similarly, inNavarro-Rice v. First USA Bank,2 99 FirstUSABank
attempted to use a new binding arbitration agreement to defend
against a putative class action alleging it had illegally increased the
interest rate charge for its credit card."'0 Although the clause
exempted class action claims to the extent they "have been finally
certified as class actions and... notice of class membership has
been given as directed by the court" prior to January 1, 1998,01
timing was such that the Navarro-Rice suit could not possibly meet
this schedule, so that only those customers who closed their
accounts would be able to avoid arbitration.0 2 The Oregon trial
court refused to allow First USA to require the putative class
members to arbitrate their claims, instead granting a temporary
restraining order which later functioned as a preliminaryinjunction
restraining defendant "from attempting to enforce any requirement
to arbitrate, against any plaintiff or putative class member in this
action, as to any claim asserted in Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint or any substantially similar claim until further order of
this Court."303
924805, at *34 (Tex. App. June 29, 2000) (affirming in relevant part trial court's order
precluding defendant from imposing arbitration regarding existing claims of members of
certified class).
299. Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2,
Navarro-Ricev. First USA Bank (Oregon Cir. Ct., Multnomah County Dec. 1,1997) (Civ. No.
97-09-06901) (on file with author).
300. Specifically, First USA sent a substantial number of its customers a notice stating
that unless they closed their account by December 30,1997, they would be covered by a new
card agreement requiring that all disputes, including "claims now in existence," be arbitrated
rather than litigated. Id. at 2.
301. Id.
302. See id. at 2-3.
303. Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Navarro-Ricev. First USA Bank (Oregon Cir. Ct.,
Multnomah County July 25, 1998) (No. 9709-06901) (on file with author). While the court
issued no published decision and provided no reasoning in its written order, the transcript
of the hearing on plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order reflects the courts
concerns that defendants were seeking to interfere with the proper definition of the class and
that persons were being provided with inadequate information to make an informed decision,
particularly at a time when the court should have been supervising their participation in the
class action. The court repeatedly expressed its concern that although the plaintiffs' rights
to participate in the class action were "fixed on the date the action was commenced,"
Transcript Hearing on Temporary Restraining Order at 64 (on file with author), the
defendant was claiming a right to "change the status quo" while the court was still
considering whether to certify the class. See id.; see also id. at 65 ("How is it that the
defendant can say unilaterally we are just going to prohibit the court from addressing the
issues that are properly before it by soliciting all of these people out under a general
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Finally, in Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley,"' the court addressed a
situation in which the day after plaintifffiled a putative class action
against Powertel, she received with her bill a pamphlet describing
the terms of Powertel's service and also requiring arbitration of all
disputes.3°5 The court refused to enforce the clause in part because
it purported to apply retroactively." 6 Emphasizing that by filing the
class action Ms. Bexley had already "elected a remedy that was
inconsistent with arbitration," °' the court stated:
It is one thing to say that the failure to object to the arbitration
clause is an implied consent to arbitration, but it is quite
another to conclude that the failure to object is the equivalent of
a voluntary decision to dismiss a pending lawsuit. Nothing in the
record suggests that the plaintiff agreed to dismiss her suit, and
we cannot draw such a conclusion on the basis of her failure to
object to [a] new condition sent to her along with her phone
bill.308
III. How COURTS SHOULD BE HANDLING THE MEETING OF CLASS
ACTIONS WITH BINDING ARBITRATION
Section III(A) will first address the question of whether companies
ought to be permitted to use arbitration agreements to eliminate
persons' rights to proceed by way of class action in either litigation
or arbitration. It concludes that existing federal statutes and
traditional contract doctrines should sometimes, but not always,
prohibit companies from entirely precluding consumers or others
from bringing class actions. Second, Section III(B) concludes that
while parties should generally be allowed to choose to handle their
arbitration policy?"); id. at 72 ("How can your client unilaterally, without notice to this
potential group, effect a contract modification that works a limitation on the court's ability
to adjudicate the litigation if the matter develops that far?"); id. at 66 (expressing concerns
about lack of access to counsel and absence of court supervision). The judge noted that
"people... may be members of this class without even knowing that the class exists or that
there is an opportunity to consider those very kinds of issues within the context of this
pending proceeding." Id. at 67.
304. 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
305. See id. at-572.
306. See id. at 574.
307. Id. at 577.
308. Id. The court also found the clause unconscionable, for reasons discussed elsewhere
in this Article. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
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class actions through arbitration, rather than through litigation,
their agreements on these issues may be constrained by statutory,
contractual, and constitutional doctrines. Finally, Section III(C)
approaches the same issues from a different perspective, providing
courts with a guide on how they should resolve these tough
questions.
A. Using Existing Law to Preserve Plaintiffs' Right to Class
Actions
The most critical question underlying this entire debate is
whether companies do or should have the power to eliminate
entirely the class action remedy; however, defense attorneys, courts,
and even commentators often fail to focus on this issue.3°9 Perhaps,
not long ago, the question was not addressed because it was
assumed that companies could not entirely eliminate the class action
in all forums. 10 Today, however, the issue must be addressed
directly, because it is evident that at least some defense attorneys
are seeking to use binding arbitration to accomplish the total
elimination of class actions.31 1 This -section suggests that while the
language of the arbitration clause is one important factor courts
should consider in determining how to handle arbitration and class
actions, it should not always be determinative.
309. Instead, they may address the question dfwhether a class action claim may be sent
to arbitration without determining whether arbitral class actions are permitted. See supra
notes 211-25 and accompanying text. Or, they may address the question of whether class
action arbitration may be ordered without considering whether it should be left to the
arbitrators to decide if a class action is permitted. See supra note 252 and accompanying
text.
310. As discussed earlier, it seems that the securities industry did not contemplate
seriously the possibility that it might use arbitration clauses to entirely eliminate class
actions, and instead merely tried to choose between the litigated class action and the
arbitrated class action. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text. Similarly, the early
commentators on class actions and arbitration did not address whether arbitration
agreements could be used to eliminate entirely class actions. See generally Quagmire, supra
note 41 (arguing, similarly, that class actions and arbitrations should be joined); Walteher,
supra note 41 (exploring the advantages of combining class actions with arbitration).
311. See supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text. At least one company is also trying to
eliminate class actions without imposing arbitration. See Sprint PCS Terms, supra note 277.
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1. Many Claims can be Brought Only as Class Actions
As the Supreme Court and numerous commentators have
recognized, many claims can be brought only if pursued as a class
action and not on an individual basis. 12 Certainly this is true not
only in general, but also of the arbitration matters with which this
Article is concerned. It also seems clear that denial of the class
action remedy will potentially be detrimental not only to the affected
putative class plaintiffs, but also to society at large, in that absent
a class action, wrongful conduct may go unpunished and undeterred
and laws may go unenforced.31 The examples of actual arbitration
cases, discussed in the introduction to this Article, show that this
concern is not hypothetical.314 Some courts have explicitly recognized
that requiring disputes to be pursued on an individual basis, in
arbitration, would as a practical matter preclude plaintiffs from
pursuing their claims under federal or state consumer protection
statutes.1 5
While many praise arbitration as relatively inexpensive, and
geared to help persons with small claims to achieve justice, no one
has seriously suggested that arbitration ensures an economically
viable forum for persons with claims of five dollars, ten dollars, or
even two hundred dollars. Rather, in many arbitration venues the
minimum filing fee will exceed the size of a small claim, even before
one begins to take account of arbitrators' salaries, hearing fees, room
fees, or lawyers' fees.316 It is therefore not surprising that after
312. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
313. See generally Fiss, supra note 108 (contending that settlements may not serve the
public interest); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 395,396 (1999) (arguing that"arbitration is not
an effective forum in which to satisfy the public policy goals of the employment
discrimination statutes, even when employees are accorded a fair hearing").
314. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998) (recognizing the
practical appeal of plaintiffs' argument that requiring each individual to pay over $500 as a
filing fee would preclude plaintiffs from pursuing small claims in arbitration).
316. See Victoria Nugent, Arbitration Clauses That Require Individuals to Pay Excessive
Fees Are Unconscionable, 5 THE CONSUMERADVOCATE, Sept. 1999, at 8 (on file with author)
(taking note of initial filing fees, daily hearing fees, room rental fees, and arbitrators' hourly
rates); Cliff Palefsky, The Civil Rights Struggle of the '90s: From 'Separate But Equal" to
"Just Another Forum," THE RECORDER (San Francisco), May 1999, at 35, available in WL
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credit card company First USA imposed its binding arbitration
program in early 1998, just four consumers filed arbitration claims
against the company. 17
One can'imagine the responses that may be offered by those
seeking to eliminate class actions, but each can easily be
answered.3" The availability of a small statutory damages award,
even perhaps a few hundred dollars, is unlikely to affect the viability
of most claims. Further, most persons with small claims cannot
afford to file or certainly would not choose to file, based only on the
hope that a portion of the fees and costs would be reimbursed in the
event of victory.319 Most consumer claims require sufficient legal and
factual analysis so that persons could not successfully expect to
represent themselves, and few lawyers would be willing to take a
very small case based only on the possible recovery of some
attorney's fees and costs. 20 Although some arbitral venues -now
5/1999 RECORDER-SF 535 ("The costs for employment arbitrations are frequently in excess
of $40,000. Even at the theoretically not-for-profit American Arbitration Association, the
filing fee alone for a discrimination case can be as high as $7,000, and that's before the
arbitrators charge at least $350 per hour, per arbitrator, in addition to other administrative
charges."); see also Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant First USA's Motion To Dismiss and/or
Stay Proceedings and To Compel Arbitration at 44, Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A. (N.D.
Tex. 1999) (No. 3-99CV0783-T) ("Without the availability of the class action tool, most
lawyers experienced in consumer law cannot justify handling [small consumer claims],
particularly where the claims are relegated to mandatory arbitration. Consumers cannot
afford to hire and pay on an hourly basis an attorney to pursue TILA claims for less than
$1,000. Even though the Act permits recover of fees, neither the client nor the attorney is
willing to assume the cost of presenting a TILA claim when the underlying damage is so
small. A contingent fee arrangement is similarly inadequate because of the size of the
consumer claim.").
317. See Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?, supra note 11, at El. By contrast, in the same
period, First USA filed 51,622 arbitration claims against consumers. See id; see also
Plaintiffs Response at 25, Marsh (No. 3-99CV0783-T) (statingthat fewer than 10 cardholders
had attempted to arbitrate disputes with First USA since it imposed mandatory arbitration
in early 1998) (on file with author). The brief also argues that the fees imposed by the
National Arbitration Forum under the program are both "excessive and indeterminate." Id.
at 30-35.
318. Many of these arguments have been made by Petitioner and by some of the amici
supporting their position in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, and have been opposed
by Respondent and some of its amici. See supra notes 51-52.
319. See Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 n.4 (10th
Cir. 1999) (stating that "it is unlikely that an employee in [the plaintiffs] position, faced with
the mere possibility of being reimbursed for arbitrator fees in the future, would risk
advancing those fees in order to access the arbitral forum").
320. Quite possibly the inability to obtain counsel has deterred many potential plaintiffs
from filing arbitration claims against First USA. See Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?, supra
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claim to make available fee waivers or lower cost systems for
persons who are indigent or bringing small claims,121 these systems
do not clearly provide all persons with an adequate forum within
which to bring small claims. 22 Moreover, money aside, most people
simply will not expend the time or emotional energy to pursue a
small claim.
note 11, at El (stating that only four consumers had filed claims since early 1998).
321. The NAF, in its rules effective December 1, 1999, spells out in Rule 45 the possibility
that an "indigent Party, who is an individual and not a business or other entity, may request
a waiver of the Small Claim filing and administrative fees" by filing a request with the
Director. National Arbitration Forum, Rule 45. Waiver of Fees (visited Apr. 8, 2000)
<http'J/www.arb-forum.com/library/code/part7.html> [herinafter NAP, Rule 45].
The AAA, in its Arbitration Rules for the Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes,
provides that consumers who bring claims for less than $10,000 can obtain an arbitration for
just $125, including the arbitrator's fee. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ARBITRATION RULEs FOR THE RESOLUTION OF CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES (1999) (on file
with author). See generally Dobbins v. Hawk's Enters., 198 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that plaintiffs should not have been permitted to challenge arbitration clause calling
for AAA arbitration as unconscionable until they first attempted to explore fully AAA's fee
waiver procedures).
322. As to the waiver provided by the NAF, the factual predicates to obtain a waiver are
not detailed. That is, the NAF rules set out no specific guidelines for determining indigency.
See generally NAF, Rule 45, supra note 321 (providing no definition of"indigent"). Although
the consumer is directed to provide evidence of family size, income, assets, and liabilities, the
criteria are left to the discretion of the director of the NAF. See id. In Baron v. Best Buy Co.,
75 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1999), the court emphasized this arbitrariness in refusing to
grant a defendant's motion to compel arbitration before the NAF. Finding the clause
unenforceable, the court stated:
The Defendants have failed to demonstrate in this record that the National
Arbitration Forum is a neutral, inexpensive and efficient forum to determine
these claims as required bylaw. Further, itis unclear what procedures the NAF
would apply to this dispute, given the changing nature of the rules they adopt
and the almost total discretion of the director to issue or modify any award or
rule.
Id. at 1370. Note that the decision has been appealed, and that the matter has been stayed
pending the appeal. See Baron v. Best Buy Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
Moreover, the NAF waiver is only temporary. NAF provision 45(D) states that ifa waiver is
granted, and if the indigent ultimately recovers money, the fees must be paid out of the
settlement or award. Finally, it is not clear whether the waiver would cover arbitrator
salaries, and it certainly does not cover attorney fees. See NAF, Rule 45, supra note 321; see
also Plaintiffs Response at 28-30, Marsh (No. 3-99CV0783-T) (arguing that because the NAF
changes rules frequently, it is impossible to know what rules would be applied to the
dispute).
The inexpensive AAA procedure applies only where the consumer is willing to forego all
personal appearances, and instead allow the arbitrator to decide the claim exclusively on a
paper record. See AAA Consumer Rule 5 (on file with author). If the consumer wants to have
a telephonic hearing she must pay an additional $100, and if she wants an in-person hearing
she must "pay all the administrative fees, expenses, and compensation costs in the
Commercial Arbitration Rules." Id. Rule 6 (on file with author).
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Yet, the mere fact that claims are not viable on an individual
basis does not mean that they are not worth pursuing from a group
or societal standpoint. Foreclosing such claims may allow com-
panies to obtain large and illegal benefits." Although an individual
plaintiff may have been deprived of only ten dollars, a company may
stand to profit by one million dollars if 100,000 plaintiffs are
involved. Thus, even commentators Stephen Kupperman and George
Freeman, who argue that "arbitration provides a reasonable forum
for persons with small claims," 24 do not go so far as to argue that
arbitration can fully substitute for class action relief.
2 5
Nor is it fair to assume that federal or state administrative
agencies can enforce the laws when persons with small claims can-
not afford to do so. Not all statutes provide for such administrative
enforcement. Moreover, even when administrative enforcement is
available, agency resources are typically too small to afford a
remedy to most claimants.
In short, courts should consider the fact that some cases are
feasible only if pursued as a class action. 26 It must be recognized,
however, that some claims filed as class actions may also be feasible
on an individual basis.
2. The Importance of Agreement Language
Traditionally, because arbitration is said to be primarily a matter
of contract, courts focus closely on the wording of the arbitration
clause to determine whether arbitration is required, and on what
terms. In the past, very few arbitration agreements have expressly
discussed the treatment of class actions. This subsection will first
discuss how courts ought to interpret those arbitration clauses that
are silent on the subject of class actions. It will next discuss how
323. Cf Moohr, supra note 313, at 427-32 (discussing the importance of litigation to deter
companies from behaving illegally).
324. Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 167, at 1591.
325. See id. ("Even if arbitration does not satisfy all the policies underlying the class
action device, the question arises whether arbitration provides an appropriate forum for
resolution of class actions.").
326. The question of whether the arguable benefits of class actions are outweighed by
their costs is considered later in this Article as part of the discussion of possible legislative
reform. See infra notes 489-93 and accompanying text.
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courts ought to interpret clauses that expressly preclude class
actions. As companies are increasingly perceiving arbitration as a
way to avoid class actions, clauses are becoming more common. 27
a. Courts Should Not Interpret Silent Agreements as Barring
Class Arbitration
As a matter of pure contract interpretation it is striking, and
rather odd, that so many courts have interpreted silence in
arbitration agreements to foreclose rather than to permit arbitral
class actions. Numerous courts have held that because they must be
true to the parties' contractual choice, they may not compel, and
perhaps may not even permit, arbitral class actions.3 8 Rather than
engaging in adequate analysis, however, most courts have simply
assumed that a silent arbitration agreement should be interpreted
to foreclose arbitral class actions without fully considering the
ramifications of the interpretation.
To the extent courts have focused at all on the meaning of a silent
arbitration agreement for class actions, they have done so, as
discussed above, by drawing an analogy to the question of whether
courts may order consolidation of two or more arbitration matters
absent an express contractual provision.329 In the consolidation area,
although a leading commentator,3 30 one federal appeals court,33' and
327. See supra note 5.
328. See supra notes 262-75 and accompanying text.
329. See id. The leading case is Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269,274-75 (7th Cir.
1995). Other courts, in following Champ, have also relied on the "consolidation" cases. See,
e.g., McCarthyv. Providential Corp., No. C 94-0627 FMS, 1994WL 387852, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal.
July 19, 1994); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn.
1993); Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998). Interestingly, in Keating v.
Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), the California Supreme Court used the
consolidation analogy to support a classwide arbitration order, stating that courts have
frequently ordered consolidation ofarbitral matters in the interests ofjustice. See id. at 1208-
09.
330. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473,475-76 (1987) [hereinafter Stipanowich, Arbitration
and the Multiparty Dispute] (arguing that consolidation can be essential to achieve efficient
dispute resolution, and that even absent explicit contractual authorization, courts should be
permitted to order consolidation of arbitration disputes).
331. See New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
1988).
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multiple state courts.32 have concluded that courts should be
permitted to order consolidation where the agreement is silent, most
federal appellate courts considering the question have reached the
opposite conclusion."3
The consolidation analogy, however, is highly problematic. To the
extent that the anticonsolidation cases are wrongly decided, their
holdings should not be expanded.3 4 Significantly, the Proposed
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act would allow courts to order
consolidation, unless the parties' arbitration agreement expressly
excludes consolidation. 35 Admittedly, however, absent statutory
332. See Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437 A.2d 208,209 (Md. 1981); Grover-
Dimond Assocs. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 211 N.W.2d 787, 788 (Minn. 1973); Exber,
Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 558 P.2d 517, 523-24 (Nev. 1976); James Stewart Polshek &
Assocs. v. Bergen County Iron Works, 362 A.2d 63,70 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976); County
of Sullivan v. Edward L. Nezelek, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 72, 73 (N.Y. 1977).333. See cases cited supra notes 269-72. See generally 3 IAN R. MACNEIL ETAL., FEDERAL
ARBrrATION LAW. AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REhEDIES UNDER THE FEDERALARBITRATION
ACT § 33.3.2 (1994) (discussing basic standards for ordering consolidation). A recent Seventh
Circuit decision reins in this doctrine somewhat. In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.
u. Sun LifeAssurance Co., 210 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2000), the court rejected the argument that
consolidation is only permitted where it is clearly or expressly allowed by the arbitration
clause, instead holding that the court could use normal contract interpretation tools to
discern whether the parties intended to allow consolidation. See id. at 773-75.
334. This author believes that the cases prohibiting consolidation, absent explicit
language, are wrong for the reasons set out by Professor Stipanowich. Professor Stipanowich
argues that, as a matter of policy, consolidation is often desirable for all concerned. See
Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute, supra note 330, at 480-82. Yet,
arbitrators frequentlylack the knowledge or ability to order consolidation. See id. at 513-14.
Further,"[piractically speaking, the absence ofa provision specifically addressing multiparty
arbitration probably signifies only that the parties did not consider the matter." Id. at 496.
Professor Stipanowich calls for law reform, ifnecessary, to allow courts to order consolidation
when it would be appropriate. See id. at 523-28.
335. The Draft for Approval of the Proposed Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 10 states:
(a) -Except as provided in subsection (c), upon motion of a party to an
agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration proceeding, the court may order
consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings as to all or some of the claims
if:
(1) there are separate agreements to arbitrate or separate arbitration
proceedings between the same persons or one of them is a party to a
separate agreement to arbitrate or a separate arbitration proceeding with
a third person;
(2) the claims subject to the agreements to arbitrate arise in substantial
part from the same transaction or series of related transactions;
(3) the existence of a common issue of law or fact creates the possibility of
conflicting decisions in the separate arbitration proceedings; and
(4) the prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is not outweighed
by the risk of undue delay or prejudice to the rights of or hardship to
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revision, this argument will have little weight in those jurisdictions
in which the highest court has already ruled that courts may not
order consolidation where the contract is silent.
Most important, therefore, is the fact that the analogy between
class actions and consolidations is inapt. First, the consequences of
a court's refusal to order consolidation of two or more arbitral
matters are far different than the consequences of a court's refusal
to allow an arbitral matter to proceed as a class action. A court will
only be faced with the consolidation issue after two or more
arbitrations have been filed. Without consolidation, the disputes can
still be aired, albeit at greater expense. By contrast, many small
claims simply cannot be heard unless the claims are allowed to
proceed by way of class action.336
Second, whereas a consolidation order may well cause conflict in
interpreting multiple contracts, an order for class arbitration need
not. As the court in Keating explained,
Consolidated arbitration often involves a tripartite relationship
in which the parties in dispute each have a contract with a third
party, but not with each other. Each contract may provide a
different procedure for arbitration, or a different method of
selecting the arbitrator. Federal courts have held that a court
"can mold the method of selection and the number of arbitrators
to implement the consolidated proceedings."... Thus, a party
may be forced into a coordinated arbitration proceeding in a
dispute with a party with whom he has no agreement, before an
arbitrator he had no voice in selecting and by a procedure he did
not agree to.
In these respects, an order for classwide arbitration in an
adhesion context would call for considerably less intrusion upon
parties opposing consolidation.
(b) The court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings as to
certain claims and allow other claims to be resolved in separate arbitration
proceedings.
(c) The court may not order consolidation of the claims of a party to an
arbitration agreement which prohibits consolidation.
Proposed Revisions of the UniformArbitrationAct, supra note 46, § 10. The Reporter's Notes
explain that the provision is designed to effectuate efficiency in conflict resolution and avoid
conflicting results. See id. at Reporter's Note 3.
336. See supra note 104.
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the contractual aspects of the relationship. The members of a
class subject to classwide arbitration would all be parties to an
agreement with the party against whom their claim is asserted;
each of those agreements would contain substantially the same
arbitration provision; and if any of the members of the class
were dissatisfied with the class representative, or with the
choice of arbitrator, or for any other reason would prefer to
arbitrate on their own, they would be free to opt out and do so."'
Third, where an arbitrator might have the power to order
consolidation on his .or her own, it is not at all clear that arbitrators
could properly handle class actions without assistance from the
courts. As has been noted, 8' and as will be discussed in further
detail below,339 class actions raise important due process issues.
Therefore, if an arbitrator, on her own, were to attempt to handle
certification, notice and other class issues, it is not clear that her
decision would be binding on absent class members. In other words,
while a court's refusal to order consolidation potentially still leaves
arbitrators the flexibility to consolidate matters on their own,34' a
337. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1208-09 (Cal. 1982) (quoting In re
Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 512 F. Supp. 1308,1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). The court's point would be
undermined in cases in which a class action was deemed to be a mandatory or non-opt-out
class action. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that persons be allowed to
opt out of class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3), opt out is not always permitted for class
actions brought for joint claims or injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2). See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). See generally NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 90, §§ 1.22, 16.17
(discussing the standards and policy rationale for opting out).
338. See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
339. See infra notes 438-71 and accompanying text.
340. Interestingly, very few of the consolidation cases discuss whether the arbitrators, as
opposed to the court, might have the power to consolidate. Those few decisions that have,
vary in their approach. In Del E. Webb Construction v. Richardson Hospital Authority, 823
F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987), the court acknowledged that the issue was not clear, but concluded
that consolidation could be resolved only by the court. See id. at 149-50. Connecticut General
Life Insurance Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 210 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2000), observed that
neither party had argued that arbitrators, rather than the court, should decide the
consolidation question. See id. at 773. In CRS Sirrine Enginers, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., No. 96-11749-GAO, 1997 WL 136335, at *1 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 1997), the court
raised the possibility that arbitrators might have the power to order consolidation on their
own, but concluded that the question was moot because the particular consolidation sought
would violate the arbitration agreement. See id. at *3. As the Del E. Webb and Connecticut
General courts observed, arbitral consolidation orders clearly raise logistical concerns such
as which panel would make the determination and how a transfer might be effected. See Del
E. Webb, 823 F.2d at 150; Connecticut Gen., 710 F.3d at 773. Also, unless the two sets of
arbitrators are identical, a panel that ordered consolidation would deprive either themselves
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refusal to order classwide arbitration effectively deprives plaintiffs
of the opportunity to proceed as a class. In short, for all of these
reasons, even where courts are required to interpret a silent
contract as preventing them from ordering consolidation, they
should not feel compelled to apply the same "logic" to foreclose
arbitral class actions.
Once courts take a fresh look at the question of whether silent
arbitration clauses should be interpreted to foreclose class actions,
there are many reasons to conclude that they should not. First, as
the Supreme Court explained in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc.,3" the federal policy favoring arbitration requires that
ambiguous contracts be read to favor arbitration.342 Mastrobuono
interpreted this to mean that arbitrators should be permitted to
award punitive damages where the agreement was .ambiguous on
the subject; 3 s this preference should similarly be interpreted to
permit class actions to be handled in arbitration. Second,
Mastrobuono also relied on the "common-law rule of contract
interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language
against the interest of the party that drafted it." 3" Companies
should not be permitted to rely on a silent arbitration clause, which
they drafted, to prevent persons on whom the clause was imposed
from proceeding by way of class action. Third, as a matter of policy,
there is no clear reason why courts should disfavor rather than favor
class actions. Class actions are permitted by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and despite criticisms levied against them of late,
Congress has not seen fit to eliminate them. Rather, Congress
apparently remains convinced that the benefits of class actions,
including efficiency and practicality, outweigh their down-
sides.345 Fourth, even if courts were to interpret a silent clause
or their fellow arbitrators of employment. These concerns alone, however, do not justify
precluding arbitrators from making such an order when it is feasible.
341. 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (refusing to vacate arbitrator's award of punitive damages).
342. See id. at 62.
343. See id,
344. See id.
345. The Seventh Circuit, in Connecticut GeneralLife Insurance Co. v. Sun LifeAssurance
Co., 210 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2000), made a similar point when it held that "silent" arbitration
clauses do not necessarily preclude consolidation:
[W]e cannot see any reason why, in interpreting the arbitration clause for
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to prohibit a court from ordering an arbitral class action, they
should not foreclose arbitrators from choosing to proceed by
way of class action. 46 The court in McCarthy v. Providential
Corp.347 drew this distinction when it refused to compel arbitration
but stated that the arbitrators might have the power to order class
treatment.348 While such arbitral decisions may require assistance
from the courts, there seems to be no good reason why they should
not be permitted. 49
Finally, and extremely importantly, even if courts were to
interpret a silent arbitration clause to preclude arbitral class
actions, they would not be justified in also interpreting that same
clause to preclude class action litigation. That is, if a court reads a
silent clause to mean that certain class action claims are not
covered, then plaintiffs should be permitted to pursue those claims
through class action litigation. As discussed earlier, several courts,
purposes of deciding whether to order consolidation, the court should... place
its thumb on the scale, insisting that it be "clear," rather than merely more
likely than not, that the parties intended consolidation. It is not as if
consolidation of arbitration proceedings were somehow disfavored; quite the
contrary-the same considerations of adjudicative economy that argue in favor
of consolidating closely related court cases argue for consolidating closely
related arbitrations.
Id. at 774.
346. Several courts have adopted a contrary position. See, e.g., Iowa Grain Co. v. Brown,
171 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that "the kind of class action contemplated by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b) is normally unavailable in arbitration"); Howard v. Elynveld Peat
Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654,665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ([A] plaintiffsuch as Howard,
who has agreed to arbitrate all claims arising out of her employment may not avoid
arbitration by pursuing class claims. Such claims must be pursued in non-class arbitration.");
Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998) (holdingthat"class-wide arbitration
should not be permitted in this case"); see also Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 277
(7th Cir. 1995) (implying that arbitrators would not have the power to order class arbitration
by stating "[wie are thus obliged to enforce the type of arbitration to which these parties
agreed, which does not include arbitration on a class basis"); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer
Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93, 96 (8th Cir. 1994) (implying that court's denial of class certification
would require plaintiffto proceed through arbitration on individual basis); cf Sterling Truck
Corp. v. Allegheny Ford Truck Sales, No. 1:00-CV-565 (N.D. Ohio May 23, 2000) (stating that
it is up to arbitrator, not judge, to determine propriety of consolidation) (on file with author).
347. No. C 94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL 387852, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994).
348. See id. at *9 ("The Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association may provide for class treatment of plaintiffs [sic] claims; but, that question is for
the arbitrator to consider, not the court.").
349. Presumably, jurisdiction to assist with class action issues would not be an issue, as
the court would have needed jurisdiction in order to compel arbitration in the first place.
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including the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, have taken
precisely this approach in interpreting securities industry
arbitration clauses that explicitly exclude class action arbitra-
tions.3s 0 Those decisions have held that because the arbitral class
action is prohibited, plaintiffs must be permitted to pursue the class
action in litigation."' Several other courts have reached the same
conclusion outside the securities context.352 The conclusion is correct.
Courts have properly held that a clause that explicitly excludes
arbitration of class actions should be interpreted to permit litigation
of those claims, just as they would allow litigation of antitrust
claims if those were not covered by the arbitration clause. When a
silent clause is interpreted, as a default rule, to bar arbitration of
class actions, it should be treated no differently than a clause that
explicitly bars arbitration of class actions. 5 ' No principle of contract
interpretation should permit a company, through a silent clause, to
eliminate completely a person's pre-existing right to litigate certain
claims through a class action. 54
b. The Growing Trend of Agreements Expressly Prohibiting
Class Actions in any Venue
Although the above arguments are powerful, they will likely have
limited relevance in many future disputes. Practical reality dictates
that interpretation of arbitration agreements that are "silent" as to
class actions may soon become rare.3 5 If a company's goal is to
350. See supra note 227.
351. See id.
352. See supra note 286.
353. Some courts' default rule of interpreting silent clauses to proscribe consolidations in
arbitration does not have the same impact. Where consolidation is prohibited, the
unconsolidated arbitrations are likely to proceed. But, where a class action is excluded from
arbitration, it is likely that many if not most of the claimants will not be able to arbitrate
their claims. Thus, interpreting a silent clause to exclude arbitration of class actions should
be treated comparably to interpreting a clause to include certain substantive claims.
354. Professor Stipanowich has made a similar point with respect to punitive damages.
Where a company writes an arbitration clause that precludes arbitrators from awarding
punitive damages, that clause should not entirely foreclose plaintiffs from seeking punitive
damages. Rather, the clause will simply require plaintiffs to seek nonpunitive damages
through arbitration, and punitive damages in litigation. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive
Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 N.W. U. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1997).
355. See Vairo, supra note 41, at 19-22 (observing that most companies will prefer not to
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entirely eliminate class actions, and if courts begin to announce that
companies can achieve this goal only through more explicit drafting,
companies will, in very short order, revise their form arbitration
agreements to provide that customers and employees agree to waive
their right to proceed by way of class action in arbitration, or more
likely in both arbitration and litigation. Some companies have
already gone this route. 5 6 Thus, the most significant and interesting
question becomes whether companies should be permitted to employ
such a waiver.
3. Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements Precluding Class
Actions to Allow Litigation of Class Action Claims
Companies that seek to use arbitration to eliminate class actions
may draft a clause that precludes the use of class actions in
arbitration, although this might well be unwise from the company's
perspective. As has already been discussed, while some courts have
interpreted such clauses to require plaintiffs to pursue their claims
as individual arbitrations, if at all, other courts have interpreted
similar clauses to provide plaintiffs with a class action exemption
from arbitration, allowing plaintiffs to litigate their claims.35 7 This
latter interpretation is more defensible. When an arbitration clause
does not cover a particular category of dispute, plaintiffs retain their
right to litigate such claims.358 To the extent a court believes there
is ambiguity as to whether a provision prohibiting class actions in
arbitration was intended to foreclose class action litigation as well,
the ambiguity should be read in favor of the plaintiff and against the
drafter to allow for class litigation. 59 Courts should not laxly
assume plaintiffs intended to waive their right to proceed as a class.
be sued in class actions and concluding that companies seeking to avoid class actions should
draft arbitration clauses to expressly prohibit class claims or consolidation).
356. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 641 (Fla. 1999) (holding that
agreement to arbitrate claims arising out of construction contract did not mandate
arbitration of common law claim for negligence).
359. See generally Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52,62 (1995)
(relying in part on presumption favoring nondrafting party to conclude that arbitration
clause was not intended to preclude recovery of punitive damages).
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4. Unenforceability of Arbitration Agreements Foreclosing Class
Actions in both Litigation and Arbitration
The question of whether creative drafters may eliminate class
actions altogether by directly precluding their use in any forum is
more complex. Assume that a company drafts a contractual clause
that provides in part as follows: "All parties to this contract agree
that any dispute arising out of or relating to this agreement will not
be resolved in a class action, either in litigation or in arbitration;
rather, all such disputes shall be resolved through individual
binding arbitration."360 The drafters of such a clause undoubtedly
would argue that it must be enforced, according to its terms, because
courts are required to honor parties' contracts.36'
There should, however, be some limit. This can easily be seen
if one imagines companies attempting to draft a similar contract
outside the arbitration context. Suppose a company, without
requiring arbitration, simply insisted that all consumers or
all employees be bound by a contract stating that they waived any
right they might have had to litigate claims using class
actions.362 As discussed below, courts should find that at least
some of these clauses are impermissible,363 on one of two possible
360. Some companies have already begun to draft clauses to this effect, although not
necessarily using this precise wording. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
361. Some commentators have assumed such a clause would be valid. See, e.g., Vairo,
supra note 41, at 19.
362. At least one company has already done so. Sprint PCS issued a document entitled
"Terms and Conditions of Service" that states, in part,
Waiver of class actions. You agree that all claims between you and Sprint PCS
related to this agreement will be litigated individually and that you will not
consolidate or seek class treatment for any claim, unless previously agreed to
in writing by both of us. This waiver applies to this agreement as amended or
modified. This section survives termination of this agreement.
Sprint PCS Terms, supra note 277; cf Edward Wood Dunham, Enforcing Contract Terms
Designed to Manage FranchisorRisk, 19 FRANcHISE L.J. 91, 98-99 (2000) (noting that there
is no sound theoretical reason why companies should be permitted to impose certain terms
like jury trial waivers and forum selection clauses by including them in arbitration clauses,
but be prohibited from imposing such terms outside the arbitration context).
363. After a court finds that an arbitration clause's mandated waiver of class actions is
impermissible, it has two choices. In some cases the court may find it appropriate to "reform"
the clause, in other words, to mandate arbitration but allow plaintiffs to bring a class action
either in litigation or in arbitration. Cf Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 266-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding unconscionable an arbitration
clause which limited plaintiffs' remedies to wages lost between date of discharge and date
of arbitration, but severing that remedial restriction rather than voiding entire arbitration
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grounds.3 In some situations a federal statute may preclude a
company from mandating waiver of one of the statute's provisions.
In other situations, a mandatory waiver of class actions may be void
as a matter of standard contract law based on unconscionability or
other contract principles. The strength of each of these arguments
will, however, depend on the specific facts. Thus, under some
particular circumstances, it may be acceptable for parties to enter
into an agreement promising not to sue each other in a class action.
a. Federal Statutory Arguments for Unenforceability
A plaintiff who seeks to bring a claim under a particular federal
statute may be able to show that a purported waiver of class actions
is unenforceable, given the specific terms, legislative history, orpurpose of the statute. 65 It is well recognized that Congress has the
clause), review granted and opinion superseded, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274 (Cal. 1999). In other
cases the court may find that it must void the entire arbitration clause. See Graham Oil Co.
v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that arbitration
agreement which precluded plaintiff from recovering exemplary damages or attorneys fees
conflicted with terms of federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act and must be voided in
its entirety). As both conclusions would result in the voiding of the anti-class-action
provision, the choice between these two approaches exceeds the scope of this Article.
364. A third argument suggests that eliminating the class action procedure violates a
constitutional right, such as the right to due process, by depriving plaintiffs of access to
court. It would seem difficult, however, to argue that there is a constitutional right to proceed
by way of class action, and such an argument would hinge on the showing that state action
was implicated and that the disputant had not waived any relevant constitutional right. Cf.
Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 83-95 (arguing that certain arbitration clauses that,
for example, deprive disputants ofa neutral decisionmaker, may be violative of due process);
see also Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternate Dispute
Resolution and3Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 963-64 [hereinafter Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity] (arguingthatmanyADRprocesses, including contractual arbitration,
raise due process concerns).
365. It is more difficult, but not impossible, to argue that state statutes can also be used
to void purported waivers of the right to proceed by way of class action. Pursuing this line
of inquiry would exceed the scope of this Article; therefore, I will primarily address only the
federal statutes. I cannot resist, however, spelling out the beginning of an argument. While
some might contend that any such state statute is necessarily preempted by the FAA, I
suggest this is incorrect. Rather, I suggest a company cannot use an arbitration clause to
achieve waivers of state consumer law that it could not achieve in other ways. The FAA's pro-
arbitration stance does not give companies leave to entirely gut state laws. That is,
companies are only permitted to require consumers to arbitrate their claims where such
arbitration would not fundamentally compromise the consumers' substantive rights. Several
state courts have relied on state law to void an arbitration provision, while holding that the
state statute was not preempted. See, e.g., Avedon Eng., Inc. v. Seatex, 126 F.3d 1279, 1286-
88 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding FAA does not preempt a New York law treating arbitration
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power to bar waivers of both substantive and procedural rights that
are provided by statute. Thus, many statutes provide that
involuntary waivers of their substantive provisions are invalid, 66 or
are invalid if not made knowingly and voluntarily,"6 7 and courts
clause as "substantial modification" to contract that was not enforceable without express
agreement); Strawn v. AFC Enters., 70 F. Supp. 2d 717 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that
mandatory arbitration clause was unenforceable in that it would have denied employee's
rights available under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act); Broughton v. Cigna
Healthplans of Cal., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 343-47 (Cal. 1999) (interpreting California's
Consumer Legal Remedies Act to prohibit arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief
under that Act, and concluding that such prohibition was not preempted by FAA); see also
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1244-46 (Mont. 1998) (holding general
provision protecting Montana citizens from mandatory out-of-state forums was applicable to
arbitration clause and was not preempted by FAA, but permitting arbitration to occur within
state). Several other decisions have also used state statutes or constitutional provisions to
void arbitration clauses, while failing to explain adequately why the provisions were not
preempted. See Bill Butler Assocs. v. New England Say. Bank, 611 A.2d 463, 465 (Conn.
Super. 1991) (holding plaintiffs claim under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act was not
arbitrable, in that Connecticut legislature intended statute's provisions be enforceable only
in civil actions); Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 243, 257 (Mich.
1996) (Cavanagh, J., concurring) (concluding that the Michigan Constitution should be
interpreted to preclude persons from waiving right to bring substantive civil rights claims
in court).
366. For example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(3)
(1994), prohibits the conditioning of the extension of credit upon a consumer's waiver of
rights. Also, inAlexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1994), the Supreme Court stated:
"there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII." Id. at 51.
Another example is Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994),
which provides that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and
regulations of the Commission shall be void." Similarly, Section 29(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1994), states: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
At one point the Supreme Court read the 1933 Act's exclusion to bar mandatory arbitration
of such claims. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). However, in ShearsonlAmerican
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), the Court held that the 1934 Act provision
applied only to waivers of substantive rights, and did not preclude mandatory arbitration.
See id. at 226-28. The Court later applied similar reasoning to reverse Wilko and held that
mandatory arbitration could be valid under the 1933 Act as well. See Redriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478 (1989).
367. Gilmer observed that in"the recentlyenacted Older Workers Benefits ProtectionAct,
Pub. L. 101-443, 104 Stat. 978, Congress amended the ADEA to provide that 'an individual
may not waive any right or claim under this Act unless the waiver is knowing and
voluntary.'" See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 n.3; cf Thiele v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063-66 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding that it would be inappropriate to compel arbitration of age discrimination claim
because the clause did not meet requirement that waiver ofjury trial right be knowing and
voluntary).
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have recognized the validity of such provisions. 68 As to arbitration
in particular, despite the Supreme Court's general pro-arbitration
stance, 69 the Court has frequently enunciated that Congress has the
power to declare that certain claims are nonarbitrable or at least
cannot be the subject of mandatory arbitrationY7 0 For a variety of
policy reasons stated earlier-specifically efficiency, the value of the
bringing of small claims, and the public interest in enforcement of
statutes3 --it is certainly conceivable that Congress might choose
to ensure that the class action device be made available to plaintiffs
bringing claims under particular statutes."2
Thus, the question of whether Congress has stated that plaintiffs
bringing specific statutory claims must be allowed to proceed byway
of class action is a matter of statutory interpretation. 3  At least
three arguments are possible. First, plaintiff might be able to show
that Congress, in a particular statute, explicitly provided that
mandatory waivers of class actions would be unenforceable.7 4
Second, plaintiff might be able to show that even though the statute
does not expressly preserve the right to bring class actions, its
language and legislative history demonstrate that Congress
intended to allow class actions and viewed them as critical to
enforcement of the statute. Third, plaintiff might be able to show
that although the language and legislative history make no
particular mention of class actions, they are nonetheless necessary
to support the enforcement of the statute's provisions.
368. See, e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
369. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
370. This declaration may, but need not, be explicit. See infra notes 383-400 and
accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
372. While Congress cannot mandate the availability of class actions in state court, it can
at least allow interested plaintiffs to file a class action in federal court.
373. It seems clear that Congress may regulate the availability of class action relief, just
as it regulates the availability of a jury trial, subject to Constitutional limits, and certain
kinds of damages. Indeed, as discussed earlier, Congress has recently passed legislation
regarding the availability of class actions in federal securities cases, and has been
considering broader legislation regarding class actions. See supra notes 130-33 and
accompanying text.
374. In Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1418 (M.D. Ala. 1997),
rev'd, 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (No. 99-1235), the
court recognized the possibility of such a statute, while concluding Truth in Lending Act did
not bar waiver of class actions.
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i. Express Statutory Preclusion of Class Action Waiver
Clearly Congress could, if it desired, draft language barring
waiver of class actions through arbitration or otherwise. The
question of whether any existing statutes already contain such
language remains. Plaintiffs have attempted to make this argument
most frequently with respect to TILA, 75 highlighting that Section
1640 of that statute speaks explicitly to class actions when it caps
the damages available in such suits." 6 Indeed, the pending case of
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 7' in which the Supreme
Court may conceivably address some of the issues surrounding class
actions and arbitration, 78 is brought under TILA.
Several courts, including the district court in Green Tree, 379 have
rejected the argument that Section 1640 explicitly guarantees a
right to proceed by class action, stating that the mere mention of
class actions and imposition of a damages cap does not imply a right
to proceed by class action.80 Although one court has held that TILA
375. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
376. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The damages cap contained in § 1640(a)
states:
[Iln the case of a class action.... the total recovery under this subparagraph in any
class action or series of class actions arising out of the same failure to comply by the
same creditor shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net
worth of the creditor.
377. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120
S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (No. 99-1235).
378. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
379. See Randolph, 991 F. Supp. at 1418 (refusing to deny motion to compel arbitration
on ground that plaintiffs would be deprived of class action, because whereas Congress may
preclude waiver of class claims, the mere inclusion of provisions governing class action
litigation alone does not provide plaintiffwith a right to proceed through class action).
380. See Brown v. Surety Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 99 C 2405, 2000 WL 528631, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 24, 2000) (rejecting argument that TILA class action cannot be arbitrated); Thompson
v. Illinois Title Loans, Inc., No. 99-C-3952, 2000 WL 45493, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2000)
(compelling consumers in putative class action to arbitrate claims under TILAon ground that
while class action may possibly be "optimal" method for enforcing TILA, statute "neither
requires class actions nor grants a substantive right to them"); Sagal v. First USA Bank,
N.A., 69 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (D. Del. 1999) ("Because Congress has not provided for a
statutory right to pursue class actions under the TILA, and because there are alternative
means to bring suit thereunder, this court does not find that the TILA amounts to a
'congressional command' to preserve class action suits at the expense of the FAA."); Lopez
v. Plaza Fin. Co., No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL 210073, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 1996) ("It is true
that compelling arbitration in light of Champ will eliminate plaintiffs ability to arbitrate his
claims on behalf of a class. Nonetheless, this result is required because Congress has not
created a statutory right to bring class actions under TILA, plaintiffs contrary assertions
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precludes mandatory waiver of class actions, it bases its conclusion
more on the overall intent and legislative history of Section 1640
than on its explicit words.3"' Yet, while the explicit language
argument has not yet succeeded, it may in the future-particularly
if Congress realizes the need to protect claimants' ability to pursue
relief under particular statutes by way of class action. 82
ii. Legislative Intent and History as Precluding Class
Action Waiver
The Supreme Court has enunciated repeatedly that statutory
prohibitions to arbitration may be found not only in explicit
statutory provisions, but also in the legislation's history or purpose.
Most recently, in Gilmer v. Johnson /Interstate Lane Corp. ,383 the
Court explained that individual agreements to arbitrate are void
where "Congress itself has evinced an intention," which is
discoverable in a statute's text, legislative history or through an
inherent conflict between arbitration and the purpose of the statute,
"to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue."384
One recent Delaware district court decision has applied this
powerful analysis to conclude that the language, legislative history,
and overall intent of TILA preclude a court from compelling
arbitration of a putative class action brought under that statute.
Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc."8 5 focused on the legislative history of
TILA and its Section 1640s damages cap in detail,"8 ' and concluded
notwithstanding. Section 1640... does not establish a right per se; it only sets forth a limit
on liability under class actions."); see also Herringtonv. Union Planters Bank, N.A, No. C1V.
A. 2:98CV231GR, 2000 WL 424232, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 2000) (rejecting argument that
the Truth in Savings Act contained language barring arbitration oi claims brought under
that statute).
381. See Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D. Del. 1999). See infra notes
385-97 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of this case and its reasoning.
382. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 489-503.
383. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
384. Id. at 24-26; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985) ("We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection
afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.").
385. 82 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D. Del. 1999).
386. See supra note 376 for the language of § 1640(a).
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that "[tihe intended purpose of the TILA was 'to encourage class
actions in the truth-in-lending context because of the apparent
inadequacy of the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement
resources and because of a continuing problem of minimum [sic]
compliance with the Act on the part of creditors."' Specifically, the
court explained that when Congress adopted the damages cap on
liability for TILA class actions in 1974, it "was trying to encourage
the use of class actions as a means for enforcing the TILA."8" 8 Prior
to the imposition of the cap, successful large class actions would
have resulted in huge damages awards because "each individual
plaintiff was entitled to a minimum award of $100.389 Thus,
=numerous federal courts refused to certify class actions under the
TILA since the 'allowance of thousands of minimum recoveries...
would carry to an absurd and stultifying extreme the specific and
essentially inconsistent remedy Congress prescribed as the means
of private enforcement."'39 ° Johnson found that the cap was adopted
to counter this trend and "to encourage the federal courts to begin
387. Id. at 266 (quoting Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 400 (6th Cir.
1980) (citing S. REP. No. 93-278, at 14-15 (1973)). Another district court similarly explained:
[T]here is not much incentive in the Act for individuals to pursue alleged Truth-
in-Lending violations. The costs of litigation against a financial institution can
be enormous, actual damages are difficult to prove and the statutory recovery
is low. It is in most individuals' interests, however, and in the public interest
that lending institutions comply with the Act and be found responsible to
consumer borrowers if they do not comply. Were it not for the class action,
many borrowers likely would not pursue their rights in court.
Hughes v. Cardinal Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 653,655-56 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also
Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10, 15 (7th Cir. 1976) (observing that class actions are
important in TILA litigation "to prevent violators of the Act from limiting recovery to a few
individuals where actual, wide-spread [sic] noncompliance is found to exist") (quoting Haynes
v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1974)); Rivera v. Fair Chevrolet
Geo Partnership, 165 F.R.D. 361, 363 (D. Conn. 1996) ("TILA specifically provides for the
maintenance of a class action."); Chandlerv. Southwest Jeep-Eagle, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 302,310
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting propriety of class action to enforce TILA claims where most proposed
class members "are probably unaware of their rights" and where such"[cilass members, even
if aware of their rights, likely would lack the initiative to bring suit individually"); Sarafin
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 585,588 (N.D. Ill. 1977) ("For [large] creditors the threat
of a class action has a potent deterrent effect. Eliminating that deterrent for all large cases
would emasculate the enforcement provisions of the Act.").
388. Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 269; see also Guarte v. Furniture Fair, Inc., 75 F.R.D.
525, 528 (D. Md. 1977) (stating that in imposing the damages cap, Congress "indicated its
intent that the class action vehicle be available in this area").
389. Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970)).
390. Id. (quoting Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412,414 (S.D.N.Y.
1972)).
20001 WILL THE CLASS ACTION SURVIVE?
certifying class actions in Truth in Lending lawsuits."3 91 The court
further cited legislative history, showing that class actions are
critical to the enforcement of TILA.392 Thus, based on the language
and legislative history of TILA, Johnson found that compelling
arbitration inherently would conflict with the underlying purposes
of TILA and therefore refused to do so. 393 Furthermore, the court
found that because the Electronic Funds Transfer Acte94 contained
a virtually identical cap, 9 and "presum[ing] that Congress was
trying to encourage courts to certify class actions under this statute
as well,"39 it would also deny defendants' motion to compel
arbitration of that claim. 397 To be sure, not all courts have concurred
with the Johnson analysis,3 98 and indeed this question may possibly
391. Id. (citing Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 400 n.6 (6th Cir. 1980)
(citing S. REP. No. 93-278, at 14-15)). Johnson also cited Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 419
F. Supp. 1116, 1119-20 & n.11 (D. Haw. 1976) (citing S. REP. No. 93-278, at 14-15)).
392. See Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 269-70. Johnson explained that the Senate Report
issued in connection with the damages cap
concurred with an earlier conclusion by the Federal Reserve Board that
"potential class action liability [wa]s an important encouragement to the
voluntary compliance which [wals so necessary to [einsure nation-wide [sic]
adherence to uniform disclosure" since "[m]ost Truth in Lending violations do
not involve actual damages and... some meaningful penalty provisons are
therefore needed to [elnsure compliance."
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 93-278, at 15). Johnson favorably quoted language from Bantolina,
another district court decision: "The possibility of class-action exposure is essential to the
prophylactic intent of the Act [] and is necessary to elevate truth-in-lending lawsuits 'from
the ineffective "nuisance" category to the type of suit which has enough sting to insure that
management will strive with diligence to achieve compliance.-'Id at 270 (quotingBantolina,
419 F. Supp. at 1120 (citing S. REP. No. 93-278, at 36-37)).
393. See Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
394. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
395. See id. § 1693m ("[In the case of a class action .... the total recovery under this
subparagraph in any class action or series of class actions arising out of the same failure to
comply by the same person shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of
the net worth of the defendant.").
396. Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 272. The court admitted that there was no legislative
history explaining why Congress adopted the cap. See id.
397. See id.
398. See Thompsonv. Illinois Title Loans, Inc., No. 99 C 3952,2000 WL45493, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 11, 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that class action liability under TILA was
necessary to ensure voluntary compliance with that Act); Sagal v. First USA Bank, N.A., 69
F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (D. Del. 1999) (observing that TILA does not "rely exclusively on class
actions as an enforcement mechanism" and concluding that mandatory arbitration of TILA
class action was permissible); Randolphv. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991F. Supp. 1410,1418-20
(M.D. Ala. 1997) (concluding plaintiff failed to present "compelling evidence" to support her
position that class actions are essential to purposes of TILA), rev'd on other grounds, 178
F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (No. 99-1235).
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be addressed by the Supreme Court in the pending case of Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph.99
Plaintiffs asserting class action claims under other federal
statutes will need to explore whether the language, legislative
history, or inherent purposes of those statutes should similarly be
interpreted to preclude mandatory arbitration of class actions
brought under the statute in question.400 Where they do, courts
should deny motions to compel arbitration of such claims.
iii. Class Actions as Integral to Enforcement of Statute
Finally, plaintiffs may also be able to show that class actions are
critical to the enforcement of a particular statute without focusing
399. 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (No. 99-1235).
In discussing the importance of class actions to TILA, some may focus on the limited "class
action moratorium" imposed by Congress as to certain claims for a period of roughly five
months in 1995. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(i) (Supp. IV 1998) (eliminating class actions for a
narrow category of claims from May 18, 1995 to October 1, 1995). The respondents in Green
Tree have argued that this partial and short term moratorium defeats the argument that
class actions are essential to the enforcement of rights under TILA. See Brief for Petitioner,
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph (U.S. June 8,2000) (No. 99-1235), available in 2000 WL
744132, at *48-49. However, this brief and partial moratorium can also be used to make the
opposite point. Surely if Congress had not felt class actions were critical it would have
eliminated them on a broader and more permanent basis.
400. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) is
another statute which explicitly references the right to proceed in a representative or class
action, and thus might form the basis for a claim that denial of the right to proceed in a class
action is impermissible. Section 216(b) states:
An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences
may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees
for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he
gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in
the court in which such action is brought.
One district court initially seemed to recognize such an argument, holding unenforceable
under the FLSA an arbitration clause which "denies plaintiffs' their statutorily-granted
rights, under both the FLSA and Oregon law, to obtain attorney's fees and to participate
collectively and without undue financial burden in the adjudication proceedings." Horenstein
v. Mortgage Mkt., Inc., Civ. No. 98-1104-AA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21463, at *10 (D. Or.
Jan. 11, 1999). In a subsequent decision in the same suit, however, the district court upheld
use of a different and less onerous arbitration clause, which permitted recovery of attorney
fees and did not impose substantial upfront fees, even though that clause would have
prevented plaintifs from proceeding collectively. See Horenstein v. Mortgage Mkt., Inc., Civ.
No. 98-1104-AA, at 7-8 (D. Or. Jul 23, 1999) (on file with author) (-Under the provisions of
Employment Agreements, the absence of a the [sic] right to proceed collectively does not
render the arbitration provisions unenforceable.").
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on specific statutory language or legislative history. The Supreme
Court has explained repeatedly that it will compel arbitration of
federal statutory claims only "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, [such that] the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function." 1 In so ruling, the Court has
recognized that not all forums are necessarily adequate, and that
procedural provisions can be critical to enforcement of substantive
rights.0 2 Thus, in Gilmer the Court held the arbitration clause
enforceable only after considering and rejecting plaintiff's claims
that the arbitral forum would be biased and unworkable in various
ways." 3 Similarly, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,44 the Court explained that where it could be shown
that aspects of a particular arbitration clause operated to deprive a
claimant of substantive rights, it "would have little hesitation in
condemning the agreement as against public policy."405 The
Delaware district court in Johnson relied in part on this passage
from Mitsubishi when it refused to compel arbitration of claims
brought under TILA.4"'
Several federal appellate courts have already found arbitration
clauses unenforceable on the ground that the particular form of
arbitration required would not allow adequate enforcement of the
401. Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
402. This sharply undercuts the conclusion of one district court, which opined that class
actions are mere procedural devices rather than subsfantive rights, and that procedural
devices may never supersede arbitration, which the court found to be substantive. See
Randolph, 991 F. Supp. at 1418.
403. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32 (finding plaintiff had failed to make adequate factual
showings that arbitral panels would be biased, that discovery would be insufficient, that
arbitrators would not write adequate opinions, or that equitable relief or class relief would
not be available).
404. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that Puerto Rican car dealer could be compelled to
arbitrate dispute with foreign manufacturer).
405. Id at 637 n.19. Plaintiff was objecting to the fact that the arbitration clause called
for the arbitration to occur in Japan. The opinion states that "in the event the choice-of-
forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of [the plaintiffs]
right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation
in condemning the agreement as against public policy." Id.
406. See Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 271 ("Thus, after considering the facts of this case in
light of the teachings of the Mitsubishi decision, this court finds that there is 'inherent
conflict' between compelling arbitration and the underlying purposes of the TILA. The court
will, therefore, deny the defendants' motion to compel the arbitration of Johnson's TILA
claims."). As discussed earlier, the Johnson court also relied on the explicit language and
legislative history of the statute. See supra notes 385-93 and accompanying text.
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relevant federal statute. As the Eleventh Circuit explained: "When
an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial
purpose of [a] statute, . . . the arbitration clause is not enforce-
able."' 7 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit favorably noted the Tenth
Circuit's announcement that:
As Gilmer emphasized, arbitration of statutory claims works
because potential litigants have an adequate forum in which to
resolve their statutory claims and because the broader social
purposes behind the statute are adhered to. This supposition]
falls apart, however, if the terms of an arbitration agreement
actually prevent an individual from effectively vindicating his or
her statutory rights. Accordingly, an arbitration agreement that
prohibits use of the judicial forum as a means of resolving
statutory claims must also provide for an effective and accessible
alternative forum.4"'
These decisions have refused to enforce arbitration clauses that
imposed excessively high fees on consumers or employees, thereby
denying them access to any forum.0 9
The same argument can easily be applied to clauses that
expressly prohibit claimants from bringing a class action, even when
neither the language nor the legislative history of the relevant
407. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 1157 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., 'Inc., 134 F.3d 1054,1062 (11th Cir. 1998)), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (No. 99-1235).
408. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management, Inc., 163
F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999)).
409. See id. (holding unenforceable, under TILA, an arbitration clause that did not set out
explicitly the extent to which consumer would be held responsible for filing fees and arbitral
salaries); Shankle, 163 F.3d at 1234-35 (refusing to enforce clause that required employees
to split arbitral fees); Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062 (holding unenforceable, under Title VII,
arbitration clause that would have required plaintiff to pay filing fee of $2,000 to arbitrate
claim of gender discrimination, and might have required her to pay at least half of
substantial costs of arbitration); see also Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d
306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[Elven if arbitration is generally a suitable forum for resolving a
particular statutory claim, the specific arbitral forum provided under an arbitration
agreement must nevertheless allow for the effective indication of that claim. Otherwise,
arbitration of the claim conflicts with the statute's purpose. .. ."); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (agreeing to mandate arbitration of a claim
brought under a federal civil rights statute, only on condition that the employer bear the sole
costs of the arbitrator's fee); Strawn v. AFC Enters., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 717, 722-26 (S.D.
Tex. 1999) (holding arbitration cannot be substituted for litigation given policy underlying
Texas workers' compensation statute).
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federal statute discusses class actions. Many claims can be feasibly
presented only by a class rather than on an individual basis,
410
despite the fact that some courts continue to enforce arbitration and
deny class actions in such impractical situations. Where plaintiffs
can establish that the prohibition on class actions would deprive
them of any forum in which to present their federal statutory claim
by making that lawsuit economically unfeasible, courts should
refuse to enforce such a provision-either by voiding the arbitration
clause altogether, by holding the arbitration clause inapplicable as
to class claims, or by permitting plaintiffs to present their claims in
an arbitral class action.41' Some might suggest that class actions
cannot be critical to enforcement of any federal statute that grants
concurrent jurisdiction to state as well as federal courts, in that the
federal class action is available only in federal court;41 however, this
ignores the fact that plaintiffs would have the option to proceed in
federal court if they thought the class action procedure was critical,
and that virtually all states also allow class actions.413
It is important, however, to recognize the limits of this statutory
argument. The argument should succeed only where plaintiffs can
present facts showing that the class prohibition would truly deprive
them of an adequate forum in which to present their claims. Where,
for example, each class member has a relatively large claim that
could be feasibly presented individually, the above argument should
fail. Also, where the clause permits arbitral class actions, and only
disallows litigated class actions, it would be difficult to show that
class prohibition violated claimants' rights to enforce the statute
unless they could demonstrate some particular statutory or
constitutional problem with the particular class action arbitration
procedures. Finally, where the statutory scheme provides plaintiffs
410. See supra notes 28-40, 100-04 and accompanying text. One court recently considered
but ultimately' rejected the argument that plaintiffs could not feasibly'present their
particular claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act unless they were permitted to proceed
by way of class action. See supra note 400.
411. The interesting question of how a court should decide whether to bar arbitration
altogether, or whether to reform an arbitration agreement to comport with relevant statutory
or contractual requirements, exceeds the scope of this Article.
412. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph (U.S. June 8,2000)
(No. 99-1235), available in 2000 WL 744132, at *45-46.
413. See HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13.04 (3d ed.
1992) (noting that 36 states have adopted Federal Rule 23 in some form, and that additional
states permit class actions at common law or under Field Code-based rules).
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with an alternative administrative means by which to enforce their
rights, courts should examine the available enforcement mech-
anisms to determine whether the prohibition on class actions has
truly deprived plaintiffs of their statutory relief.
The Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, although admittedly only
dicta, supports the analysis suggested here with respect to class
actions. In Gilmer, plaintiff sought to avoid mandatory arbitration
of his claim under the ADEA based partly on an argument that
deprivation of the opportunity to proceed by way of class action
would preclude him from adequately enforcing his statutory
rights.414 The Court seemed to accept the possible viability of such
an argument, but found plaintiff had failed to make an adequate
factual showing supporting his claim.415 The Court emphasized that
the New York Stock Exchange rules at the time allowed for
collective proceedings, 41 6 and that "arbitration agreements will not
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and
equitable relief."
417
It is true that the Court also made a statement that some have
interpreted as supporting the use of arbitration to disallow class
actions. Specifically, the Court stated that "'even if the arbitration
could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be
granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the
possibility of bringing a collective action does not mean that
individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred." 1
In context, however, the statement should not be interpreted to
preclude plaintiffs from arguing that class actions are necessary to
414. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
415. See id. at 35.
416. See id. at 32.
417. Id. It seems that the Court too easily assumes both that an individual's arbitration
clause would not be interpreted to preclude the EEOC from pursuing relief on the
individual's behalf and that a claim brought by the EEOC is an adequate replacement for an
individual claim. Neither assumption is necessarily warranted. In several post-Gilmer
decisions, courts have held that individual arbitration clauses may, at least in part, limit the
EEOC's power to proceed on behalf of that individual. See cases cited supra note 58.
Moreover, even when an EEOC enforcement action is brought, the EEOC may not choose to
pursue all of the reliefthat an individual or class might have sought. For example, the EEOC
might elect to seek injunctive relief, but not compensatory or punitive damages. In such an
instance, it might well be argued that the limitation on individual class actions deprives
persons of their opportunity to enforce their statutory rights.
418. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221,241 (3d Cir.
1989) (Becker, J., dissenting)).
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allow enforcement of specific statutes in certain circumstances. It
is important to recall that Gilmer was filed as an individual suit,
and not as a purported class action. Thus, the Court seems to be
saying only that it may sometimes be permissible for plaintiffs to
waive any right they may have had to proceed by class action. This
author does not disagree. An individual who, post dispute, decides
she would prefer to arbitrate than to participate in a class action,
should have this option.
Thus, according to extant decisions by the Supreme Court and by
federal courts of appeal, when plaintiffs can show that an arbitral
prohibition on class actions would deprive them of the opportunity
to adequately enforce their statutory rights, courts should not
enforce such a prohibition.419
b. Unenforceability as a Matter of Contract Law
In addition to the above federal statutory arguments, plaintiffs
may also contend that an arbitration clause that precludes class
actions is void as a matter of traditional contract law. Citing the
FAA's Section 2,420 the Supreme Court has stated frequently that the
Act preserves persons' rights to challenge arbitration on standard
contract grounds such as lack of agreement to arbitrate, fraud,
duress, violation of public policy, or unconscionability.42
i. Unconscionability
Of these potential contractual arguments, unconscionability is the
most promising. Particularly of late, courts have become
increasingly willing to use this defense to void arbitration clauses
they believe are particularly unfair,422 and two courts have relied in
419. The same analysis would apply if a company sought to exclude class actions without
using an arbitration clause.
420. Section 2 provides arbitration clauses may be voided "upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
421. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S, 681, 686 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985); Southland Corp v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11
(1984).
422. Plaintiffs could make the same argument as to a contractual provision which,
without offering or requiring arbitration, prohibited plaintiffs from bringing a class action.
Of course, the argument that the bar on class actions is unconscionable assumes that class
actions are generally available, according to the prevailing rules of civil procedure. If
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part on an arbitration clause's elimination of plaintiffs' class action
opportunities in holding that clause unconscionable.423
The conclusion reached by these two courts is consistent with
courts' overall handling of unconscionability in the arbitration
context. In general, clauses which deprive claimants of adequate
access to a forum,4 24 or which deny claimants relief to which they
would ordinarilybe entitled425 are among those provisions courts are
most likely to strike down as unconscionable. Applying a similar
analysis, courts should find unconscionable those arbitration clauses
which, by precluding plaintiffs from joining together in a class
action, effectively deny plaintiffs the opportunity to present their
claims in any judicial or arbitral forum. As discussed above, many
small claims can be economically pursued only if a group of plaintiffs
can join together in a class action. Otherwise, plaintiffs may not be
Congress chose generally to eliminate the class action, contracts which did not allow for class
actions would not be unconscionable.
423. See supra notes 231-38 and accompanying text.
424. See, e.g., Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. 229 B.R. 821, 838 (N.D. Ala. 1999)
(refusing to enforce clause in part on ground of unconscionability where debtor would be
required to pay for arbitration); Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563,
565-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause imposed by financing
organization on California consumers that apparently required arbitration to be heard in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, and required plaintiffs to pay substantial filing fees, observing that
procedures that might be fair as applied to business entities are not necessarily fair as
applied to consumers); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569,573 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998) (holding unconscionable on ground of cost, clause which both required computer
purchasers to arbitrate disputes in Chicago and also required arbitration according to the
rules of the ICC, which impose high administrative costs).
425. See, e.g., Hooters of Am. Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614 (D.S.C. 1998)
(holding arbitration unconscionable in part because employee was "stripped of numerous
substantive remedies under Title VII [in that] ... compensatory damages, backpay relief,
frontpay relief, punitive damages, and attorney's fees are either eliminated or substantially
curtailed," and because procedural rules were biased against employee in favor of company,
where company had total control over selection of arbitrators, employee had severely limited
discovery, and witness disclosure and sequestration were one sided), affd on more limited
grounds, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999); Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft Employees Fed.
Credit Union, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (voiding, as substantively
unconscionable, clause which shortened statute of limitations, allowed employer to continue
to seek judicial relief, and severely limited employee's discovery rights), review granted and
opinion superseded, 978 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1999), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 990 P.2d 504
(Cal. 1999); Armendariz v. Foundation- Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding unconscionable an arbitration clause that limited plaintiffs'
remedies to wages lost between date of discharge and date of arbitration, but severing that
remedial restriction rather than voiding entire arbitration clause), review granted and
opinion superseded, 973 P.2d 51 (Cal. 1999); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138,
150 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding unconscionable contract which, inter alia, precluded
plaintiff from recovering damages other than "actual damages for breach ofcontracf).
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able ' to secure representation, to pay filing fees, or to make the
commitment of time or emotion that litigation or arbitration
requires.4 26 When a company deprives plaintiffs of the class action
opportunity in such circumstances, it entirely forecloses plaintiffs
from enforcing their legal rights. Thus, the class action prohibition
can easily be analogized both to those arbitral provisions that deny
access by imposing high costs or distant locations, or to those
provisions that deny remedies. As noted above, both of these types
of arbitration clauses have been voided for unconscionability, and
clauses which eliminate class actions should be evaluated
similarly.
427
As discussed above with respect to statutory remedies, however,
the limitations of the unconscionability argument must also be
recognized. When an arbitration clause eliminates the use of class
actions but does not thereby prevent plaintiffs from presenting their
claims, it is not at all clear if the clause would be unconscionable.
Thus, the showing of unconscionability will turn on the specific facts
of each case, as well as on the local jurisdiction's law of
unconscionability. Plaintiffs who have large claims or who are
independently wealthy might be less successful in using the
unconscionability argument than would be poorer plaintiffs with
smaller claims.
ii. Other Contractual Claims and Defenses
While scholars have argued that courts should also use other
contractual arguments, such as lack of consent,4 28 fraud, duress, and
426. See supra notes 28-40,100-08 and accompanying text. The draft Reporter's Notes to
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act also support the use of an unconscionability argument
to void an arbitration agreement that precludes class actions, when that prohibition may
undermine consumers' rights by heightening the cost of arbitration or makingit too difficult
for claimants to procure legal counsel. See supra note 46.
427. Because the law of unconscionability varies somewhat from state to state,
unconscionability determinations will depend upon state law. For example, some states
require a showing of both substantive and procedural unconscionability. See, e.g.,
Maciejewski v. Alpha Sys. Lab Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) ("The
concept includes both procedural and substantive elements .... "). Nonetheless, it seems
likely that a prohibition on class actions that has the effect of entirely foreclosing plaintiffs
from pursing relief that could have been sought in class action litigation may well qualify as
unconscionable in many jurisdictions.
428. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV.
1377,1434-47(1991) [hereinafterStempel,ABetterApproach] (arguingthatresistingparties
should be able to revoke arbitration clauses by demonstrating "blameless ignorance," "dirty
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violation of public policy to invalidate certain arbitration agree-
ments, courts have often rejected such claims.429 Nonetheless, some
of these contractual defenses may be used to defend against clauses
that require waiver of class action procedures. For example, when
the deprivation of class action procedures is imposed to prevent
plaintiff from proceeding with a claim in any forum, the clause
should be voided for violation of public policy. ° As well, unless
such a waiver is very clear, a court should rule that the plaintiff did
not actually consent to be deprived of class action procedures.43 '
Also, when a company uses trickery or deception to impose such a
clause, it should be voided for fraud.4 32 As with unconscionability,
the success of any of these defenses as a means of voiding the
elimination of class actions will turn on the specific facts
surrounding the imposition of the clause and its impact, as well as
on the law of the particular jurisdiction.
B. Parties'Ability to Elect Classwide Arbitration Over Classwide
Litigation
Given the argument set out above-that at least in some
situations plaintiffs cannot be deprived of their right to proceed by
way of class action-should parties be permitted to choose to resolve
their disputes through an arbitral class action rather than a
litigated class action? In general, the policies supporting arbitration
and parties' right to contract support such a choice. There may,
however, be some constitutional, statutory, or con-tractual limits.
Moreover, even assuming the election of classwide arbitration over
class action litigation is permissible, it is unclear whether it would
be desirable for many parties. The answers to both questions will
dealing," "inescapable adhesion," "substantive unconscionability," or "defective agency").
429. See, e.g., Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 25-39 (asserting that courts'
favoritism toward arbitration leads them to reject valid common law defenses).
430. See, e.g., Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (1997) (holding void, as a
matter of public policy, an arbitration agreement that restricted arbitral remedies).
431. See Longv. Fidelity Water Sys., Inc., No. C-97-20118 RMW (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2000)
(holding plaintiff never "agreed" to arbitration imposed by credit card company in change of
terms notice) (on file with author); see also Stempel, A Better Approach, supra note 428, at
1426 (arguing that courts should use "consent" concept to void unfair arbitration clauses).
432. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 917-22 (1997)
(holding that arbitration clause could be voided for fraud because company gave false
assurances as to speed of arbitration).
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ultimately depend upon the nature and feasibility of the classwide
arbitration.
It seems clear that under existing law parties should, in at least
some circumstances, be permitted to resolve their class action
disputes through arbitration rather than through litigation. The
policy arguments favoring class actions do not necessarily dictate
that the class action must be litigated rather than arbitrated." s In
theory, at least, and assuming its basic feasibility, an arbitral class
action might provide the same efficiencies as would class action
litigation, thus serving the interests of plaintiffs with small cases
and of the public at large. Moreover, the law and policy favoring
arbitration would seem to support parties' election of an arbitral
class action over a litigated class action.'
1. Possible Limitations on Parties' Choice of Classwide
Arbitration
a. Statutory Limits
As discussed above, Congress has the power to explicitly or
implicitly legislate that certain disputes are not subject to
arbitration.4"' If Congress so chose, it might specify that claims
under particular statutes or even claims in general could not be
resolved through arbitral class actions. It does not appear, however,
that Congress has enacted such legislation to date.
b. Contractual Limits
Alternatively, it can be argued that courts need not and should
not enforce arbitration clauses that they find to be unconscion-
able.4"' If the nature of an arbitral class action were such that
plaintiff could show that an agreement contemplating such a
mechanism was grossly unfair, then the court should refuse to
433. See supra text accompanying notes 90-108 for a discussion of the policy arguments
favoring class actions.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 66-74 for a discussion of the law and policy
favoring arbitration.
435. See supra text and accompanying notes 365-419.
436. See supra text and accompanying notes 420-27.
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compel such arbitration. To make such a showing plaintiff might
demonstrate, for example, that the arbitral class action would be
biased or excessively expensive or inconvenient, compared to class
action litigation or that essential discovery would not be available.
Thus far, while experiences with class action arbitration are scant,
participants in the few classwide arbitrations that have been held




The most interesting question is whether the Due Process Clause
limits parties' election of class action arbitration over litigation. As
discussed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that because
class actions, as "representative" litigation, raise special due process
concerns,438 certain elements of Rule 23 appear to be mandated by
the Due Process Clause. In order for a litigated class action to be
binding on absent class members, the court must have helped
properly define the class, provided for adequate notification of
absent class members, ensured the adequacy of the class
representative and attorneys, and perhaps provided notice of and
approved any settlement. 9
But how are these due process concerns relevant to parties'
decision to resolve their disputes through class action arbitration?
The most straightforward implication of the existing body of law for
arbitral class actions is that, if a named plaintiff and defendant
agree to resolve a dispute through an arbitral class action, and if
that class action does not provide adequate protection for absent
437. See supra note 168. Significantly, however, the courts played an extensive role in
each of these classwide arbitrations.
438. See generally Monaghan, supra note 109 (examining due process challenges to
antisuit injunctions and preclusivejudgments in class action suits); Mullenix, supra note 109
(focusing on plaintiffs' due process rights); Cottreau, supra note 122 (arguing that due
process requires that nonresidents, and in some instances even residents, should have the
option to opt out of a class action).
439. See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, a question exists
as to whether some of the due process protections are available only to out-of-state class
members. See supra note 115. At minimum, therefore, such protections must be offered in
all class actions involving out-of-state plaintiffs.
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class members, those absent class members would not be bound by
the result. It is inconceivable that courts would allow absent class
members to be bound by an inadequate arbitral proceeding, where
they would not have been bound by an inadequate judicial
proceeding."' Thus, if the named plaintiff lost the class action, the
absent class members would be free to bring their own suit if they
could show that the notice they received was inadequate, that the
named plaintiffs failed adequately to represent their interests, or
that a settlement which was reached did not adequately represent
their interests.
ii. Court Protection of Due Process Rights
Some may argue that arbitrators are just as capable of protecting
due process interests as judges." 1 They may suggest that arbitrators
do not need courts' assistance to protect due process interests. Or,
they may argue that arbitrators should be permitted to function as
magistrates or special masters, making the important class action
determination subject to ceremonial approval by the court.
Without questioning the dedication or competence of many
arbitrators,. 2 this Article nonetheless suggests that some judicial
participation in an arbitral class action is necessary to protect the
due process rights of absent class members. Allowing arbitrators on
their own to decide such issues simply will not comport with the Due
Process Clause. One can best see the need for substantial judicial
participation in arbitral class actions by considering some of the
various stages of a class action and the due process interests that
may be implicated. From the outset, the arbitral class action poses
an interesting question: who chooses the arbitrators? In a nonclass
arbitration, the arbitration clause typically will allow plaintiff and
440. See id.
441. This seems to be the position of at least one commentator, who argued that, once the
class is certified, arbitration would be sufficient to protect any due process interests and that
no substantial court involvement would be necessary during the actual proceedings. See
Waltcher, supra note 41, at 403-05.
442. In many instances, the attorneys or former judges who serve as arbitrators may be
as familiar "with class action issues as judges. Several of the attorneys interviewed in
connection with this Article emphasized that the expertise of the arbitrators regarding class
actions was a selling point for the process. See supra notes 148-49.
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defendant jointly to select the arbitrator. Yet, in a class action,
presumably the named plaintiff, or more likely the class attorney,
will choose an arbitrator or arbitrators on behalf of the absent class
plaintiffs. Without court supervision of the formation and treatment
of the arbitral class action, this means that the absent class
members will ultimately be bound by the ruling of an arbitrator they
had absolutely no role in selecting.
The process and legitimacy of class certification is critical to the
question of whether absent plaintiffs may be bound to the outcome
of the class action. As the Manual for Complex Litigation states:
"Whether a class is certified and how its membership is defined can
often have a decisive effect not only on the outcome of the
litigation[,] but also on its management."44 Certification is key
because it determines not only whether a representative suit may be
brought, but also how it must be structured to ensure that all class
members' interests are adequately represented. Discovery and an
evidentiary hearing may be required in order to explore certification
issues fully.' At times subclasses must be created to protect
adequately the interests of class members with interests that
conflict to some degree." 5
Once the certification determination has been made, adequate
notice must be afforded to class members-at least in damages
actions-so that they can opt out. The notice issues are again
complex, turning on not only the precise wording of the notice, but
also on the means by which the notice will be communicated to class
members." 6 Sometimes courts employ their subpoena powers to
443. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 94, § 30.1. The Manual goes on to
explain:
[Class certification] determines the stakes, the structure of trial and methods
of proof, the scope and timing of discovery and motion practice, and the length
and cost of the litigation. The decision on whether or not to certify a class,
therefore, can be as important as decisions on the merits of the action and
should be made only after consideration of all relevant evidence and arguments
presented by the parties.
Id.
444. See id. §§ 30.12-.13.
445. See id. § 30.15.
446. See id. § 30.211.
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obtain information necessary to provide adequate notice. 7 Then, if
a tentative settlement is reached, the absent class members must be
notified and afforded an opportunity to attack the validity of the
settlement. To review the fairness and adequacy of a settlement a
court will need to consider the likely results had the case litigated,
and may well need to hear evidence.44
An arbitrator could play each of these roles, but it seems
questionable whether a case in which each of these functions was
performed by an arbitrator rather than a court would comport with
due process. Put simply, judges are substantially burdened by the
responsibility of protecting the interests of absent class members,
and many commentators have questioned the practice, particularly
with respect to mandatory as opposed to opt-out class actions." 9 It
seems even more inappropriate to bind absent class members to
class action determinations in a case supervised only by an
arbitrator. First, the arbitrator will have been selected at least in
part by the named plaintiff or their attorneys, not by the absent
class members. Thus, it is difficult to see how such an arbitrator
would play the role of the court in checking possible self-dealing.
450
Second, although the Supreme Court has expressed great
enthusiasm for private arbitrators and their capabilities, 451 we may
not yet have reached the point at which they are deemed equally
447. See id.
448. See id. §§ 30.41-.42.
449. See Weber, supra note 121, at 1215-17 (arguing that all class members should be
given the choice, after they learn of the specific contents of a settlement agreement, of
whether to accept the agreement or instead opt out of the class, thereby retaining their right
to file an independent action). See generally Monaghan, supra note 109 (arguing that a court
should not use antisuit injunctions to prevent nonparty, nonresident class members from
making due process challenges in a second court); Mullenix, supra note 109 (discussing due
process concerns that arise in class actions and suggesting possible reforms).
450. Cf MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 94, § 30 (explaining that class
litigation imposes unique responsibilities on the court to protect interests of class members);
see also supra note 125 (collecting articles discussing possible conflicts of interest between
class counsel or named plaintiffs and absent class members, and emphasizing concomitant
duty of court to protect against unfairness).
451. For examples of the Courtes acknowledgement ofdeference to legitimate arbitration
agreements, see Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1999); First
Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,943 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1995).
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capable of protecting individuals' critical due process interests.
Third, if arbitrators alone were to decide these crucial class action
issues, it is unclear how a record could be made for possible appeal.
How could a court review an arbitrator's decision without a
transcript or other documents? Yet, at a minimum, due process
would seem to require that a class member not be bound by an
arbitrator's decision on class issues without at least having the
opportunity to seek review by a higher court.452
In short, it is telling that in all of the arbitral class actions that
attorneys have discussed with this author, the judge rather than the
arbitrators decided all the critical class action issues.45 3 The judge
in each case defined the class, approved the wording of the notice to
class members, approved any opt-out provision, and approved any
proposed settlement. 5' In fact, in one of the arbitral class actions
the judge decided all motions and supervised all discovery, and the
parties did not even select an arbitration panel until they were
ready to make their factual presentations.4 5  Thus, real-world
experience, as well as theory, supports the point that judges must
play a substantial role in deciding class action issues in order to
protect the due process interests of absent class members. 56
452. Some courts may reject the analysis proposed here, choosinginstead to examine each
arbitral class action on a case-by-case basis and to conclude that absent class members are
bound by those class actions in which, even without court participation, the arbitrators
adequately protected their rights. In order to permit such a review, it will at minimum be
necessary for class arbitrations to keep a transcript and record that is more substantial than
that kept in a typical arbitration. When transcripts are kept, such as in labor arbitrations,
they will likely be sufficient. In most commercial arbitrations, however, no transcripts are
currently maintained. See Keating v. Superior Court, 245 P.2d 1192, 1210, 1215 (Cal. 1982)
(Richardson, J., concurring and dissenting).
453. See supra note 149.
454. See id.
455. See supra note 151.
456. As noted above, one commentator has suggested an alternative to active judicial
participation in the early stages of the arbitration whereby the arbitrator make4 preliminary
decisions on class issues, subject to ultimate review and approval by the court. Such a
scheme might be deemed acceptable on due process grounds in that the courtwould maintain
final decision-making power. However, such an approach would seem unworkable, and I have
uncovered no evidence that it has ever been attempted. If one reads through materials such
as the Manual for Complex Litigation, one is immediately struck by the great complexity of
class actions. The decisions are never simple or discrete. Rather, even the wording of a notice
can require intensive arguments and hearings. A rule requiring courts to review arbitratoi-s'
decisions on all such matters would either call for a great deal of redundant analysis on the
part of the litigants and the court, or otherwise result in the court simply rubber stamping
the arbitral decisions. Either result is undesirable and the latter may be unconstitutional.
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iii. Raising Due Process Concerns in the Instant Case
It is important to consider whether due process concerns
regarding arbitral class actions can only be raised in a subsequent
case, in which absent class members seek to assert their rights,45
or whether such concerns can be raised at the time the arbitral class
action is being heard. From a practical standpoint this question is
critical. If due process concerns can only be raised in a subsequent
proceeding, they may never be raised. As with other claims, many
due process claims may feasibly be made only if brought on a class
basis. Thus, once the initial class action is resolved, it may not be
feasible for absent class members to bring individual claims.
Several Supreme Court decisions provide that due process
concerns may be raised at the time of the initial proceeding. First,
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,45 the Court allowed defendant to
secure dismissal of a class action because the named plaintiff could
not afford to provide adequate notice to the absent class members.45 9
Second, in Phillips the Court explicitly held that the defendant had
standing to assert the due process concerns of the absent
plaintiffs,46 although it ultimately refused to dismiss the action for
lack of personal jurisdiction over the absent class members .461 Third,
Amchem and Ortiz both took note of due process concerns in voiding
settlements of class actions46 2 without insisting that challengers
wait to raise such concerns in a subsequent case.463 Thus, it seems
457. According to conventional terminology, this is the question of whether a due process
challenge may be asserted only in the "F2." case, or whether it may be raised in the "Fl."
action. See Monaghan, supra note 109, at 1149-50.
458. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
459. See id. at 161. Eisen did not explicitly address the question of whether a defendant
should have standing to raise this due process concern, but did permit the claim.
460. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985) ("Whether it wins or
loses on the merits, petitioner has a distinct and personal interest in seeing the entire
plaintiff class bound by res judicata just as petitioner is bound.").
461. See id. at 803-14.
462. Amchem recognized that constitutional concerns existed, but chose not to reach
them, rulinginstead onlyon statutory grounds. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591,628-29 (1997). Ortiz emphasized that mandatory class actions implicate the Due Process
Clause by purporting to bind those who do not directly participate in the suit and in fact have
no opportunity to opt out. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2314-15 (1999).
463. Rather, in Ortiz the Court approvingly cited Phillips for the proposition that "before
an absent class member's right of action [is extinguished] Due Process require[s] that the
member 'receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation.'"
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clear that in the context of a class action arbitration, either
defendants or objecting plaintiffs should be permitted to raise the
claim that the procedures do not adequately protect the due process
interests of absent class members. Moreover, courts should permit
objectors to raise such challenges in court on an interlocutory basis,
rather than requiring them to wait until the completion of the entire
arbitral class action. Requiring challengers to wait until the
completion of the entire class action would potentially cause
challengers, participants, and the court to incur substantial delay
and to waste time and resources. Purported class action arbitration
should not be permitted to proceed unless it adequately protects the
interests of the class members.4 4
iv. Agreeing to Arbitration Should Not Waive Due Process
Rights
Finally, some may suggest that, simply by agreeing to arbi-
tration, absent class members waive any due process right they may
have had in court. The argument fails at several levels. First, and
most importantly, waivers of constitutional rights may not be
inferred lightly,465 and at the very least must be clear.46 6 Thus,
Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting Phillips, 472 U.S. at 812). In both suits, the challenges to
the settlement were raised in the initial case by objecting class members. See Ortiz, 119 S.
Ct. at 2305-06 (noting that district court allowed objectors to intervene in the suit);Amchem,
521 U.S. at 605.
464. In all of the arbitral class actions about which I could obtain information, the court
preserved for itselfthe responsibility to make important decisions that would implicate due
process. See supra note 149.
465. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (stating "courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver," and holding that party's request for directed
verdict did not waive party's right to have jury resolve factual issues); see generally
Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 49-55 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that
address waiver of constitutional rights).
466. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding that contract for sale of stove
which permitted seller to repossess for nonpayment did not waive purchaser's due process
right to notice and hearing because it did not specify that retrieval would be without notice
and hearing); see also Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 364, at 1022 (arguing that
the knowledge and voluntariness of a waiver of due process rights "should be structured
according to the following three factors: (1) the visibility and clarity of the waiver agreement
on its face, (2) the general contractual environment in which the waiver was secured, and (3)
the specific facts and circumstances of the actual bargaining over the waiver"); Sternlight,
Rethinking, supra note 4, at 49 (arguing that waiver must be clear).
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unless an arbitration clause expressly provided that persons who
agreed to its terms were waiving their due process rights to be
protected by a court in the event of a class action, the arbitration
clause should not be interpreted to have such an effect. Certainly
few, if any, people would understand that their agreement to
arbitrate also served as a waiver of their constitutional rights
connected to the filing of a class action. Second, as I have argued
elsewhere, the Supreme Court's waiver cases involving other issues
use a more complex fact specific analysis to determine whether
waiver of a constitutional right should be found.467 Specifically, in
Fuentes v. Shevin468 and D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co." 9 the court
has implicitly adopted a four-factor balancing test for waiver calling
upon courts "to examine the visibility and clarity of the waiver itself,
the relative knowledge and economic power possessed by the parties,
the degree of voluntariness of the purported agreement, and the
substantive fairness of the purported agreement."47 ° Applying this
test, courts should find that when companies use contracts of
adhesion to impose binding arbitration on consumers and
employees, those consumers and employeds have not waived their
due process rights to be treated fairly in the event a class action is
filed on their behalf. Third, an argument can be made that the right
to proceed in court, rather than through arbitration, is
nonwaivable.47 In short, the due process interests of absent class
members cannot be ignored.
2. Likely Unpopularity of Classwide Arbitration
For the reasons set forth above, it is appropriate to allow parties
to choose classwide arbitration over class action litigation, subject
to statutory, contractual, and constitutional limitations. It is not at
all clear, however, that classwide arbitration will be a popular
467. See Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 56-69.
468. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (refusing to find waiver).
469.405 U.S. 174 (1972) (upholding a clear confession-of-judgment clause which was the
subject of lengthy negotiations by attorneys on behalf of two knowledgeable parties, and
which was provided in return for consideration).
470. Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 57-58.
471. See Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 364, at 1038-40 (suggesting that
persons might not be able to waive their rights to certain kinds of fair procedures).
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choice. First, if many companies have chosen arbitration over
litigation in order to avoid class actions altogether,472 those
companies may have little interest in a classwide arbitration
process. Second, given the due process protections that must be
employed in order for arbitral class actions to pass constitutional
muster, some companies may conclude that classwide arbitration
would be as undesirable as or perhaps even more undesirable than
classwide litigation.473 If a body of practice or law were to develop
that required substantial back-and-forth between judge and
arbitrators in working out the details of certification, notice,
adequacy of representation, and settlement approval, it might well
be that classwide arbitration would prove more burdensome and
time consuming than class action litigation.474 That is, the concerns
expressed by several courts and commentators as to the logistical
difficulties of the hybrid process 475 may cause the technique to be
unpopular. Third, because the technique of classwide arbitration is
relatively new and untried, it is inevitably somewhat unpredictable.
Companies and their attorneys may prefer to resolve their disputes
through the known quantity of class action litigation, rather than
risk a bad experience with the relatively unknown. As the SEC
pointed out, whereas courts have already developed a substantial
body of caselaw dealing with class actions, arbitrators would either
have to follow the court rules or create their own set of rules.476 Yet,
if the arbitrators choose to follow courts' rules, there seems to be
little reason to prefer classwide arbitration to class action litigation.
Attorneys' experiences with classwide arbitration, to date, support
the idea that classwide arbitration is not likely to be popular. As
might be expected, given the extensive role played by the judge in
each case, none of the attorneys interviewed found that classwide
arbitration held significant efficiency advantages over classwide
litigation.477 Instead, while the attorneys interviewed were generally
472. See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
473. 1 focus on the popularity of the technique among companies, rather than consumers,
because, as a practical matter, companies are the ones drafting arbitration clauses.
474. It is not clear whether this increased burden would be worse for companies or class
plaintiffs. Although in some types of litigation, defendants may use expense and slowness to
weaken the plaintiffs, plaintiffs' class action attorneys may be able to withstand and even
take advantage of such a lengthy process.
475. See supra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
476. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
477. See supra note 168.
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pleased with a version of the process in which judges maintained
control over the class action determinations, and arbitrators
ultimately decided the merits of the dispute, they typically viewed
the two processes as quite similar.47 Thus, while some companies
may draft arbitration clauses specifying that class actions must be
arbitrated, others may follow the lead of the securities industry and
opt for litigation of class action claims." 9
C. How Courts Should Interpret Various Arbitration Clauses
Some clauses purport to eliminate both litigated and arbitral class
actions. Courts should refuse to enforce such a clause when the
elimination of the class action remedy would explicitly violate a
relevant federal statute, would prevent plaintiff from obtaining
adequate relief under the statute, or would put plaintiff in an unfair
situation such that the contract should be held unconscionable or
violative of other contractual doctrines. However, absent any of
these circumstances, and absent viable arguments that others may
develop, courts should permit parties to opt not to proceed with class
actions.
Other clauses specify that class actions will be handled in
litigation, and that individual disputes will be handled through
arbitration. Courts should enforce both aspects of such a clause.4 80
There is no reason why parties should not be able to elect to resolve
some disputes through litigation, and others through arbitration.
Agreements along these lines have been used in the securities
industry for several years, and courts have been interpreting them
appropriately.
Finally, some clauses specify that class actions, as well as indi-
vidual claims, will be handled through arbitration. Such a clause
478. Although one defense attorney believed that it was sometimes advantageous to his
client to be able to pick an arbitral factfinder, rather than to depend on a judge or jury, he
did not suggest that this choice resulted in a substantial savings in time or money. Rather,
he hoped that the arbitrators might be more sympathetic to his client's position. He also
observed thatin other circumstances he would find the in-depth appellate review of litigation
more attractive. See Telephone Interview with Gordon Bosserman, attorney for defendant
in Blue Cross cases (Oct. 11, 1999).
479. One attorney reported that franchisor Southland had ceased to require arbitration
of class actions in its franchise agreements. See Telephone Interview with John F. Wells,
attorney for plaintiff in Keating (Sept. 29, 1999).
480. This assumes, of course, that no independent reasons exist for voiding the
agreement.
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will often be enforceable. In some situations, however, it may be
impermissible for the parties to resolve disputes through class
arbitration. Specifically, when, due to the inadequacies of the
particular classwide arbitration, the clause denies absent parties
their due process rights, violates a relevant statute, or is so unfair
as to be considered unconscionable, courts should refuse to mandate
class arbitration.
Currently, however, most arbitration agreements remain silent on
the issue: they require arbitration of a broad category of claims but
do not explicitly state whether disputes may be resolved in an
arbitral class action. While companies will likely soon begin to state
explicitly that disputes may not be resolved through class actions,
in the immediate future courts will be required to deal with the
silent clause. This Article has argued that when a clause is silent,
it is inappropriate for a court to assume that the parties meant to
eliminate the right to proceed by way of class action.481 Courts
should not, as some have done, simply apply the consolidation cases
to this new context without considering the distinctions between
consolidation and class action.482 Thus, a court has only three
conceivably legitimate choices in interpreting a silent clause: (1)
hold the class issue to be nonarbitrable, therefore allowing it to be
litigated; (2) order the dispute to be handled through classwide
arbitration (assuming the prerequisites for certification are met); or
(3) order the dispute to be arbitrated, and let the arbitrators
determine whether classwide arbitration should be allowed. The
choice is not easy, but the second option best protects all of the
relevant contractual and policy interests, 4' at least when no federal
statute or contractual doctrine prohibits classwide arbitration in the
particular setting.4s When the parties have agreed to a broad
arbitration clause, it is not appropriate to exclude an entire class of
disputes from arbitration, unless permitting class arbitration would
violate constitutional, statutory, or contractual interests. 485 As
481. See supra text accompanying notes 328-54.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 328-40.
483. This is the approach taken by the California courts, and by one Pennsylvania court.
See supra notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 360-419 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, it might be argued
that state statutes or additional constitutional arguments also bar classwide arbitration or
the entire elimination of class actions. See supra note 365.
485. For a discussion of the arguments supporting classwide arbitration even when
agreements are silent on the issue, see supra notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
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between the second and third options, it is preferable on due process
and policy grounds for the court, rather than the arbitrator, to
determine the permissibility of class actions.486
When courts, notwithstanding the arguments presented here,
interpret a silent contract to proscribe them from ordering a dispute
to be handled through classwide arbitration, they should at
minimum refrain from impermissibly interfering with arbitrators'
own determination to allow a classwide arbitration.487 Even if a
silent contract may be read to deny courts the authority to order
classwide arbitration, certainly such a contract should not be read
to allow a court to prohibit arbitrators from ordering classwide
arbitration. Then if, as is admittedly unlikely,48 the arbitrators
were to order classwide arbitration, the court should assist in at
least supervising certification, notice, and approval of any
settlement to ensure that the interests of absent class plaintiffs are
adequately protected.
IV. A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
As set out above, courts can adequately protect the policies
underlying both class actions and arbitration using existing case
law. Nonetheless, to the extent courts fail adequately to protect
consumers, employees, and others from companies' unfair attempts
to eliminate class actions, Congress should enact protective
legislation.
A. Legislation Precluding the Use of Arbitration Clauses to
Eliminate Class Actions
Legislation will be needed to prevent companies from using
binding arbitration clauses to eliminate class actions entirely, to the
extent we decide it would be undesirable to allow companies to
insulate themselves from class actions, and to the extent that courts
fail to accept the statutory and contractual arguments set out in this
486. See supra notes 441-56 and accompanying text.
487. A few courts have not only refused to certify a classwide arbitration, but have also
ordered arbitration to proceed on an individual basis. See supra note 346.
488. Few arbitrators are likely to order classwide arbitration on their own volition. See
supra note 137 (noting no record of such cases); supra note 340 (discussing why arbitrators
are not likely to order consolidated arbitration).
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Article or elsewhere. By allowing suits to be brought by small
claimants who otherwise could not afford to sue, the class action not
only protects the rights of those persons, but also facilitates
enforcement of laws passed by our legislatures. Potential defendants
should not be permitted to insulate themselves from liability in such
small cases simply by imposing an arbitration clause in a contract
of adhesion. While such defendants might seek to cloak themselves
in the rubric of freedom of contract, what they really are seeking is
freedom from statutory regulation.
Nor can such insulation from class action liability be justified by
the fact that class actions are controversial and have been under
attack recently. Some of these attacks, such as that class actions
may at times benefit the attorneys more than the class members,
may well be justified." 9 The solution to such problems, however, is
not to allow companies to entirely insulate themselves from liability
in small cases, but rather to attack any specific problems with class
actions more directly-through court disapproval of proposed
settlements,49 ° or perhaps even through rule changes or leg-
islation.491 One plaintiff-side organization, the National Association
of Consumer Advocates, has taken the need for reform seriously and
published Standards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling
Consumer Class Actions.492
Even if Congress and state legislatures were to determine that
class actions are an undesirable device, and should be entirely
489. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
490. See, e.g., Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 880-82 (7th Cir.
2000) (disapproving proposed class settlement in consumer suit on ground that settlement,
while providing benefits to named plaintiffs and class counsel, was not fair to absent class
members).
491. If class attorneys are not adequately representing the interests of class members, the
solution would seem to be improved court supervision of class settlements, rather than total
elimination of the class action. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 125, at 805-06 (arguing that
despite their risks, class actions must exist to counter problems such as transaction costs and
barriers to entry); Macey & Miller, supra note 125, at 3-118 (analyzing consequences of
divergent interests between plaintiffs and their class action attorneys); Lazos, supra note
125, at 308-32 (arguing that conflicts of interest between plaintiffs' attorneys and class
members calls for appointment of guardian to protect class members'interests); HENSLER ET
AL., supra note 1, at 31-35 (arguing that increasing judicial regulation of damages class
actions is the key to improving the balance between the good and the ill consequences of such
class actions, and urging judges to scrutinize proposed settlements more closely, and to
reward attorneys only for their actual services).
492. See Brian Wolfman, Forward: The National Association of Consumer Advocates'
Standards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling Class Actions, 176 F.R.D. 370, 370-74
(1998).
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eliminated, they should have the courage to make such a
determination explicit by, for example, eliminating the provision for
class actions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or comparable
state rules. Such a measure, while opposed by this author, would at
least put the real issue before the public, rather than allowing
putative defendants to achieve the result clandestinely through
arbitration clauses.493
If Congress does decide to act to prevent companies from using
arbitration to abolish the class action, it would need to think
carefully about how to structure such legislation. For example, it
might not be desirable to entirely eliminate parties' right to freely
waive their right to proceed by way of class action. At the extreme,
if two sophisticated companies, represented by counsel, knowingly
contract that they will never sue each other in a class action494
absent other special circumstances, it should not be voided on
statutory495 or contractual grounds. A workable but less extreme
statute might bar companies from using contracts of adhesion to
prevent persons from suing in a class action. Such a rule would
protect consumers and employees from unknowingly waiving their
right to sue in a class action, without preventing larger, more
sophisticated parties from knowingly reaching a similar agreement.
The California Supreme Court in Keating laid the foundation for
such an approach, by focusing on the defendant's troubling use of
adhesion contracts to require arbitration and to eliminate the class
action.496 Of course, approaching the issue in this manner would
493. Professor Christopher Drahozal has argued that because rational consumers or
others might well waive, their rights to class actions, concluding that their costs outweigh
their benefits, courts should notvoid such seemingly unfair clauses. See Drahozal, supra note
5, at 62-64. However, he fails to present any empirical datasupporting this claim, but instead
merely asserts a theoretical possibility. Moreover, the argument fails to account adequately
for significant economic and psychological phenomena including lack of information, lack of
perfect competition, overoptimism, and disparate treatment of'potential losses and potential
gains. See Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 68, at 686-93. Further, because no one can
plausibly assert that consumers are actually making an informed decision as to whether to
waive their opportunity to proceed by class action, it would be more honest to handle these
concerns legislatively than to pretend that consumers are voluntarily giving up the class
action.
494. Although sophisticated companies typically do not sue one another in class actions,
such a scenario is not entirely impossible to imagine. For example, a class ofdistributorships
might choose to sue a manufacturer or a dealer in a class action.
495. The exception would be if a relevant substantive statute explicitly barred such a
waiver.
496. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982) (observing that allowing
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require the drafters to define "contracts of adhesion," but this does
not seem to be an insurmountable obstacle. 97
Alternatively, Congress might attempt to bar the elimination of
class actions in those cases where plaintiffs have no feasible
alternative by which to present their claim. Such a statute would
more narrowly address the particular situation that seems most
troubling: elimination of plaintiffs' only viable way of preventing
their claims. The drafting and enforcement of such a provision,
however, might prove unworkable. It is hard to imagine how a
statute could define clearly those situations in which class actions
are logistically necessary to permit enforcement of a claim.
B. Legislation Precluding the Use of Classwide Arbitration
Existing law permits parties to select classwide arbitration over
class action litigation, subject to statutory, contractual, and
constitutional constraints. Given the inherent problems with
classwide arbitration, however, Congress may conclude it would be
desirable to prohibit use of the technique.
As discussed earlier, the various self-regulated securities
organizations and the Securities and Exchange Commission have
rejected the use of classwide arbitration in the securities context,
concluding that the technique was undesirable for logistical
reasons.49 Therefore, class action claims against brokerages are
litigated, and individual claims are arbitrated.499 This dual system,
which has been in place since 1992, appears to be working
companies to use adhesion contracts to eliminate class actions would chill effective protection
of common interests, foreclose many individual claims, and protect the drafter against
liability;, and noting that such a practice "may well be oppressive and may defeat the
expectations of the nondrafting party").
497. One piece of pending legislation, the Consumer Fairness Act of 1999, H.R. 2258
106th Cong., takes on a broader but related definitional task. Its goal is "[t]o treat arbitration
clauses which are unilaterally imposed on consumers as an unfair and deceptive trade
practice and prohibit their use in consumer transactions, and for other purposes." Id. To
achieve this end the bill defines "consumer transaction" as "the sale or rental of goods,
services, or real property, including an extension of credit or the provision of any other
financial product or service, to an individual in a transaction entered into primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes." Id. § 1002.
498. See supra text accompanying notes 169-78. Some also urged that classwide
arbitration was undesirable because arbitrators could not adequately protect the due process
interests of absent class members or that arbitrators lacked the requisite expertise to decide
class action issues. See supra text accompanying notes 176-78.
499. See supra text accompanying notes 169-78.
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smoothly. 0 Despite the fear that a rule prohibiting arbitration of
class action claims creates a major loophole in the general
requirement of arbitration of individual claims,0 1 this apparently
has not occurred.
50 2
Thus, Congress might also determine that class action arbitration
is simply an unworkable idea, and might choose to prohibit parties
from electing that dispute resolution process in lieu of class action
litigation. Congress might conclude that such legislation is desirable
to protect the interests of absent class members and to decrease the
workload of the courts. Supervision of class action arbitrations may
well prove even more burdensome for the courts than handling class
action litigation. However, while this author is skeptical as to the
merits of arbitral class actions, Congress should not hurry to pass
such legislation. Rather, Congress should allow further experience
with the technique and refrain from outlawing classwide arbitration
until more information is available as to its realistic workability.
Thus far, while none of the participants in classwide arbitration has
raved about its advantages over litigation, neither have they harshly
criticized the technique.0 '
CONCLUSION
As arbitration meets the class action, one thing seems clear:
companies should not be permitted to use arbitration clauses as a
stealth weapon or Trojan horse50' to preclude plaintiff class actions
in both the litigation and arbitration arenas. If companies believe
the class action device is being abused and ought to be eliminated,
they are free to seek such legislative reform. They should not,
however, be permitted to use contracts of adhesion to eliminate class
500. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. Indeed, while the system has not been
modified, there does not appear to be a widespread call for change.
501. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
502. It is quite likely that the great expense and logistical complexities of class action
litigation deter plaintiffs and their attorneys from filing class suits solely to evade an
arbitration clause.
503. Instead, participants seem to agree that the technique works fairly well, at least so
long as the court continues to do all the major tasks associated with class actions. See supra
notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
504. I credit Professor Katsoris for the Trojan horse metaphor. See Constantine N.
Katsoris, Riding the Trojan Horse Back to Wilko? SEC. ARE. COMMENTATOR, July 1999, at
1, 3 (arguing that securities brokerages should not be permitted to use arbitration clauses
to prevent customers from recovering punitive damages).
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actions on a wholesale basis. When companies attempt to do so, they
should be stopped, at least to the extent that the elimination of the
class action deprives plaintiffs of statutory rights or results in a
contract that is unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. If courts
do not begin to step in to prevent companies from eliminating the
class action, Congress should legislate to defend this important
procedural device which has helped to achieve so many important
and just results.
Some of the other legal and policy issues raised by the clash
between mandatory binding arbitration and class action are more
complex. This Article concludes that the hybrid arbitral class action
should be permitted, but only so long as courts maintain sufficient
involvement to protect the due process rights of absent class
members. Given the rarity with which classwide arbitrations have
been employed, it is somewhat difficult to conceptualize precisely
how the interplay between courts and arbitrators should work, and
what protections must be utilized to comply with due process. To
date, however, it seems that courts have chosen to retain all of their
usual class action responsibilities, including definition of the class,
notification of absent class members, and approval of settlements.
This seems to be the wisest way to proceed in order to ensure that
the due process rights of absent class members are protected.
Some questions regarding how arbitral class actions ought to be
handled may soon become moot. If courts begin to conclude that
statutory and contractual doctrines often prevent companies from
entirely evading the class action, it may become clear that the
disputes over the permissibility of classwide arbitration were just a
decoy. That is, it may become obvious that the fight over the
permissibility of classwide arbitration has distracted observers from
the companies' true goal: total evisceration of consumer and
employment class actions. This author predicts that, as courts begin
to reject defendants' attempts to eliminate class actions altogether,
it will become evident that the hybrid of classwide arbitration has
few advocates. Rather, defendants, plaintiffs, and society as a whole,
likely will adopt the securities industry's conclusion that class
actions are most efficiently and justly handled through litigation.
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